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This dissertation analyzes tense, in particular the past tense, within English in the framework of 
formal semantics. Previous tense theories are either indexical or quantificational—whether tens-
es refer to time or an existentially quantified time interval prior to the time of utterance suffices 
for a past tense morpheme. This dissertation proposes that tense has both interpretations, definite 
and indefinite, and which interpretation a tense has depends on whether tense denotes salient 
times in the context. Tense involves a free variable over times and is assigned its value via an 
assignment function. Two different readings are achieved by two different types of assignment 
function: an assignment function fixed by the context assigns salient times to definite tenses, and 
another type of assignment function for indefinite tenses, which agrees with the function fixed by 
the context.    
 In a discourse, times denoted by tenses and temporal adverbials are added to the context 
as salient. There may be multiple time intervals that are contextually salient, and these are avail-
able for the interpretation of subsequent temporal elements. That is, they may work as an ante-
cedent of anaphoric adverbials, be assigned to definite tenses, or possibly, be involved in com-
plex tenses without further proposing a fourth time, as some previous theories have done. The 
system in this dissertation, with both definite and indefinite interpretations of tense, successfully 
accounts for some dynamic temporal phenomena without overlooking either quantificational or 
indexical aspects of tense. Also, this dissertation affirms that tenses are interpreted within a lim-
ited domain and shows how temporal domains are selected and shifted in discourse. Temporal 
adverbials are analyzed as well and some previously raised problems are solved in the analysis. 
Immediately is also investigated, which shows sensitivity to the size of relevant temporal do-
mains and characterizes the interval between the two events it connects.   
 This dissertation presumes that tense is contextual and relationally determined by time 
intervals in the context. Contentious ideas in previous tense theories are unified in this disserta-
tion with regard to definiteness, which has been a more robust concept for nominals, and such a 
framework makes a tense theory more flexible and comprehensive. This theory provides novel 
intuitions about various temporal phenomena in a discourse, which are contextually and prag-
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1.1 How Does Language Encode Time?   
How do people perceive time? How does language, which is said to be the essence of humanity, 
encode time and express unfolding states and affairs bound by time? Such questions have fasci-
nated many philosophers and logicians since Aristotle. Tense is a grammatical phenomenon that 
relates time and propositions. Comrie (1985: 9) asserts that tense is “a grammaticalised location 
in time,” most often with respect to the time of utterance.1 Basically, we start from “now,” the 
time of utterance, and use different tenses depending on whether the time associated with the 
tense is before, simultaneous with, or after the “now” time. Not all languages have these three 
tenses. Some languages have a dichotomy between past and non-past, and some languages do not 
even mark tenses grammatically. This dissertation aims to present an accurate analysis of tense, 
mostly the simple past tense, or preterit.  
 One of the many threads of tense discussion throughout history has been to classify tens-
es into definite and indefinite ones (Binnick 1991). In the 1700s, Bishop Lowth (1762) proposed 
a taxonomy of tenses, as shown in (1) (Binnick 1991: 45-46). To Lowth, indefinite tenses were 
those which had no aspect marked, or, in modern terms, simple tenses. His classification was in-
fluenced by the Stoic tense system. (2) shows Holt’s (1943) interpretation of the Stoic system of 
Greek tenses, in which indefinite means that aspect is undetermined (Binnick 1991: 23). In such 
terms, future and aorist are classified as indefinite tenses; everything else is definite.2   
 
     (1) Lowth’s (1762) taxonomy of English tenses: 
           a. Indefinite (undetermined): present (love), past (loved), future (shall love) 
           b. Definite (determined): present imperfect (am loving), present perfect (have loved), past 
               imperfect (was loving), past perfect (had loved), future imperfect (shall be loving),  
    future perfect (shall have loved)  
                                                            
1 On the contrary, in the same book, Comrie says that aspect deals with “different ways of viewing the internal tem-
poral constituency of a situation,” which is outside the scope of this dissertation.  




     (2) Holt’s interpretation of the Stoic tense classification:  





In this long history of tense classification, grammarians have used these terms definite 
and indefinite in many different ways. The sense of definite- and indefiniteness of tense suggest-
ed by Pickbourn, as cited by Binnick (1991), is as follows: “[an indefinite tense …] cannot be 
used in ascertaining the precise time of an individual action … and a definite tense … is capable 
of being applied to that purpose.” In other words, an indefinite tense does not select a specific 
time interval in the interpretation, while a definite tense does.  
 In modern day formal semantics, many researchers have been arguing that tenses are re-
ferring expressions like pronouns. The distinction I will make between definite and indefinite 
readings of tense is also relevant to that of definite and indefinite determiner phrases (DPs). Thus, 
in Pickbourn’s terms and based on the meaning of (in)definite we use for DPs, intuitive readings 
of the simple past may be expressed as in (3). An indefinite view of tense is aligned with existen-
tial quantification over times, which was advocated by Montague (1973), Dowty (1979, 1982), 
and Ogihara (1989, 1996). On the other hand, the more recent perspective, as pointed out by 
Binnick, that simple past denotes a particular time interval, is a referential analysis wherein tense 
morphemes are treated as a pronoun. This position has been supported by Partee (1973), Enç 
(1981, 1986), Kratzer (1998), and others. 
 
     (3) Intuitive readings of the simple past for a sentence : 
          a. Indefinite: There is a time t such that  is true. 
          b. Definite: At the designated time t,  is true. 
 
Let’s take Partee’s famous sentence (4a) as an example. This sentence is often mentioned 
as a counterexample to quantificational analyses. As she argues, it seems to accord with the defi-
nite reading of the simple past tense: the speaker would have in mind a particular moment in the 
 Definite tenses Indefinite tenses 
 Extended Complete  
Present/future present perfect future 
Past imperfect pluperfect aorist 
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past at which she did not complete the action of turning off the stove, and if at this particular in-
terval the speaker did not turn off the stove, then the sentence is true. Let us consider more ordi-
nary sentences—those without negations—typical declarative past tense sentences, such as (4b). 
Of course, the speaker could pick out the exact time at which John took the garbage out if she 
was with John, checking the exact time when John was taking out the garbage. However, even 
though the speaker realizes that the garbage can is empty after she returned home from running 
errands, (and therefore, not knowing the exact time of the event), if some time interval in which 
the described event occurred exists and John took out the garbage at some time in the past, the 
sentence still holds true. John’s action of taking out the garbage does not have to occur at a par-
ticular time in the past known to the speaker, as long as there exists a time in the past at which 
the event occurred.  
 
     (4) a. I didn’t turn off the stove. 
           b. John took out the garbage.  
 
However, this does not seem to paint the whole picture. Take (5) as an example. The 
speaker is describing a single accident using two different verb phrases (VPs), whose tenses de-
note the same time. The first tense may be eligible for an indefinite reading, but not for bit—its 
tense refers to a time that is already quite salient in the context and hardly invokes indefiniteness. 
Another example in (6) presents a question-answer pair. It may be that the tense used in (6a) is 
still indefinite, even though the interlocutors are discussing the contextually salient party; how-
ever, the tense in (6b) cannot denote a completely random time in the past since it is clearly ana-
phoric to the tense used in (6a). Examples (4)-(6) cannot be accounted for with only one type of 
assumption. Though we find both kinds of examples, I have not witnessed an analysis that in-
cludes indefinite and definite interpretations of tense. Many tense theories take one stance and 
only discuss the possibility of the other interpretation. Besides, tense interpretation depends 
heavily on context, but so far the role that the context plays in tense interpretation has not been 
explicitly examined.        
 
     (5) I got one tiny scar right there. That’s where a raccoon bit me. 
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     (6) a. Did you go to the party? 
           b. Yes, I did.  
 
Therefore, in this dissertation, I propose an analysis that investigates the context sensitivi-
ty of tense in more detail, encompassing indefinite and definite uses of tense within the frame-
work of formal semantics. In my analysis, an indefinite tense introduces a free variable that is 
used over times and is bound by existential closure, and thus is existentially quantified. I will al-
so appeal to domain restriction or domain anchoring, in which the context plays a role in provid-
ing a pragmatically limited domain for the interpretation of tense. When the context provides a 
salient time interval, we have a definite tense whose value is fixed by the context. On their own, 
neither stance can account for tense phenomena. I intend to present a descriptively and theoreti-
cally coherent analysis of tense unifying both interpretations of tense.  
While it seems plausible to account for both indefinite and definite readings for the sim-
ple past in a single system, we now ask how definite interpretations are distinguished from indef-
inite ones, especially when English does not morphologically mark definite vs. indefinite past, 
unlike English DPs. I briefly discuss some languages that lack articles and therefore do not overt-
ly mark definiteness of DPs. Given the lack of articles in those languages, it is not an absurd con-
jecture to state that the definiteness of tense may also be covertly marked, and determined by the 
context, as observed in other languages in a “parallel” domain.     
Now, let us return to this ambitious and challenging question: how does language encode 
time? Profound ontological reflection about time would be outside the scope of this dissertation; 
how language users process time and how temporal structure is formed in their mind are fasci-
nating questions, but not the ones to be addressed here. This dissertation may be placed some-
where in the middle of the two fields of study, with a clear focus on the structure of grammar in 
the framework of formal semantics. It is my intention that this dissertation provides some clue to 
these intriguing but vast questions. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Premises       
In this dissertation I propose a formal semantic theory, that is truth-conditional and composition-
al (Frege 1892; Montague 1970, 1973; Gamut 1991). We use 	  to represent denotations of ex-
pressions and use letters of the Greek alphabet as variables over linguistic expressions, following 
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the practice in formal semantics. For any expression α, α w is the denotation of α relative to 
world w. Declarative sentences denote either truth (= 1) or falsity (= 0). Commonly known logi-
cal connectives and brackets are also used in this dissertation. For example, in a simple formal 
language, (7a) may be represented as (7b) where t is a variable over times.   
 
     (7) a. John smiles. 
           b. t[smile(j,t)] 
 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews some theories of tense from both 
sides discussed above, quantificational and referential, which are meaningful and commonly dis-
cussed in formal semantics literature. After we review the gist of the selected analyses and some 
challenges they face, we will close the chapter with a conclusion that a proper tense theory 
should account for both indefinite and definite uses of tense, with advantages for both types of 
theory. 
 Chapter 3 presents my analysis of tense, integrating quantificational and indexical aspects 
of tense. To have a better idea of what we mean by an indexical or a definite tense, we will first 
discuss definite descriptions and see how we connect definiteness as characterized in one domain 
of grammar to definiteness/indexicality of tense, which is another domain of grammar. This ex-
ploration will provide grounds for expanding parallelism between tense and pronouns to the 
realm of tense and nominals. This parallelism between nominals and tense as proposed in this 
dissertation will not only be based on anaphora resolution, but also comes from definite readings 
of tenses associated with contextually salient time intervals, without any obvious antecedent in 
previous discourse. Different types of assignment function, one fixed by the context, the other in 
agreement with the assignment which is fixed by the context, will account for these definite and 
indefinite interpretations of tense. 
 Based on the grammar established in Chapter 3, in which indefinite and definite uses of 
tense are allowed, the following two chapters will explore how this phenomenon is at work spe-
cifically and how other temporal elements work within such a grammar. Chapter 4 deals with 
temporal anaphora and temporal phenomena in a larger protion of sentences. We will see how 
limited temporal domains are selected and shifted within a discourse, and how contextually sali-
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ent times and other pragmatic assumptions contribute to this process. Multiple time intervals, 
which are highlighted as salient, will be available for complex tense interpretation.   
Temporal adverbials are investigated in Chapter 5. We will begin with temporal locating 
adverbials. The presence of a time adverbial within a sentence raises a problem of how the bare 
tense should be consistently interpreted—that is, whether or not there is a time adverbial. I will 
present an analysis that solves this problem; further, I will assert that temporal adverbials restrict 
the context, so that the tense morpheme may be interpreted in a more restricted domain. Also, we 
will see how different types of temporal locating adverbials contribute in different ways to the 
context. We will save a section for immediately, which not only makes reference to the relevant 
time interval involved in its interpretation, but also shows sensitivity to its size. Lastly, I will 












I’ve made a connection in the Introduction, namely, that the distinction between indefinite and 
definite tenses in earlier times is analogous to the more recent debate about tense being quantifi-
cational or referential/indexical in formal semantics. In this chapter, we will review some of 
those theories of the nature of tense and tense interpretation—both quantificational and indexical 
approaches—along with their issues and problems. I will also present some arguments for exis-
tential quantification over times, which I hope will lead us to the position that it is the default 
mechanism for tense interpretation; nevertheless, the indexical property of tense cannot be totally 
discarded, based on empirical grounds. A proposal that both quantificational and indexical com-
ponents are indispensable for tense semantics will conclude this chapter. In a way, the finding in 
this chapter implies that neither approach deserves to be completely recanted or retained. Before 
we jump into these contentious positions, with hopefully, a reasonable amount of formal details, 
Reichenbach’s idea will be reviewed first, as it has been the underlying theme of many recent 
analyses of tense.  
 
2.1 Reichenbach (1947) 
Among varied perspectives from which Reichenbach’s (1947) idea may be summarized, I would 
like to begin by pointing out that he defined tenses in terms of relations between time intervals. 
Reichenbach makes references to particular points of time and explains various tenses and as-
pects in terms of the relationship of those time parameters. The three points of importance in his 
analysis are the point of speech (S), the point of reference (R), and the point of event (E). The 
point of speech refers to the time point at which the sentence is uttered, the point of the event is 
the time when an action takes place, and the point of reference is the time point in which the 
event is interpreted—which is determined by the context or the progression of the narrative. For 
example, in the past perfect sentence presented in (1), the point of reference is ‘last Wednesday’, 
which precedes the point of speech; and the point of event is when John completed the project, 




     (1) Last Wednesday, John had completed the project. 
 
 These main time points are specified with respect to another time point, usually the point 
of speech, and relationally determined tenses and aspects (p. 288). Tenses and aspects in English, 
according to the combinations of the time parameters, are summarized in (2), where “,” indicates 
simultaneity and “—” precedence. Main tenses—simple past, present and future—are deter-
mined in terms of the relationship between the point of speech and the point of reference. If the 
point of reference occurs before the point of speech, we have past tense (2b); simultaneous with 
the point of speech, simple present (2g); after the point of speech, simple future (2l). In the case 
of simple tenses, the point of reference is simultaneous with the point of event (E, R); hence, it is 
equivalent to say that we have simple past when the point of the event occurs before the point of 
speech, simple present when the point of event is simultaneous with the point of speech, and 
simple future when the point of event takes place after the point of speech.  
 
     (2) Reichenbach’s tense representations (p. 297): 
   Structure   New Name         Traditional Name 
           a. E—R—S Anterior past  Past perfect 
           b. E, R—S Simple past  Simple past 
           c. R—E—S Posterior past          — 
           d. R—S, E Posterior past          — 
           e. R—S—E Posterior past          — 
           f. E—S, R Anterior present Present perfect 
           g. S, R, E Simple present Present 
           h. S, R—E Posterior present Simple future 
           i. S—E—R Anterior future Future perfect 
           j. S, E—R Anterior future Future perfect 
           k. E— S—R Anterior future Future perfect 
           l. S—R, E Simple future  Simple future 




The future tense, according to Reichenbach, is ambiguous, (2h) and (2l), one of the devia-
tions of his system as he calls it. Sentences in (3) are in future tense, but one of them has now, 
which is present, and the other tomorrow, which is future (p. 295). According to Reichenbach, 
adverbials are referred to as the point of reference, not to the point of event.3 Now coincides with 
S, and thus R coincides with S; tomorrow follows now, and thus R follows S and coincides with E. 
Since neither one is more prevalently used, Reichenbach claims that both options are retained for 
simple future. 
 
     (3) a. Now I shall go. (S, R—E) 
           b. I shall go tomorrow. (S—R, E) 
 
Six tenses combined with the perfect aspect in English are diagrammed in (4) (p. 290). 
As you can see in (4) and (2), the reference time (R) serves a more important role in determining 
the perfect tenses. In past perfect, present perfect, and future perfect, the point of event (E) al-
ways precedes the point of reference (R), which is not the case in simple tenses. Namely, the es-
sence of the perfective aspect is well represented, in that the event of interest has already taken 
place at some point prior to a particular time (R) of some importance in the discourse or in the 
context.4  
                                                            
3 Normally, temporal adverbials are anchored to the reference time. That is one way of explaining why these sen-
tences (i) and (ii) are ungrammatical. The reference time of (i) is present and the reference time of (ii) is past, and 
thus the adverbials are a mismatch for each sentence:  i. *John has arrived yesterday. 
      ii. *John arrived now.  
However, temporal adverbials seem to be able to anchor to the event time as well. In (iii) and (iv), it is a possible 
reading that John arrives at 3, in which case at 3 anchors to the event time. When the adverbial anchors to the refer-
ence time, we have a reading that John arrives some time before 3, either in the past or in the future depending on 
the tense: iii. John will have arrived at 3. 
   iv. John had arrived at 3.  
 
4 Interestingly, the progressive aspect is represented by an extended point of event (E). The progressive in each tense 
in English is illustrated below (p. 290):  
  Past, Perfect, Extended  Simple Past, Extended  Present Perfect, Extended 
I had been seeing John      I was seeing John   I have been seeing John 
 
   
 
Present, Extended  Simple Future, Extended  Future Perfect, Extended 




             |        | 
    E          R         S 
                     | 
      R,E                S 
                     | 
          E              S,R 
            |         
              S,R 
E       |             
     S,R           E    
    |                | 




     (4) a.  Past Perfect              b. Simple Past  c. Present Perfect 
   I had seen John.  I saw John.     I have seen John. 
                                                           
 
           d.  Present       e. Simple Future  f. Future Perfect 




Reichenbach’s analysis has a few advantages, especially when compared to an operator 
system. If the sentence I saw John is represented with a past tense operator P, we will have (5a); 
to represent the past perfect, we would have to iterate the operator as you see in (5b). This arbi-
trary iteration of operators is not necessary in Reichenbach’s system. Also, his system draws a 
clear semantic difference between past and present perfect. As you will see in more detail in the 
next section, a classic operator theory would represent past and present perfect with the same op-
erator (either P or H), which does not satisfactorily reflect the difference between past and pre-
sent perfect in natural language use. On the contrary, Reichenbach distinguishes between past 
and present perfect by employing different positioning of the reference time (R), as shown in (4b) 
and (4c).  
 
     (5) a. P(I see John) 
           b. PP(I see John)      
 
Ogihara (1989, 1996) characterizes Reichenbach’s system as compositional, in that vari-
ous combinations of tenses and aspects are represented individually in accordance with different 
relationships, between S and R/E and R. Modal auxiliaries, tenses, and perfect may be combined 
in various and constrained ways in English and such morphosyntactic combinations correspond 
to appropriate sequences of time parameters at the semantic level. Based on this critique on com-
positionality, Ogihara takes a step further and points out a problem with Reichenbach’s system: 
Reichenbach’s structure does not exhibit the syntactic composition of will (present tense + woll) 
   |       |        | 
  E     R       S 
     |            | 
  R,E         S 
   |             | 
  E          S,R 
          |       
      S,R,E     
    |            | 
 S,R         E 
  |        |        | 
 S       E      R        
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and would (past tense + woll). A quite complex case, for which the three time parameters of 
Reichenbach cannot account, is presented in (6). The italicized part of (6) is a subordinate clause 
in a complex sentence whose main tense is past and which contains the combination of would 
and the present perfect. The problem is that while perfect specifies that the event time precedes 
the reference time (E < R), would specifies the contradictory order R < E; what would indicates 
in terms of the relationship between the time parameters is supposedly that, according to Ogihara, 
the event time (E) occurs later than some point (R) in the past. To resolve this problem, Ogihara 
proposes the fourth time point, the Quasi-reference point (QRpt), which is revised as the refer-
ence time for a modal verb (RM, not the reference time for a tense morpheme, which is RT) in 
his later work (1996). Of course, his famous Sequence-of-Tense analysis is built up from this 
structure later in his system.5   
 
     (6) John and Bill were talking about the July 28th deadline for the submission of dissertations. 
           John said that Mary would have finished hers a month before that.        (Ogihara 1989: 36) 
 
If you construe Reichenbach’s analysis as one using three time parameters, you will find 
a copious number of implementations of this idea, either thorough or rough. The gist of the 
Reichenbachian system, that tenses are determined in terms of the relationship between particu-
lar time points, is retained in Klein (1994), among others. As Klein summarizes, “Tenses are 
grammaticalised temporal relations” (p. 120). Only, Klein did not agree with having the refer-
ence time as the third time; he claimed that the reference time is vacuous and rather vague, and 
that it cannot be completely identified with either the time of other event in a discourse or the 
time pointed out by a temporal adverbial (pp. 25-26). Instead, he proposed the topic time (TT, 
which Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (2005, 2007) call the assertion time) as the third time. 
TT is “the time for which a claim is made” or “the time span to which the speaker’s claim is con-
fined” (pp. 3-6). For example, the event time (or the time of situation in Klein’s terms) in (7a) is 
the time during which the light was on, which precedes the time of utterance. The topic time of 
(7a) becomes more understandable if you think of it as an answer to (7b): simply put, the topic 
time for (7a) would be the time at which the hearer looked into the room. The question would be 
                                                            
5 In referring to adding another time index, Dowty (1982) proposed the quasi-speech time in addition to the two time 
parameters—the speech time and the reference time—in his analysis in order to account for embedded sentences 
under future tense. More detail will come in the next section on Dowty’s analyses.  
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whether the light was on at the time of interest of the interlocutors, not the entire duration of the 
light being on. If the light is on at the topic time, the sentence is true; and since it is a past-tensed 
sentence, the topic time precedes the utterance time.   
 
     (7) a. The light was on.   
           b. What did you notice when you looked into the room?  (Klein 1994: 2-4) 
 
The topic time of Klein, however, does not seem, in tis function, different to me from the 
Reichenbachian notion of reference time. Klein’s words that define topic time might be clearer 
and more constrained, but the times referred to as the topic time in discourses are the same times 
picked out as the reference time. For instance, in (8) from Klein (1994: 40), the TT is fixed by 
the when-clause in the question. However, Reichenbach would choose the same time at which 
the addressee enters the room as the reference time. Unless the TT is fixed by a when-clause or 
an adverbial, its concept is still vague as well.  
 
     (8)  What did you notice when you entered the room? 
 
Moreover, Klein basically makes the same claims about the relationships between the 
time parameters that determine tenses and aspects, though these are not the only claims about the 
definition of tenses and aspects. (9) stipulates the relation between the TT and the TU for simple 
tenses and the relation between the TT and the TSit; and in Reichenbachian terms, (9a) and (9b) 
amount to saying that tense concerns the relation between the reference time and the speech time, 
and aspect concerns the relation between the reference time and the event time, which was al-
ready made clear above.   
 
     (9) a. Tense concerns the relation between TT and TU (time of utterance). 
           b. Aspect concerns the relation between TT and TSit (time of situation)—the way, or  
   sometimes ways, in which some situation is hooked up to some TT.  (Klein 1994: 6) 
 
 Whether you use the reference time or the topic time for this third time parameter, there 
seems to exist some conceptually substantive time in a speaker’s mind, which is necessarily in-
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volved in the determination of tenses and aspects. Time intervals picked out by when-clauses or 
temporal adverbials will come up again as a temporal domain in Chapter 4. A more faithful im-
plementation of the Reichenbachian system would be found in Nerbonne (1986). Demirdache 
and Uribe-Etxebarria (2005, 2007) use the time parameters suggested by Klein and propose the 
syntax of tenses and aspects in relational terms.     
 
2.2 Quantificational Theories of Tense 
What is more significantly contentious in tense discussion in formal semantics is whether tense 
contains a quantificational or indexical interpretation. In this section we will first review a few 
significant analyses, which assume (or are equivalent to) existential quantification over times. I 
would like to begin with Prior’s (1967) operator system, which provided a logical basis for more 
recent quantificational theories of tense semantics.   
 
2.2.1 Prior (1967) and Montague (1973) 
Prior’s (1967) semantics of tense treats tense as a sentential operator. For example, let us say that 
the sentence John runs a marathon corresponds to φ; if this proposition occurs in the past tense, 
that is, John ran a marathon, it is now represented as Pφ. Likewise, for φ in the future tense, Pri-
or used another operator, F. These operators are defined in (10).  
 
     (10) a. Pφ is true iff it has been the case that φ. 
  b. Fφ is true iff it will be the case that φ. 
 
Though it is intuitive, the Priorian tense system has faced some challenges. As briefly 
mentioned above, an operator system does not distinguish the preterit and the perfect as both 
tenses are represented by a single operator, P. The behavior of preterit and perfect, however, is 
different, particularly with temporal adverbials. Adverbials that denote time intervals in the past 
occur with the preterit, but those that are relevant to the present occur with present perfect. For 
example, (11a) is good, but (11b) is not; (11c) is odd, but (11d) is not, as time intervals denoted 
by since 1999 include those in the present as well.   
 
      (11) a. Last Friday, John ran a marathon. 
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              b. #Last Friday, John has run a marathon.  
              c. #John played the cello here since 1999. 
              d. John has played the cello here since 1999. 
 
Another problem with regard to operators comes from the fact that this system would it-
erate tense operators to mark complex tenses like past perfect and future perfect. As shown in 
(12a), past perfect would be represented with iterated operators PP. But what is observed in natu-
ral language is slightly different: strictly speaking, there is one tense per clause, and as can be 
seen in (12a), an additional tense(-like) morpheme indicates aspectual subtleties of the given 
event. There is the interesting example of stacking tense morphemes in Korean: (12b) shows a 
case in which the past suffix -ess is repeated three times with some additional pragmatic effect. 
This is not often found, but not impossible, especially in informal contexts. Notice, however, that 
this is the upper limit on the number of occurrences of -ess in a clause without a facetious tone, 
and that it is unnatural to observe that all three of those suffixes serve purely temporal purposes 
even though they have morphologically identical forms. Shin (1988) points out that the suffix -
ess has an aspectual meaning of discontinuity and each suffix has a different semantic scope.     
 
      (12) a. John had run a marathon: PP[run-a-marathon(J)] 
              b. John-i    marathon-ul  hay-(e)ss   -ess  -ess  -ta 
                       Nom               Acc  do    Past  Past  Past  Dec 
                  ‘John had run a marathon.’6 
 
Also, the operator system has scope-induced problems when tense operators interact with 
negation and/or a time adverb which introduces another operator. Partee’s example, I didn’t turn 
off the stove as uttered, for example, in a car to a friend about what happened immediately before 
the speaker departed for the current outing, clearly shows a bad interaction between a tense oper-
ator and negation. The two possible interpretations of the sentence are stated in (13) below. (13a) 
would be true if there is any time in the past during which the speaker did not turn off the stove; 
(13b) tells us that not even once in the past did the speaker turn off the stove. However, what we 
understand is that the speaker did not turn off the stove at some time in the past—specifically,  
                                                            
6 Nom indicates a nominative marker, Acc an accusative, and Dec a declarative.  
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close to the time she left home. This problem still holds if you change the operator in (13) to the 
existential quantifier in (14). Due to this faulty interaction, Partee (1973) suggests that tenses re-
fer to a specific point of time like pronouns, rather than being existentially quantified. This in-
dexical or referential approach, with which Enç (1986, 1987) and others concur, will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
     (13) a. P(I turn off the stove) 
  b. P(I turn off the stove) 
 
     (14) a. t [t precedes the time of utterance  [I turn off the stove]] 
  b. t [t precedes the time of utterance  I turn off the stove] 
 
A more serious problem arises with temporal adverbials, a problem which in the literature 
has been dubbed the adverbial scope paradox. Consider the sentence φ, John gave a speech yes-
terday: the interval at which John gave a speech falls within the time frame denoted by yesterday. 
Under an operator system, as yesterday introduces a new temporal operator Y, for example, to 
the sentence φ, which means it was yesterday that φ, we now have two options for interpreting 
the sentence, as presented in (15). Roughly, (15a) says that it is true in the past that it was yester-
day (or the day before) that John gave a speech, and (15b) says that it is true that it was yesterday 
that in the past that John gave a speech. Either way, they place the time interval at which the 
event took place at some point even before yesterday, which is the day before the day containing 
the time of utterance. And of course this is not the desired reading. To solve this problem, a 
Priorian tense logic would suggest that we only keep the operator introduced by yesterday and 
eliminate P, introduced by the past tense. Such an approach, however, does not provide a compo-
sitional explanation, since the past tense and the temporal adverb are analyzed as a single unit, as 
if the past tense is no longer effective, given the presence of the temporal adverb.   
 
     (15) a. PY[give-a-speech(J)] 




There are two more examples that an operator system cannot explain. The examples in 
(16) are discussed in Kamp (1971) and repeated in Ogihara (1989, 1996) and Binnick (1991). 
Priorian tense logic may explain (16a) as in (16c): when F is under the scope of P, will could turn 
into would. But it cannot explain the embedded future in (16b): the time at which this child be-
comes king is later than the time of utterance, outside the scope of the past, and the child is not 
king yet while (16b) is being uttered. These complications are presented by complex tense-
under-tense structures, which have posed some challenges to other approaches as well. Ogihara 
(1989) proposed his tense deletion theory, recanting Reichenbach’s system, to account for the 
sequence-of-tense phenomena, and Dowty (1982) proposes the fourth time parameter to make 
sense of future-under-future sentences, and so on.     
 
     (16) a. A child was born who would become king. 
  b. A child was born who will become king. 
  c. P(a child is born and F(it becomes king)) 
 
(17) also causes a problem, as pointed out by Enç (1986). (17b) and (17c) with a tense 
operator P are possible readings for (17a), but we have a serious problem with (17c). Since both 
noun phrases, rich men and obnoxious children, are bound by the single past tense operator, be-
ing a rich man and being an obnoxious child are happening at the same time, which is not possi-
ble. Plus, (17a) could be read to mean that some of the men are rich only in the present and some 
were rich in the past as well; but (17b), not to mention (17c), does not present such an interpreta-
tion because it merely states that all men are rich in the present.   
 
     (17) a. All rich men were obnoxious children.  
  b. x [rich-man(x)  P[obnoxious-child(x)]] 
  c. Px [rich-man(x)  obnoxious-child(x)] 
 
 Adopting Prior’s assumption that tense is a scope-taking propositional operator, Monta-
gue (1973) presents an analysis that tense in effect is interpreted as an existential quantification 
over times. Montague uses two operators, W and H, which are read as “it will be the case that” 
and “it has been the case that” (Notice that there is no distinction between past and present per-
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fect). For a formula φ, Wφ and Hφ are defined in (18) in the metalanguage.  is a model, j is a 
time of evaluation, and ≤ indicates a linear ordering. Notice that both (18a) and (18b) are equiva-
lent to existential quantification in that there is a time in the future or in the past at which φ oc-
curs; φ is true at j, which is either in the future or the past.  
 
     (18) a. [Wφ] ,i,j,g  is 1 iff φ ,i,j',g  is 1 for some j' such that j ≤ j' and j' ≠ j. 
  b. [Hφ] ,i,j',g   is 1 iff φ ,i,j',g  is 1 for some j' such that j' ≤ j and j' ≠ j.  
 
This is where the difference from Prior’s perspective comes in: of course Montague’s 
system is model-theoretic, in that expressions are evaluated in the model and relative to the indi-
ces, but not only that—times in the past or in the future are real to Montague, but not to Prior. 
Prior contends that what actually exists is present, not past or future; thus, he would not allow for 
the relativization of denotations to times. This distinction concerns their ontological commit-
ments to the notion of time, that are discussed in more detail in McTaggart (1908), Prior (1967), 
and Binnick (1991). Since Montague maintains that tense is a propositional operator, his analysis 
is still bound by the problems of the Priorian system, as discussed thus far.  
 
2.2.2 Dowty (1979, 1982) 
Dowty (1979) directly uses the existential quantifier in his analysis, as represented in (19). (19a) 
is the definition of the AT operator; (19b) and (19c) are the definitions of the tense predicates, 
clearly given in his fragments. Dowty treats PAST, PRES, and FUT as predicates of times; AT is 
a two-place operator which connects a tensed sentence and a particular time interval, chosen by 
the tense; i is an interval of time, t is a variable over times, τ is a meaningful expression of type 
of intervals, and φ is a sentence. After the rules are applied, the sentence John slept in (20a) is 
translated as in (20b). (20b) reads something like, For some past time t, John’s sleeping is true at 
t.  
 
    (19) Dowty’s (1979) tense interpretation rules  (pp. 353, 359) 
  a. AT(τ,φ) ,w,i,g = 1 iff φ ,w,i',g = 1, where i' = τ ,w,i,g. 
  b. PAST(τ) ,w,i,g = 1 iff there is some non-empty i'  I such that τ ,w,i,g < i' < i. 




     (20) a. John slept. 
  b. t[PAST(t)  AT(t, sleep'(j))] 
 
Using quantifiers over times is more expressive than a simple propositional operator sys-
tem, as a variable under the scope of one quantifier can be related to another variable, which is 
outside the scope of the quantifier.7 Also, if we analyze (17a) as (21) using quantifiers rather than 
a propositional operator, we can account for the sentence because, now, time parameters can be 
more freely bound by quantifiers. Note here that Enç’s (1986) idea that NPs, not only verbs, take 
a pragmatically defined time argument is also applied. The variable i1 is bound by the universal 
quantifier and thus it covers all the time intervals related to each man denoting different times for 
each man; all the intervals coincide with or follow i2. So, (21) says that all rich men who were or 
are rich at different times were all obnoxious children at i2. This is the missing reading pointed 
out above, and it is now obtained with quantifiers over times and time arguments for NPs. But 
referentialists would argue that, as previously mentioned, this type of existential quantification 
over times cannot explain the bad interaction between the existential quantifier and negation as 
found in I didn’t turn off the stove.  
 
      (21) i1i2[x[[rich-man(x) at i1]  [obnoxious-child(x) at i2]]  [i2 ≤ i1]] 
 
The biggest difference in Dowty (1982) from his earlier work would be that he uses mul-
tiple time indices. He proposed this technique in order to solve the adverbial scope paradox. 
What was first suggested in Dowty (1979) is called a syntactic solution: a separate set of rules 
for adverbials is proposed, and applied to tenses that occur with a temporal adverbial in the same 
sentence. It is not an easy task to select the correct rule to apply to temporal adverbials, and it is a 
disadvantage to have two separate sets of tense rules depending on the presence or absence of a 
temporal adverbial. Dowty’s (1982: 32) new set of tense rules in (22) with double indices now 
semantically solves the scope paradox problem.   
 
                                                            
7 Such an example is given here, thanks to Lasersohn: t[t=now & AT(t, α(a, t'[t'<t & AT(t', β(b, t''[t''=t & AT(t'', 




     (22) a. PRES  i,j = 1 iff  i,j = 1 and i = j.   
  b. PAST  i,j = 1 iff  i,j =1 and i < j.   
  c. FUT  i,j = 1 iff  i,j = 1 and j < i.    
 
This multiple-indexing technique is accredited to Kamp’s (1971) proposal to solve the 
problem pointed out in (16b). In order to account for the reading that a child who is not currently 
a king was born, Kamp inserts N before F, which is now under N, not P, and thus, the reference 
time is no longer in the past, but is now the time of utterance, so that we have the future tense in 
relation to now (the time of utterance).   
 
     (23) a. A child was born who will become king. 
  b. P[a child is born and NF[it becomes king]] 
 
 As I have briefly mentioned above, Dowty (1982) proposes the fourth time parameter in 
the sense of Reichenbach, the quasi-speech time, which offers a three-indexing interpretation. 
What made Dowty propose another time index is (24): according to Dowty, the event of finding 
a unicorn takes place not on tomorrow, the day after the day containing the time of utterance, but 
the day after tomorrow, because tomorrow' is under the scope of the FUT of the main clause. 
However, if you look closely at the new addition to the rules in (25), with Dowty’s original nota-
tions, this third index j is not so much needed other than in this future-under-future adverbial 
context. Also, as Dowty himself points out, the motivation for double indexing no longer serves 
its purpose, in that tenses and temporal adverbials are now interpreted in relation to different 
time indices—tenses to the quasi-speech time and adverbials to the actual speech time. Again, it 
seems possible to solve this problem if we forgo the assumption that tense is a scope-taking op-
erator. Interpretation of tenses and temporal adverbials will be tackled in more detail in Chapter 
5.  
 
     (24) a. John will meet a man who will find a unicorn tomorrow. 
  b. FUT … tomorrow'(λt[… FUT …]) …]  (Dowty 1982: 51) 
 
     (25) Revised tense rules with the quasi-speech time (Dowty 1982: 52) 
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  Definition of true3 relative to a triple of intervals i, j, k:   
  (Here i = ‘reference time’, j = ‘quasi-speech time’, and k = ‘actual speech time’) 
  PRES  i,j,k = 1 iff  i',j,k = 1 for some i' ≤ i < j   
  PAST  i,j,k = 1 iff  i',j,k =1 where i' = j   
  FUT  i,j,k = 1 iff  i',j,k = 1 for some i' < j.    
  tomorrow' i,j,k = the set of all sets of intervals containing an interval falling within the 
             Day after the day containing k. 
  A triple i, j, k is an utterable context iff j = k.  
  If i, j, k is utterable, then  is true1 at k iff there is some i such that  is true3 relative to  
  i, j, k. 
 
2.2.3 Ogihara (1989, 1996, 2006)  
Ogihara (1989, 1996, 2006) forcefully defends a quantificational interpretation of tense. His 
formal language and analysis are similar to Dowty’s, and Ogihara (1989) also uses the AT opera-
tor, but not in Ogihara (1996). In Ogihara (1996), tensed verbs have an argument position for a 
time; as was mentioned above, the quasi-reference time (tQR) becomes the reference time for a 
modal verb (tRM). Let us take a look at some definitions from Ogihara (1996). 
Tenses are defined as given in (26). tRT is the reference time associated with the tense 
morpheme, and tRM is the reference time associated with the future auxiliary (p. 58). As we have 
seen above, woll is due to the syntactic decomposition of will and would. (26a) shows that the 
past tense is defined in terms of the relation of two time intervals, and in matrix clauses t2 is the 
speech time (s*). What brings about existential quantification over times is the manner in which 
the truth of a tensed matrix sentence is defined, as shown in (27). The sentential existential quan-
tifier requires the existence of some time interval (in relation to the speech time) at which the 
sentence is true.   
 
     (26) Ogihara’s (1996: 60) definitions of tense items:  
 a. Past = λt1λt2[t1 < t2 & t1  tRT] 
 b. Pres = λt1λt2[t1 = s* & t1  tRT] 




     (27) Ogihara’s sentential truth (1996 : 58): 
  An IL expression  of type <i,<i,t>> that serves as a translation of a natural language 
 matrix sentence is true in the context c (in the structure M) iff there is a time i  T such 
 that  M,cW,gc,c (cT)(i) = 1 (equivalently, t[(s*)(t)] M,cW,gc,c = 1).  
 
Now, (23a), repeated in (28a), is represented in Ogihara’s style as you can see in (28b), 
including Ogihara’s notations (1996: 35). A time variable due to tense is existentially quantified 
according to (27). He makes clear the point that some temporal expressions, such as would are 
sensitive to the evaluation time or serve to order the time relation in accordance with a shiftable 
time interval, and expressions such as will and now are sensitive to the speech time (p. 35). Tense 
morphemes are sensitive to the context, as well as to different elements of the context.  
 
     (28) a. A child was born who will become king. 
  b. t[t < s* & x[child'(t, x) & be-born'(t, x) & t'[s* < t' & becomes-ruler-of-the-world' 
     (t', x)]]] 
 
Ogihara (1996) did not include existential quantification as part of the lexical semantics 
of tense morphemes, and instead chose to let the truth definition take care of that aspect. Ogihara 
(2006: 233) introduces another possible technique to achieve the quantificational force—
temporal expressions, such as tensed verbs, are defined in such a way that what a tense describes 
holds within the time denoted by its time argument, not at the time. (29) is a denotation of a 
tensed version of the proposition that John is eating lunch. The value of the variable t over times 
is assigned via g, and John eats lunch during g(t), not at g(t).    
 
     (29) eats_lunch(John, t) g = 1 (Ogihara 2006: 233) 
 
As quantifiers, instead of propositional operators, are used and as more time parameters 
are used to determine the reference point of temporal expressions, we have more flexibility in 
tense interpretation—especially in the interpretation of complex tenses and embedded tenses. 
Actually, Ogihara is more famous for his sequence-of-tense theory: his main complaint about the 
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referential approach comes from Enc’s (1987) treatment of embedded tense (see Ogihara (1989, 
1996) for more detail). Ogihara’s tense deletion rule will be discussed again in Chapter 4.    
 
2.3 Indexical Theories of Tense 
A referential/indexical analysis basically assumes that tense behaves like a pronoun, denoting a 
particular time. This position has been maintained by Partee (1973, 1984), and Enç (1986), 
among others. These authors disputed the notion that tenses are scope-taking sentential operators. 
Let us start with Partee’s claims and move on to Enç. 
 
2.3.1 Partee (1973, 1984) 
Partee (1973) holds that tenses are parallel with pronouns, which have deictic, anaphoric, and 
bound variable uses. We are able to find uses of tense that correspond to all three. The value of 
deictic pronouns is dynamically fixed by the context: sometimes this occurs by pointing with a 
finger as (30a) shows, or others by shared knowledge between the interlocutors, such as in (30b) 
when they clearly know who they are talking about, or in cases such as (30c), in which the refer-
ents of the pronoun are not so clear. Deictic tenses are parallel with deictic pronouns. The time 
denoted by the tense in (30d) is fixed by the extra-linguistic context and in (30e), like (30c), the 
tense refers to whenever it was that John went to school, though the time it refers to is left vague. 
(30d) was mentioned in (13): if we adopt the concept that the tense refers to a particularly fixed 
time interval by the context, we no longer have the scope paradox.  
 
     (30) a. Deictic pronouns: He shouldn’t be in here. 
  b.             She left me.  
  c.             They haven’t installed by telephone yet.  
 d. Deictic tenses: I didn’t turn off the stove.  
 e.         John went to a private school.    (Partee 1973: 602-603) 
 
A pronoun is also anaphorically used in the following sentences: in (31) from Partee, it in 
(31a) refers to the car in the first clause, and he in the second part of (31b) refers to the first he, 
modified by the relative clause. Tense also has an anaphoric use in which the tense in the subse-
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quent clause indicates the same time, as denoted by the tense in the antecedent clause, as in (31c) 
and (31d).  
 
     (31) a. Anaphoric pronouns: Sam took the car yesterday and Sheila took it today. 
  b.        He who stole my cow, he will suffer the penalties. 
  c. Anaphoric tenses: Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk. 
  d.              When Susan walked in, Peter left.  (Partee 1973: 604-605) 
 
A bound variable use of pronouns is found in (32a) and (32b). The value of it in (32a) is 
set and reset depending on which arrow hits the target or who does the speaking. Similarly, tens-
es sometimes behave like a bound variable whose value depends on the interpretation of its pre-
vious tense. The time denoted by the consequent clause is specified by the proper interaction 
with the time denoted by the tense in the antecedent clause, as if the tense in the consequent 
clause is bound by the tense in the antecedent clause. 
 
     (32) a. Bound variable pronouns: If one of the arrows hits the target, it’s mine. 
  b. Bound variable tenses: If Susan comes in, John will leave immediately. 
(Partee 1973: 605-606) 
 
Dowty (1982), in arguing the case for his double indexing analysis of tense, shows that 
(30d) I didn’t turn off the stove, which a normal quantificational analysis has difficulty explain-
ing, can be accounted for with his two time indices. On the one hand, this is how Dowty’s double 
indexing accounts for the indexical character of the past tense (p. 37): truth is defined as in (33), 
so that the reference time works as a contextual parameter. With this being the case, the refer-
ence time can now refer to the particular time in the near past, at which the speaker did not turn 
off the stove (which sounds very much like Klein’s conceptualization of topic time). Recall (22), 
in which tenses are defined merely in terms of the precedence relation between the reference 
time i and the speech time j. On the other hand, even though Dowty proposed a quantificational 
approach, he concedes the indexical character of the past tense. A quantificational theory can ac-




     (33) ‘ is ture2 at i, j’ is interpreted as  is true when uttered at j and used to talk about  
  the time i’.  
 
What Partee (1984) primarily discusses in her later work is temporal anaphora resolution, 
which exclusively focused on the anaphoric usage and bound variable usage of tense, in the 
framework of Discourse Representation Theory. She claims that the reference time plays a cru-
cial role in temporal anaphora (p. 256). Let us take the example of (34), in which Partee quotes 
from Hinrichs (1981) (Partee 1984: 254). e indicates an event and s a state. According to Partee, 
as represented in (35), where r0 is some reference time in the past and rs is the current reference 
time, reference times must include event times and be included within state times. That is, e1 is 
included in r0 and introduces another reference time, r1, which occurs slightly after the event. 
This new reference time includes the next event time, and so on.   
 
     (34) Jameson entered the room (e1), shut the door carefully (e2), and switched off the light (e3).  
 It was pitch dark around him (s1), because the Venetian blinds were closed (s2).  
 
     (35) a. e1  r0 
  b. e1 < r1 < rs 
  c. e2  r1 
  d. e2 < r2 < rs 
  e. e3  r2 
  f. e3 < r3 < rs 
  g. r3  s1 
  h. r3  s2     (part of Partee’s DR from p. 255) 
 
Due to this characteristic of the “moving forward of time” in temporal anaphora, Partee 
retracts her original claim that tenses are referring expressions. She abandons the idea of direct 
parallelism between tenses and pronouns and argues that tense does not directly refer to times. 
Also, as Partee points out, time intervals denoted by consecutive clauses or sentences do not al-
ways perfectly coincide. Obviously, in the following example from Partee, Jones’ introduction of 
Smith occurs before Smith speaks: When Smith spoke, Jones introduced him. In the previous ex-
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ample When Susan walked in, Peter left, the time interval at which Susan walked in may not pre-
cisely overlap with the time interval at which Peter left. However, as we have seen, Partee main-
tains the idea that tenses are anaphoric, and thus her analysis is still indexical. 
 
2.3.2 Enç (1981, 1986)  
Enç (1981, 1986) forcibly proposes a scopeless tense theory and argues that NPs and tensed VPs 
are indexicals, and therefore tense does not affect NPs. Including (17) as we discussed above, 
Enç presents a series of problems with the traditional scope-taking tense operators. (36) provides 
another such example. Consider a situation (36b) for (36a). We have three individuals who are 
currently seniors, as well as a group of former, current, and future US Presidents, whom each 
senior will have met individually. Suppose that we are currently in Ronald Reagan’s Presidency, 
which includes the time of utterance and the days before and after it, and that President George 
H.W. Bush will become the next president, in January of 1989. Now let us say Bob had met 
Lyndon Johnson during his Presidency, Mary met Bush yesterday and therefore Bush is not yet a 
President, and tomorrow Tom will meet the current President, Reagan. By February of 1989, 
when H.W. Bush becomes the President, (36a) will turn out to be true.  
 
     (36) a. Every senior will have met a President.    (Enç 1986: 408) 
  b. Seniors = {Tom, Mary, Bob}  
      Presidents = {Johnson, Reagan, Bush} 
      During Johnson’s Presidency: Meet(B, J)  
      The day before the time of utterance: Meet(M, B)      
      The day after the time of utterance: Meet(T, R) 
 
Now, let us try to capture this reading with a traditional operator system, with the three 
possibilities as seen in (37). Each tense operator corresponds to a tense morpheme; thus we have 
F for will and P for the perfect, in this order. In order to obtain the reading with (36b), we need to 
quantify over a past President, a current President, and a future President, which is impossible to 
represent with quantifiers and propositional tense operators. (37a), (37b), and (37c) may be 
roughly paraphrased as (37a'), (37b'), and (37c'), respectively. (37a') says that someone is a Pres-
ident some time between February of 1989 and the time of utterance, or even before the time of 
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utterance, which may be Reagan or Johnson, but not Bush; therefore, (37a) is false. (37b) is false 
because Johnson and Bush are not currently Presidents; (37c) is false because Johnson is some-
one who was a President.  
 
     (37) a. x[senior(x) → FP y[president(y) & meet(x, y)]] 
  a'. For all seniors, someone who will have been a president they will have met. 
  b. x[senior(x) → y[president(y) & FP meet(x, y)]] 
  b'. For all seniors, someone who is currently a president they will have met.  
  c. x[senior(x) → F y[president(y) & P meet(x, y)]]  
   c'. For all seniors, someone who will be a president they will have met.  (Enç 1986: 408) 
 
One might argue that we stipulate that tense operators are strictly local and VPs do not in-
teract with NPs to save the operator approach. However, Enç claims that this is too restrictive 
and cannot account for other scopal interaction between VPs and NPs. Instead, in order to ac-
count for the time-sensitivity of VPs and NPs, she proposes that VPs and NPs take a temporal 
argument. One difference between a VP temporal argument and an NP temporal argument is 
how their temporal arguments are motivated and assigned their value. A VP temporal argument 
is morphologically motivated, but the value of the temporal argument of a noun will be available 
if it is possible for the context to provide one. Since the temporal interpretation of NPs is prag-
matically fixed, independently of the verb tense, there is no problem due to the scopal interaction 
between a verb and an NP. To Enç there was no true motivation for treating tense as a scope op-
erator.  
 
2.4 Arguments for a Unifying Approach 
In this section I will present some arguments for the quantificational approach and show why a 
tense interpretation should be quantificational by default. I will take a further step and discuss 
that in spite of the adequacy of a quantificational analysis of tense, we may not completely elim-
inate the referential aspect of tense. It is my intention that by the end of this Chapter it may be 
persuasive that neither a narrow sense of parallelism between tense and pronouns nor an exclu-
sively quantificational theory is adequate for a fair tense theory.  
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 Let us go back to the sentence I didn’t turn off the stove, which Partee used to show that 
existential quantification is inadequate for tense interpretation. It can be dismissed if we take 
domain narrowing into consideration. As Lasersohn (2017) pointed out, we restrict the domain of 
quantification over times disregarding irrelevant time intervals to the utterance, and now we can 
account for the sentence. The domain of quantification in general is pragmatically determined 
(Lasersohn 1999). Restrictions on the model may be applied in such a way that only relevant in-
dividuals or time intervals are contained. For the above sentence, the immediate past is of inter-
est to us, and if within such a sufficiently limited domain there is a time interval during which 
the speaker does not turn off the stove, the sentence is true, in which case the idea of existential 
quantification over times suffices. Ogihara (1989: 52-53) puts it this way: “as far as the simple 
past tense in English is concerned, that the existential quantifier meaning is central and that its 
contextual dependency stems from the fact that context imposes an additional restriction upon 
the interpretation of tense.” He does not specify that this additional restriction is domain narrow-
ing; but if we assume that the context intervenes in tense interpretation, for example, by provid-
ing a well-limited domain, existential quantification gives an interpretation without a problem 
with regard to expressions, which apparently seem to have an indexical character.   
Stronger evidence for a quantificational analysis comes from sluicing and pre-sluicing 
constructions, as pointed out in Lasersohn (2017). Examples cited from Lasersohn are presented 
in (38); (38a) and (38b) are sluicing constructions and (38a') and (38b') are corresponding pre-
sluicing ones from which sluicing sentences are derived through ellipsis. Such constructions re-
quire indefinite descriptions in the antecedent clause: a sentence like John is dating Linda but I 
don’t know who does not make sense. Lasersohn shows that the same pattern is possible with 
Partee’s example, as follows: John turned off the stove, but I don’t know when. If this parallelism 
holds, it may be that such constructions require indefinite interpretation for tense involving exis-
tential quantification over times. Treating tenses like a definite as though they select a particular 
time interval cannot explain why the sentence with indefinite temporal antecedent is acceptable, 
because the speaker does not know exactly when John turned off the stove.  
 
     (38) a. John is dating someone, but I don’t know who. 
             a'. John is dating someone, but I don’t know who he is dating.  
             b. Mary left her wallet someplace, but can’t remember where. 
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             b'. Mary left her wallet someplace, but can’t remember where she left her wallet.  
 
Ogihara (2006) argues that existential quantification is necessary as we may see in (39), 
“even if a particular salient past interval is involved in determining their interpretation” (p. 233). 
For example, let us say this salient time is John and Bill’s lunch time, between noon and 1 p.m., 
which is a time period set by their company. Nevertheless, the time during which Bill actually 
carried out the action of eating may not be the entire one hour time period. Therefore, some time 
interval within this one-hour period, which is existentially quantified, is relevant to the interpre-
tation of the past tense.   
 
     (39) John: Did1 you eat lunch? 
 Bill: Yes, I did2.  
  
 It seems agreeable that did1 may denote some existentially quantified time in the past. 
However, it is not clear whether did2 also denotes a random existentially quantified time inde-
pendently of did1. did2 in the answer is a proform of the VP in the question, and is anaphoric to 
did1, which is a clear link between did1 and did2. Such grammatical coherence must not be over-
looked; therefore, existential quantification cannot be the singularly available mechanism for 
tense interpretation. Moreover, the entire time interval Ogihara suggested as salient does not 
seem to serve as the value of the tense morpheme in (39). As he described, the time during which 
Bill actually ate lunch is included in this longer interval. I would like to treat this extended time 
interval as a domain in which a tense morpheme is interpreted rather than directly involved in the 
relational tense interpretation. Of course this domain may be a salient time in the context—in the 
case of (39), since John and Bill already know what their regular lunch hour is, and that workers 
are expected to eat lunch during this time, the lunch period is therefore contextually salient as 
shared knowledge between the interlocutors.   
 It is possible that John asked the question without knowing at what time Bill ate lunch, 
but Bill knows the exact time during which he ate lunch and had that time in mind when he an-
swered John’s question. Still, however, my claim that did2 must be anaphorically (therefore, in-
dexically) treated is not necessarily about whether the times denoted by did1 and did2 actually 




     Intuitively, noun phrases ‘refer’ and tenses don’t; nominal anaphora can be viewed as in- 
     volving a generalization and explication of the notion inaccurately but intuitively labelled ‘co- 
     reference’. Temporal anaphora is more subtle because of the categorial variety of the expres- 
     sions involved – tenses, adverbs, adverbial clauses, and main clauses (including the aspectual 
     classification of the clauses themselves into even-like and state-like). It is still fair to say that 
     tenses, like pronouns, are anphoric, and like pronouns can be construed with either linguistic    
     or non-linguistic antecedents; but it doesn’t follow that they ‘refer’ to times to the degree that 
     pronouns ‘refer’ to individuals.      
 
This matter concerns how a tense system characterizes a grammatical correlation that cannot be 
dismissed between the tenses, regardless of their referring to times. 
 Ogihara (2006) quotes Partee as she concluded that existential quantification is the most 
empirically accurate analysis of tense. I now add to this statement “by default,” without neglect-
ing the indexical character of tense. As we have seen, anaphoric usage of tense shows a clear 
connection between the two relevant tenses. Additionally, it is not uncommon that tenses specifi-
cally denote a contextually salient time. Partee, who originally proposed a referential analysis, 
later retracted her claim and accepted existential quantification, and Dowty, an advocate of the 
quantificational approach, attempted to account for the indexical character of tense with the dou-
ble indexing technique (although it is not clearly stated that Dowty was convinced that the index-
ical character of tense should be part of tense semantics). Obviously, tense does have both a 
quantificational and indexical character, a fact which needs to be properly addressed. However, 
to date, to my knowledge, there has been no analysis proposed which systematically combines 
these two interpretations of preterit in the grammar. This is exactly what my dissertation aims to 
achieve, among other goals.  
 Another change I will present in this dissertation is that we have multiple time parameters 
available for tense interpretation. As we have seen above, Reichenbach began with the three time 
parameters and defined tenses and aspects in terms of their relations. However, Dowty and Ogi-
hara had to suggest a fourth time interval in order to account for complex temporal relations due 
to embedded tenses and multiple temporal adverbials. Now, my analysis adds and keeps multiple 
salient time intervals in the context, so that the context not only keeps track of time intervals de-
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noted by tense morphemes and temporal adverbials, but also provides possible candidates in a 
much more dynamic and flexible way for complex temporal interpretation, which is also rela-










3.1 Ambiguity of Tense   
As I have shown in the previous chapter, prior theories of tense provide explanations for how 
tense is interpreted (mostly in English) to some extent, but they are not free from problems. 
Quantificational analyses of the past tense cannot explain the pronoun-like usage of tense, espe-
cially in a discourse in which the tense specifically denotes the time interval that was highlighted 
in the previous discourse. Referential analyses seem to fail to account for the quantificational 
reading that is obviously present in English preterit, as previously shown. To alleviate the prob-
lems caused on each side, I will present an analysis that systematically combines these two lines 
of account so that a wider range of examples may be explained with more flexibility.   
I argue that we have both the quantificational and referential interpretations of tense, de-
pending on the context; tenses work as a free variable over times in the semantic derivation, and 
a quantificational interpretation is the default unless there is a salient time interval supplied by 
the context. When there is a contextually salient time interval, whether it is established in a pre-
vious discourse or some particular time interval known to the interlocutors, the tense morpheme 
in the following utterance selects that salient time interval.  
By allowing for both types of tense interpretation, we are in an advantageous position to 
account for how different categories of temporal adverbials work, and in similar terms how tem-
poral anaphora is resolved in a discourse. As I discussed in the previous chapter, with the help of 
domain narrowing the apparently bad interaction between the tense operator (or an existential 
quantifier for time variables) and negation can be resolved, thereby maintaining existential quan-
tification over times. If a definite time interval is specified by the context, and if a tense mor-
pheme concerns that time, the time variable of the tense is anaphorically bound to that time in-
terval. 
Many researchers have already pointed out that tense interpretation is contextually sensi-
tive (Binnick 1991; Ogihara 2006; Lasersohn 2017): the content of a tensed sentence may vary 
with pragmatic context—in particular, with the utterance time. For example, if John is giving a 
seminar talk today is uttered on April 13, 2015, the sentence expresses the content that John 
32 
 
gives a seminar talk on April 13, 2015; but if this is uttered the next day, the content expressed is 
that John gives a seminar talk on the 14th of the same month (Lasersohn 2017). In tense interpre-
tation, the time that tense morpheme denotes is sensitive to the time of utterance: a time denoted 
by past tense precedes the utterance time, a time denoted by present tense coincides (or overlaps) 
with the utterance time, and so on.    
Interestingly, Binnick (1991: 247) argues that the past tense in the sentence Brutus killed 
Caesar has two readings, indefinite and definite, depending on the context in which the sentence 
occurs. The sentence seems to refer to a particular, definite time interval in (1a), but not neces-
sarily so in (1b). Binnick suggests that if we negate the sentence, the difference becomes clearer. 
After we negate the sentence we continue as follows: But Brutus didn’t kill Caesar—he waited 
until later and killed him [then]. It is agreeable that this kind of continuation is possible with (1a) 
because the moment (that Brutus killed Caesar) is mentioned in the previous utterance and hear-
ers are led to think about some particular moment. If the past tense in Brutus killed Caesar de-
notes the same time interval highlighted in the previous sentence, the above continuation could 
make sense—namely, that the negation is merely relevant to that particular time interval. The 
same cannot hold for (1b): if we finish (1b) with But Brutus didn’t kill Caesar, it is a contradic-
tion and there is no way to save the passage, as we did in (1a).   
 
(1) a. There was nothing Brutus could do. Caesar was becoming a tyrant. Nothing could stop 
him now. When the Ides came, Brutus was ready. The moment had come. Brutus killed 
Caesar.  
b. There is considerable testimony that Brutus was there, that he had a motive, that he 
was prepared to commit the deed. There is no alibi. There is no testimony that he was ab-
sent or innocent. There is no doubt. Brutus killed Caesar.  
 
However, such a distinction between definite and indefinite tenses isn’t explicit yet. 
Binnick does illustrate how different contexts lead to different readings of tense, but it is not 
clear what he means by (in)definite tense in this example. One could intuitively agree with his 
illustrations, and we associate the indefinite reading of the preterit with a quantificational analy-
sis and the definite with an indexical analysis.     
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Since I state that both quantificational and indexical interpretations of tense are allowed 
in the grammar, the nature of the tense in my system will be ambiguous. I will argue in the fol-
lowing section that such an ambiguous tense system is (not only more explanatory but also) fea-
sible based on the data from other languages, such as Korean. But before that, let me first discuss 
why fusing the two kinds of interpretation of tense into a single system is not totally bizarre: I 
will make more explicit under what conditions we have one or the other interpretation of tense, 
pointing out a similarity between tense and some aspects of DPs.     
 
3.1.1 Definite and Indefinite Tenses 
Traditionally, in attempts to classify tenses, there has been discussion on which tenses are defi-
nite and which are indefinite. Of course, there is a caveat: people have been using these terms 
definite and indefinite in various but vague ways in the context of tense discussion. Sometimes, 
the indefinite/definite distinction in tenses means simple vs. non-simple tenses or aspects (Bhatt 
2007, Binnick 1991); if you use the term definite tense for Turkish data, it means evidentiality 
marked by one of the two separate suffixes for the verb.  
The notion of definiteness for tense has been fluctuant in the discussion of that subject. 
Binnick (1991) recapitulates the indefinite and definite tense discussion by “vernacular gram-
marians.” In their earlier discussion, rather an intuitive idea was that preterit was classified as 
indefinite past and perfect as definite past. Their sense of definiteness, however, does not seem 
quite settled. You see here in (2) one of the first differentiations between preterit and perfect, 
coming from a French grammarian named Jean Pillot in 1550. The reason perfect was classified 
as definite is that it “denotes a more determinate perfect time, but a little past,” while preterit 
“signifies a time […] not determined, and a thing long past,” as quoted in (2). But the statement 
sounds as though it describes some graded tense system that has distant and immediate past tens-
es depending on how close the event time is located from the speech time. Also, characterizing 
one tense as determinate because it denotes a time immediately prior to the present seems a bit 
impressionistic in that one could always insist inversely. The notion of definite tense is not defi-
nite, but rather obscure, as we observe that it changed over time.  
      
(2) [T]he perfect preterite in the indicative is two-fold, the first of which [sic] can be called 
‘Indefinite’: for it signifies a time assuredly preterite, but not determined, and a thing 
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long past. The second of these in truth denotes a more determinate perfect time, and but a 
little past, as when we say: I’ ay lu auiourd’ hui l’ Evangile. (Binnick 1991: 39)8 
 
In relatively modern times, the sense of definiteness begins to mean something similar to 
what we are familiar with: it stems from the question of whether tense refers to a particularly 
fixed time or specific point assumed by a speaker, although this is not the settled definition of 
definite tense. However, since Partee (1973) proposed that (simple past) tense refers to a particu-
lar or definite time interval—establishing the analogy between tense and pronouns—simple past 
is considered a definite tense by many (Partee 1973; Enç 1986; Binnick 1991; Kratzer 1998; 
Kearns 2011).  
 Binnick also introduces a possibility of a Priorian-style dual operator system in which 
there are two separate operators for definite and indefinite past, such as PASTdef and PASTindef. 
But he seems to be concerned about stacking operators like this even for more complex aspectual 
meanings, such as future perfect progressive. Such subtleties will not be elaborated with a series 
of operators like Fut(Perf)(Prog), which merely paraphrases what we have in syntax. Using two 
operators for a single tense in the metalanguage may not be an attractive way of treating indefi-
nite (or quantificational) and definite (or indexical) readings of the past tense, especially when 
such a difference is not morphologically marked. Though it seems difficult to completely discard 
the idea that simple past does sometimes behave like a pronoun, we do not commit ourselves to 
this idea—to the extent that we employ dual operators for the simple past.   
 Providing a detailed taxonomy of tenses is not a main goal of this dissertation, and I do 
not attempt to support one of the positions that simple past is exclusively definite or exclusively 
indefinite. I discussed the parallelism between tense and pronouns, first pointed out by Partee, 
and now I would like to extend this analogy or connection slightly farther to the more general 
domain of DPs. If I describe my claim in terms of definiteness of tense, it will be that simple past 
is both indefinite and definite. More precisely, past tense is quantificational unless the context 
provides a salient time interval, which qualifies a definite or indexical interpretation. A tense 
theory should be built with a system that reflects this sensitivity of tense to the context. Though 
my analysis allows for both definite and indefinite readings of past, this is not analogous to a du-
                                                            
8 Peck, H. T. (1911). A History of Classical Philology from the Seventh Century, B.C. to the Twentieth Century, A.D. 
New York: Macmillan. 
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al operator analysis: my system will have variables over times whose values are fixed by differ-
ent types of assignment functions, with respect to contextual parameters rather than operators.   
 But, still, definiteness is not yet explicitly defined. Actually, if an action took place some 
time in the past, the time at which the action took place must be definite or specific whether it is 
known to the interlocutors or not—an action that took place in the past means that it took time 
for the action to take place and this time interval that exists in the past is specific in the sense that 
it exists. Due to such confusion in terminology, I will clarify and delimit my use of the “definite” 
sense of tense in the next section, starting from a brief sketch of some of the properties used to 
define definiteness in the domain of NPs/DPs and showing how different or similar my idea of 
temporal definiteness is from nominal definiteness, which has been more commonly discussed 
and is therefore probably more familiar to us.  
Definite DPs include different types of DPs, such as definite descriptions (the + NP), 
pronouns, demonstratives, possessive DPs, and proper names. Since definite DPs are not our 
main focus in this dissertation, I would like to limit my discussion with regard to definiteness in 
this section only to definite descriptions, which are DPs headed by the determiner the, to the ex-
clusion of other types of definite DPs, such as pronouns or demonstratives. Of course it is easy to 
identify definite descriptions in English, as the clearly marks the definiteness of the DP, but there 
is another reason I will not concern myself about theories of pronouns at the moment: although 
pronouns are commonly classified as definites, they have unshared characteristics with definite 
descriptions. For example, there are some cases in which pronouns do not seem to have the 
uniqueness effect, which is one of the defining properties of definite descriptions. Heim’s (1982) 
sage plant example represented in (3) is often mentioned. If the italicized pronoun it denotes a 
unique sage plant x among the nine she bought, sage plant y, for example, makes the sentence 
false. This is contrary to our intuition—(3) is still true even if it denotes sage plant y. Later, this 
example was used by many against the claim that the pronoun requires a unique individual to 
satisfy the descriptive content of its antecedent.   
 
     (3) Every woman who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with it.  
 
Roberts (2003), using psycholinguistic and corpus studies, discussed another difference 
between pronouns and definite descriptions, which is that pronouns generally require an anteced-
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ent in the local context or context of utterance. However, this is not always the case for definite 
descriptions. Even when a definite description is used the first time in a discourse without an in-
definite antecedent, it is felicitous via accommodation. Illustrations of this in (4) and (5) come 
from Roberts (2003: 290). The (a) sentences contain a definite description that is underlined in 
each sentence and it is expected that there will be only one clown in the puzzle or only one but-
ton in the box. However, when we substitute pronouns for definite descriptions, as instantiated in 
(b), the sentences do not have the same reading as the (a) sentences. (4b) will be felicitous only if 
there is a particular man already salient in the context; in (5b), the speaker pushed the lid, never a 
button as in (5a). In other words, as Roberts puts it, when a new definite description is uttered, it 
takes the focus of a discourse or becomes salient, while pronouns refer to an element that is al-
ready highly salient in the context of utterance without shifting the focus of a discourse. Proper-
ties such as uniqueness and accommodation, which usually pertain to definite descriptions, do 
not work for pronouns. For these reasons our exploration of the nature of definiteness in the next 
section will be limited to definite descriptions, and I will correlate it with definite- or indefinite-
ness of tense. Parallelism between tense and pronouns will be brought up again for more discus-
sion in later sections. For more detailed taxonomies and typological discussion on definite DPs, 
see Abbott (2004) and Lyons (1999).  
 
(4) a. On the next page, you will find a puzzle. Find the clown in the puzzle.  
            b. On the next page, you will find a puzzle. Find him in the puzzle.  
 
(5) a. I found a box in my attic the other day. I opened the lid and pushed the button I found 
inside. You won’t believe what happened.  
b. I found a box in my attic the other day. I opened the lid and pushed it. You won’t be-
lieve what happened. 
 
3.1.1.1 Definiteness of DPs: uniqueness  
Russell’s (1905) theory would be the classic theory of definiteness, one in which definite de-
scriptions require uniqueness. Russell rejected the idea that was maintained for a long time that a 
definite description refers to a particular object. Rather, Russell set variables for a definite DP 
and quantificationally analyzed it, requiring that there should be one and only one entity that sat-
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isfies the descriptive content of the DP, which is represented in (6). For example, for the sen-
tence The philosophy professor is late to be true, there must be one and only one x, such that x is 
a philosophy professor, and s/he is late.  
 
(6) a. The φ is ψ.  
b. x(φx  y(φy  y = x)  x)  
 
 Intuitively, uniqueness seems to be a viable option. As soon as you hear the sentence 
about the philosophy professor, you would assume that there must be one and only one philoso-
phy professor who is of interest to us. Otherwise, the use of the is infelicitous. However, there is 
not simply one philosophy professor in the universe. Unless we take the context or shared 
knowledge between the interlocutors into account, the felicity of the sentence is inexplicable. 
Russell’s uniqueness doesn’t seem to have this contextual element, or in other words, suffers an 
incomplete description. For example, when you hear the sentence, John put this book on the desk, 
you would assume that there must be only one desk that you and the speaker both know about. In 
this case, the uniqueness of the desk is relative to a limited set that has been pragmatically pro-
vided. A purely semantic or conventional approach which requires there to be one and only one 
desk in the universe does not give us a complete picture of this uniqueness, which is either as-
sumed by the interlocutors or entailed by the context. 
People have been pointing out the pragmatic nature of this uniqueness and responding to 
Russell’s semantic analysis in different ways. The desk example with an incomplete description 
above or cases of “bridging” as seen in (7) below are counterexamples to Russell’s analysis 
(Roberts 2003). Clark (1975) actually uses the term implicature as he explicates bridging. 
Among millions of dashboards in the universe, there is only one dashboard in one car, and based 
on this implicature or pragmatic knowledge we associate the dashboard in (7) with the car, which 
is of interest to us in this context. We often interpret definites using pragmatically filled-in in-
formation, and without it, the interpretation of definites in terms of purely semantic uniqueness 
as defined by Russell is not complete. However, McCawley (1979) argues that such moves that 
provide a pragmatically limited domain cannot save the Russellian uniqueness approach. Look at 
sentences (8a) and (8b). Let us say there is only one dog in our pragmatically limited universe of 
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discourse in order for the dog to refer to that unique dog. Then, (8a) amounts to saying (8a') and 
(8b) to (8b'). Obviously, neither (8a') nor (8b') is what (8a) means.     
 
     (7) This car has a statue on the dashboard.    (Roberts 2003: 290) 
 
     (8) a. The dog likes all dogs. 
           a'. The dog likes himself. 
           b. The dogs like all dogs. 
           b'. The dogs like each other.      (McCawley 1979: 378) 
 
Later, to solve this incompleteness problem of the uniqueness analysis, Heim (2011) sug-
gests covert domain restriction for DPs so that a unique, one-and-only-one individual that meets 
the descriptive content of a definite description may be picked out within a limited set. A restric-
tor set may be, for example, a set of things in our house or a set of things recently mentioned, 
and the idea is that a definite selects the unique individual that meets the descriptive content of 
the DP from the restrictor set. This type of contextual restriction may save the uniqueness analy-
sis. Take (7) again as an example. If the dashboard picks out its referent from the set of things 
that are recently mentioned and things that are relevant to them, we don’t need to worry about all 
other dashboards in the world but only the dashboard of the car being discussed. Consequently, 
as Heim also pointed out, restrictors bring equivalent effects to Lewis’s salience theory, which 
will be discussed in more detail.  
 Another discussion of Russell’s uniqueness concerns the presuppositionality of definites. 
Russell further argued that if the reference of a definite description does not exist, the sentence 
containing the definite description is false. For example, (9a), the famous example from Russell, 
entails (9b). When there is no king in France, (9a) turns out to be false because the fact that there 
is no king in France is contradictory to (9b), which is part of the assertion made by (9a). Rus-
sell’s position was supported by Neale (2005) and Kaplan (2005), among many others. 
 
(9) a. The King of France is bald. 




Russell explained the negation of a sentence with a definite description in terms of a 
“primary occurrence” and a “secondary occurrence” of a definite description, which now corre-
spond to wide scope and narrow scope, respectively. Consider (10a), which is a negation of (9a), 
and assume there is no king in France. When the definite description the King of France takes 
wide scope over negation as in (10b'), (10a) is false. Since the definite description is not affected 
by the negation, (10a) asserts that there is a unique king in France, which is contradictory to the 
fact that there is no king in France. In contrast, when the King of France takes a narrow scope, 
(10a) asserts (10c') which can be paraphrased as (10c). In this case, (10a) turns out to be true be-
cause the proposition that it is not the case that there is a unique king in France coincides with 
the fact that there is no king in France.   
 
(10)  a. The King of France is not bald. 
  b. There is exactly one King of France and he is not bald. 
  b'. x(Kx  y(Ky → y = x)  ¬Bx) 
  c. It is not the case that there is exactly one King of France and he is bald.  
  c'. ¬x(Kx  y(Ky → y = x)  Bx) 
 
Not all authors agree with Russell. Strawson (1950) argued that there is a king in France 
in (9b) is not part of what is asserted or part of the meaning of the sentence, but rather, part of 
what is implied or indicative of the speaker’s implicit knowledge. Uniqueness is not part of de-
scriptive content, but rather, of presupposition. This may be confirmed via von Fintel’s Hey, wait 
a minute test. Consider examples in (11) and (12) taken from von Fintel (2004: 326). After the (a) 
sentences, it is natural to have a response like the (b) sentences in which the existence of the def-
inite description’s potential referent is being questioned. However, responses like the (c) sen-
tences cause “squeamishness” due to the conflict in presuppositions—namely, that there is no 
king in France or no such mathematician who proved the Conjecture.  
 
(11) a. The King of France attended the APEC conference this week. 
     b. Hey, wait a minute—I had no idea that France is still a monarchy. 




      (12)  a. This year’s Fields Medal was awarded to the mathematician who proved Goldbach’s  
       Conjecture. 
               b. Hey. Wait a minute—I had no idea that someone proved the Conjecture.  
               c. Hey. Wait a minute—I had no idea that she got the medal.  
 
 Prior to Strawson, Frege (1892) posited that the existence of a referent of a definite de-
scription is presupposed, not entailed. Let us return to (10a), negation. With (10a), what is negat-
ed is what is entailed by the (9a). There is one and only one King of France is presupposed by 
the King of France and thus the unique existence of the King of France is not negated although 
the entire sentence found in (9a) is negated. When there is no unique, one-and-only-one object 
denoted by a definite description, the sentence is neither true nor false. In such a case of presup-
position failure, we have a truth-value gap—that is, the absence of a truth value.   
 Frege and Strawson’s position has been supported by Heim (1991), Roberts (2003), 
Kripke (2005) and Elbourne (2010), among many others. Support for presuppositional unique-
ness also comes from definite descriptions embedded under propositional attitude verbs and their 
scope interaction with quantifiers and conditionals. See Kripke (2005), Elbourne (2010), and 
Heim (2011) for more discussion about this subject.   
 If definiteness of tense is defined in terms of uniqueness: a definite tense will involve a 
unique, one-and-only-one time interval at which the action described by the tense takes place. 
However, it is not an easy task to characterize a time interval that is unique. Can a time interval, 
which is abstract by nature, be unique in a speaker’s mind? What makes a time interval unique? 
Perhaps a time interval might become unique if an event takes place at that time, and that time 
interval is associated with the event. In such a case, it is the event that makes the time interval 
unique, not vice versa. It may be quite challenging to prove the uniqueness of a time interval to 
be a requirement for a definite tense. Another problem comes from cases like (13). Let us apply 
Russell’s definition in (6b) to tense as represented in (13). Let φ be a sentence I didn’t turn off 
the stove; (13) roughly reads as though there is a time t at which the speaker did not turn off the 
stove and for all other times at which the speaker didn’t turn off the stove, those times are t. 
However, it is possible that the speaker did not turn off the stove not only at t—say some time on 
Friday afternoon, but again at some other time, such as Monday morning. Russsellian uniqueness 




     (13) t(φ(t)  t'(φ(t')  t' = t))  φ  
 
3.1.1.2 Definiteness of DPs: familiarity 
Some people have related definiteness to knowledge of interlocutors. Christophersen (1939) is 
often cited in this line of theory—interlocutors use the when they are acquainted with the refer-
ent of the DP in question. Heim (1982) develops this idea and accounts for indefinite and definite 
descriptions in terms of Novelty/Familiarity Conditions. Definiteness is now governed by a felic-
ity condition, which is a matter of pragmatics rather than a semantic principle.  
 Both indefinites and definites involve a variable in Heim’s analysis. An indefinite DP in-
troduces a new free variable (or starts a new file, in Heim’s File Change Semantics) into a dis-
course, which is bound by an unselective binder at the text level. A definite DP is interpreted 
with a discourse-old variable, coindexed with a variable that has already been introduced. Heim 
treats definite descriptions and pronouns in the same way, but a file card for definites, of course, 
has a description compatible with the definite DP. Heim’s Extended-Novelty-Familiarity Condi-
tion is summarized in (14) (pp. 369-370). F indicates a file and roughly corresponds to the con-
text, as position with which many semanticists agree (Kadmon 2001, Roberts 2003). Heim’s the-
ory is advantageous for examples like (15) from Heim. The problem of incomplete description 
mentioned in the previous section is not a problem anymore for familiarity. A wine glass starts a 
new card with a variable x, and the card has the information that this wine glass x broke last night. 
The coindexed definite the glass is associated with this already established or familiar card, and 
the variable x on it and the compatible description is still on the card and available for the inter-
pretation of the definite DP.    
 
     (14) For  to be felicitous w.r.t. F it is required for every NPi in  that: 
 (i) if NPi is [-definite], then i  Dom(F); 
 (ii) if NPi is [+definite], then  
  (a) i  Dom(F), and  
  (b) if NPi is a formula, F entails NPi. 
 




 However, English speakers sometimes use the for NPs which have not been introduced in 
a discourse. Being called novel definites by Heim, such definites as seen in (16a) may still be fe-
licitous via Lewis’s (1979) accommodation. Abbott (2004) discussed a problem of complete de-
scription for familiarity, which is illustrated in (16b). Due to the descriptive content associated 
with the definite NP, it is possible to select a unique entity in Russell’s terms, and the underlined 
definite description is felicitous, although a big bag was not previously introduced in the dis-
course. Accommodation will again solve this and explain the felicity of the utterance, but, as 
Abbott pointed out, such cases “seem contrary to at least the spirit of the familiarity type of ap-
proach.”      
 
     (16) a. Watch out, the dog will bite you. (Heim 1982) 
  b. If you’re going into the bedroom, would you mind bringing back the big bag of potato  
      chips that I left on the bed? (Abbott 2004)  
 
Roberts (2003) proposed a more nuanced version of familiarity. She called Heim’s ver-
sion of familiarity a strong familiarity and proposed a weak familiarity. In Heim’s terms, a dis-
course referent of a familiar DP has an antecedent in the prior discourse; Roberts’ weakly famil-
iar DPs are the ones whose discourse referents are entailed in the local context of interpretation 
or common ground, whether or not they have been previously introduced in the discourse. 
Uniqueness is also combined in Roberts’ analysis—weakly familiar discourse referents to inter-
locutors should also be unique. This analysis now can explain examples such as (17) from Rob-
erts (2003), interpreted similarly to the bridging ones. As Roberts puts it, a knife or stabbing is 
not “absolutely entailed,” but in order to relate the second sentence to the first, we “accommo-
date” that John was stabbed, from among many possibilities of how a person is murdered. Once 
the stabbing is accommodated, the existence of a knife as the murder weapon is entailed by the 
common ground, which licenses a weakly familiar discourse referent. Roberts also argued that 
pronouns do not trigger uniqueness effect, but only definite descriptions do.   
 




 How do we apply familiarity to tense? Again, it is not easy to associate DPs which have 
tangible referents with abstract time intervals. But, still, we could at least say that familiar time 
variables are definite, whether these are coindexed variables with a previously occurring one or 
those whose referents are entailed by the context. Such theories can be advantageous, as dis-
course-old time variables are distinguished from those associated with events that are introduced 
to a discourse for the first time.   
 
3.1.1.3 Definiteness of DPs: salience 
McCawley (1979), like many others mentioned above, pointed out problems with Russell’s 
uniqueness in his discussion of definite descriptions. He further argued that domain restriction is 
not a solution for the incomplete description problem of the uniqueness analysis, due to exam-
ples in (8), The dog likes all dogs. If the dog is interpreted in a restricted domain where there is 
only one dog and denotes this unique dog, the sentence is analogous to the dog likes himself. To 
solve this, he adds the contextual domain in his system and the interpretation of definite descrip-
tions is related to the contextual domain, not to the universe of discourse or even to some re-
stricted domain. McCawley’s contextual domain represents the set of objects, and the set in-
cludes both kinds of objects that are mentioned in the previous discourse (or, familiar, in Heim’s 
terms) and those “taken for granted” (entailed by the context in Roberts’ terms). A search is done 
for the members of the contextual domain to select a referent for a definite description that satis-
fies the semantic content.   
McCawley also employed the “context,” which is a set of propositions. The context and 
the contextual domain become incremented as the discourse proceeds. For example, a discourse 
referent of an existentially quantified NP in the antecedent clause is added to the contextual do-
main, and it then works as a referential constant (or a discourse referent) in subsequent utteranc-
es. As the antecedent clause is uttered, the proposition introduced by the antecedent is added to 
the context, and so, incremented. These incremented context and contextual domain are now 
available for the interpretation of the definite description in the consequent clause. Contextual 
incrementation may be temporary for conditionals until the acceptability of the consequent 
checks out and the next utterance is produced.  
Let’s take an example in (18), from McCawley (p. 382). (18b), with McCawley’s nota-
tion, shows that the context X and the contextual domain Y are incremented when the antecedent 
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clause is uttered, and the definite descriptions in the consequent are interpreted relative to these 
enlarged context and contextual domain. The antecedent clause is interpreted relative to X and Y; 
the consequent clause is interpreted relative to the updated X' and updated Y'. X' contains all the 
propositions in X and the propositions due to the antecedent (x' is a motorcycle, y' is a truck, and 
x' collides with y'; x' and y' are the two discourse referents); Y' has one motorcycle (x') and one 
truck (y'). Since these are now the only objects in the contextual domain for the interpretation of 
the consequent clause, they are selected as the referents for the definites in the consequent. This 
idea of updated or incremented context and contextual domain is quite similar to Kamp’s Dis-
course Representation Theory or Heim’s File Change Semantics.     
 
(18)  a. When a motorcycle collides with a truck, the motorcycle is generally damaged worse 
than the truck.  
 b. ((x: motorcycle x)(y: truck y)(x collides with y)  
       X 
       Y                    (the motorcycle is generally damaged worse than the truck)) 
          X' = X ∪{x' collides with y', motorcycle x', truck y'} 
          Y' = Y ∪{x', y'} 
 
 Salience enters as an answer to this question “What if there is more than one object in the 
enlarged contextual domain?” for the interpretation of a definite description. McCawley posits 
that the contextual domain is not merely a set, but a structured set with a hierarchy “of succes-
sively broader domains” among the individuals in the context, and we have different levels 
(though it is not very explicit what these levels are) in the hierarchy through which we can search 
for acceptable elements for the interpretation of definite descriptions. He also stipulates that the 
hearer, interpreting a definite description, searches from the first level of the hierarchy where 
temporarily added elements to the context are found, until he finds an element that is the appro-
priate referent of the definite description. If there is no element prominent enough at the level, 
you move on to a lower level and search for the next most prominent object that fits the descrip-
tion of the definite DP, and so on. If there is more than one element that satisfies the definite de-




 In order to show that the contextual domain is a structured set, McCawley uses an exam-
ple such as (19). He also allows the addition of new items to the contextual domain, which corre-
sponds to accommodation in Lewis’s (1979) terms. It seems that the referent of the dog is added 
to the first level of the contextual domain and the referent of a dog is added at a lower level, 
which becomes available for the search for the referents of the dogs in the second sentence. Ac-
cording to McCawley, the prominence structure, or hierarchy, is determined by the speaker. No-
tice that this type of salience analysis uniformly treats a definite description with an existentially 
quantified antecedent and a deictically used definite.   
 
(19) Yesterday the dog got into a fight with a dog. The dogs were snarling and snapping at 
each other for half an hour. I’ll have to see to it that the dog doesn’t get near that dog 
again.  
 
 Lewis (1979) is another author who discussed salience for the interpretation of definite 
descriptions. He also pointed out that the uniqueness of a definite description, even in the contex-
tually determined domain, is not enough, especially for the cases in which there is more than one 
object in the domain that fits the description. Lewis also referred to McCawley’s example in (19): 
although there are two dogs in the context, hearers still understand the utterance with the shifting 
from dog 1 to dog 2. This is due to salience—that is, the referent of the definite description is the 
most salient individual, according to the salience ranking.  
 What makes an object salient or how is salience ranking determined? Lewis asserted that 
it is contextually determined and conversational means can raise the salience of an individual. 
For example, an object thrown to the interlocutors in the middle of a conversation gains salience 
at the moment; you raise the salience of an object by pointing. Conversational means could in-
clude the course of a conversation such as talking more and more about an object and introduc-
ing an existentially quantified object (indefinite NP), as in a cat is on the lawn, wherein the cat 
on the lawn is now at the top of the salience ranking. According to his accommodation rule for 
comparative salience, which is introduced in (20) below, salience shifts in a way that contextual 




(20) If at time t something is said that requires, if it is to be acceptable, that x be more salient 
than y; and if, just before t, x is no more salient than y; then – ceteris paribus and within 
certain limits – at t, x becomes more salient than y.  
 
The salience analysis that von Heusinger (2013) elaborated is less vague than McCaw-
ley’s or Lewis’s presentation of salience in the sense that he compositionally shows how, accord-
ing to salience, the referent of a definite description is selected. He uses a context dependent 
choice function that applies to a set of entities and chooses one element from the set that is at the 
top of an ordering associated with each context. This association is indicated by an index on a 
function: for example, a choice function fi is associated with the context i. Consider a situation in 
which there are three cat owners: Ann, Beatrice, and Carola, who own, respectively, cats Albert, 
Bobby, Casimir, and a sentence (21a) whose logical form is in (21b) (p. 368). When (21a) is ut-
tered by Ann, the choice function fann associated with Ann applies to the set of the three cats 
{Albert, Bobby, Casimir} and yields the most salient cat to Ann, which is Albert, and so on.  
 
     (21) a. The cat is very intelligent.  
  b. Very_Intelligent(fi(cat))  
 
Originally, choice functions were proposed by Reinhart (1997) and Winter (1997) for the 
interpretation of indefinites. In von Heusinger’s analysis, a choice function is also used for 
definites. He also called his choice function a global one, which depends on the common ground 
shared by the speaker and the hearer, contrasted with Reinhart’s or Winter’s local choice func-
tion. Their choice function is considered local according to von Heusinger because it is bound at 
some point in the derivation, “but not higher than the text level.” For example, A man comes in 
(22a) would be analyzed as in (22b) in the choice function approach, with Winter’s notation (p. 
434). (22b) asserts that there is a choice function and that the individual selected by this function, 
which is applied to the set of men is in the extension of comes. The variable over choice func-
tions is existentially closed. 
 
     (22) a. A man comes. 




Now, let’s expand this example in (22a) to the anaphoric use of definite descriptions by 
adding The man smokes as in (23a) (von Heusinger 2013: 370). Like Lewis, von Heusinger 
maintains that an indefinite NP not only introduces a new discourse referent, but also “gives the 
highest salience ranking to an individual that fits the description.” He uses both kinds of choice 
function in his analysis—a local one for indefinites and a global one for definites representing 
the salience structure. The indefinite NP a man denotes an arbitrary object (d) via the Rein-
hart/Winter style choice function fx which selects an individual not from all the sets but from as-
sociated sets which meet the descriptive content of the indefinite,9 and this object becomes the 
most salient one in the ranking (he uses the term salience change potential). Now, in the second 
sentence in (23a), the man denotes the same individual d, since it is the most salient man in the 
context, which coincides with our intuition. We start with the initial context i and the global 
choice function fi, and due to the indefinite introduced to the discourse, we now have the updated 
context j, and the updated choice function fj. « » in (23c) indicates the updated part of the choice 
function: fj is identical to fi except for the assignment to the set of men, which is represented by 
/d.     
 
     (23) a. A man comes. The man smokes. 
  b. Comes(fx(Man)) & Smokes(fj(Man)) (with fx(Man) = d) 
  c. fj = fi « [[Man]]M,g/d » (with fj(Man) = d)         (von Heusinger 2013: 370) 
 
 Salience theories give a relatively reliable account of the contextual contribution to the 
interpretation of definite descriptions—not only those definites with incomplete descriptions or 
cases that require accommodation, but also the anaphoric use that Heim’s familiarity analysis 
eminently accounts for, which I beleive is one of the advantages of salience theories over other 
theories of definiteness descriptions. Salience is now more explicitly represented in the recent 
work I have just introduced. My question, though, still pertains to how we apply this to tense. 
Lewis’s point that conversational means or pointing raises the salience of an object makes sense, 
but time intervals are abstract, in that they can neither be “thrown to the interlocutors in the mid-
                                                            
9 It is stated in von Heuisinger (2013) that fx is a local choice function, as in Reinhart and Winter, but in von 
Heuisinger does not provide an explicit configuration of a choice function for indefinites. For a detailed formalism 
in von Heuisinger’s analysis of choice functions, see von Heuisinger (2004).   
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dle of a conversation” nor be pointed at like a tangible object. Whether I refer to salience or fa-
miliarity to explicate definiteness of tense, the idea of salience for tense or time intervals still 
needs to be more clearly defined.    
 Being salient in the context actually sounds as if it is an idea from the field of language 
processing. Underlying questions for salience would include what will catch interlocutors’ atten-
tion or whether information is foregrounded or backgrounded. When this rather vague idea ap-
plies to time intervals, discourse-related features, which might be still vague but formally tracea-
ble, will have to be examined to decide whether a time interval is salient. Heim’s theory requires 
an examination of discourse features, and an account of salience for time intervals will likewise 
require such an examination. It still seems plausible to say that a time interval gains salience as it 
is introduced to the discourse or is repeatedly mentioned. Actually, since tense is not restricted 
by overt markers such as a/the, definite and indefinite interpretations of tense may be stipulated 
with more flexibility. Based on the exposition of definiteness theories presented so far, I adopt a 
salience-based theory of definiteness as a viable option for the definite tense and take the posi-
tion that a tense is definite iff it denotes a salient time. Let me discuss in more detail the ad-
vantages of a salience account of definite tense and its more specified conditions with regard to a 
definite tense.       
 
3.1.1.4 Definite tense with contextually salient time intervals  
To address in a more concrete way the question of under what conditions we have a definite in-
terpretation of tense, I have discussed some notions used to characterize definiteness of DPs, as 
definite descriptions are less abstract than time intervals. Additionally, definite descriptions have 
been explored quite extensively. I will refer to and apply some characteristics of salience among 
the properties discussed above for definiteness descriptions. As we have seen, salience has virtu-
ally the same effect as uniqueness and knownness to interlocutors; also, it can uniformly account 
for deictic and anaphoric uses of definites, which was not possible with uniqueness or familiarity 
theory.  
 The advantage of this uniform treatment of various types of definite DPs is also pointed 
out by von Heusinger (2013: 367): “With the illustration of this small discourse the anaphoric 
use of definite descriptions is explained in terms of salience. That means that the anaphoric use 
can be seen as a specialized form of deictic use. In this way a uniform conception of definite NPs 
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and deictic and anaphoric pronouns is possible.” Using Lewis’s cat example represented in (24), 
von Heusinger shows how the most salient cat in the context is determined. By (24) (i), which is 
added by von Heusinger to the original Lewis example, Bruce is introduced to the discourse and 
is the most salient cat. Therefore, the cat in (ii) denotes Bruce. By (iii) the other cat, Albert, is 
mentioned and thus gains salience and becomes the most salient cat as the discourse continues 
with (iv). Therefore, he in (vi) and the cat in (vii) refer to Albert.   
 
(24) (i) In the room is a cat. (ii) The cat is in the carton. (iii) The cat will never meet our oth-
er cat, (iv) because our other cat lives in New Zealand. (v) Our New Zealand cat lives 
with the Cresswells. (vi) And there he’ll stay, because Miriam would (vii) be sad if the 
cat went away. 
  
 Anaphors seem to be a unique type of definite. They are not exactly in the form of the + 
NP like commonly known definite descriptions, but on the other hand create the uniqueness ef-
fect, as shown when Kadmon (1990) compares (25a) and (25b). A chair in (25a) is indefinite, 
and the object introduced by this expression need not be a unique one identifiable to the speaker 
or the hearer; the sentence is true as long as Leif has at least one chair. In (25b), we have an 
anaphor in the second sentence and a chair is its antecedent. According to Kadmon, many 
speakers cannot use (25b) in a situation in which they cannot identify one unique chair among 
Leif’s other chairs. Namely, we now have the uniqueness effect: (25b) is felicitous only if there 
is exactly one chair of Leif’s identifiable to the speaker. However, unlike uniqueness, which 
solely relies on extra-linguistic information to select the referent of a definite description, an 
anaphor and its antecedent have a strong connection that is linguistically based and traceable in 
the context. That is, anaphors gain their reference from an indefinite expression in the previous 
discourse, which renders the expression their antecedent.       
 
     (25) a. Leif has a chair.  
             b. Leif has a chair. It is in the kitchen.  
 
 Lyons (1999) investigates anaphoric NPs in different languages. Typologically, in lan-
guages like Hidatsa and Ewe, only anaphoric or previously mentioned NPs occur with a definite 
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article. In Lakhota, there is an article for general definites, and “its specialized anaphoric form” 
appears when used for previously mentioned referents (for more discussion on whether such arti-
cles are definite or demonstrative, see Lyons 1999). Of course, a definite expression in one lan-
guage may correspond to an indefinite one in another language; an expression in an articleless 
language may be marked as indefinite or definite when translated into languages such as English 
and French, with overt definite and indefinite articles. Although different languages encode defi-
niteness of NPs in a variety of ways, anaphoricity is a key factor in those languages in order to 
determine the definiteness of NPs. 
 As coreference of anaphors is important with regard to the definiteness of NPs; corefer-
ence of time variables also may be important in definiteness of tense. Time variables denoting 
identical time intervals have some grammatical connection that enforces coreference. Also, as a 
time interval is repeatedly denoted, it will become entrenched in the minds of the interlocutors 
with higher salience.  
 We apparently digressed to definiteness of NPs from definiteness of tense. Of course, we 
cannot exhaustively apply all the notions used to define definiteness of NPs to tense. Expanding 
the parallelism between the two domains first suggested by Partee should be restricted in a well-
constrained manner to some applicable notions to an abstract domain. Though Partee retracted 
some of her initial proposals in her later work, the pronoun-like behavior of tense is still an intri-
guing idea. The link between an anaphor and its antecedent is noteworthy in English, but in some 
languages it is the only feature that defines the definiteness of NPs. It is not totally implausible 
for a tense to have a definite interpretation in cases in which coindexation or coreference is es-
tablished between a time variable and its reference.  
 As to definiteness or contextual salience of a time interval, we maintain that an interval 
that is first introduced in the discourse gains salience. When the same interval is used again, such 
as an anaphoric pronoun or a definite description, it is now a more salient time and induces a def-
inite, indexical interpretation. In other words, once a time interval gains salience, it is considered 
definite, but it is still possible that a time interval is more salient than others depending on the 
context. Let us take an example from Partee (1973: 605): Sheila had a party last Friday intro-
duces a time interval in the discourse which gains salience, and the past tense of the clause has 
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an indefinite reading involving existential quantification over its variable.10 It is natural to infer 
that Sam’s becoming drunk occurred during the time in which Sheila was having a party, and the 
tense in the second clause involves this already salient interval, yielding a definite interpretation. 
Likewise, in (26b) the sentence When Susan walked in involves a variable ranging across a past 
time which is existentially quantified, and the past tense in the subsequent clause has an indexi-
cal reading due to the repeatedly used salient time interval.     
 
     (26) a. Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk. 
   b. When Susan walked in, Peter left.  
  
 One might raise a question about a discrepancy between salience and definiteness. While 
salience is a gradable notion, in that you could say one object is more salient than another, defi-
niteness is basically a binary concept. I posit that once an interval gains some salience in the con-
text, a tense involving that interval has a definite interpretation, as suggested in McCarthy’s, or 
von Heusinger’s salience theory of definite descriptions. Still, one interval may be more salient 
than another interval, and they both induce a definite interpretation.  
 We allow a definite interpretation and a default indefinite interpretation in our tense sys-
tem, unifying both lines of analysis reported in the literature. Unless there is a contextually sali-
ent time interval, we have a quantificational interpretation of tense. Basically, interlocutors will 
track what is going on in the context with respect to temporal elements. When a new time varia-
ble is introduced into a discourse or a coindexed time variable is repeatedly used, the time it de-
notes will be highlighted or become the most salient one in the minds of interlocutors, compared 
to other time intervals. Such a treatment of tense represents a situation in which a familiarity the-
ory is intertwined with a salience theory, so that a familiar discourse referent in Heim’s terms 
becomes salient in the context. But a salient discourse referent can become even more salient de-
pending on the context, and being old to the discourse may not be the only factor that makes a 
time variable salient.  
 I will assume that a free variable over times, due to an indefinite tense, is bound by the 
operation of existential closure rather than by an overt quantifier. In that case we do not need to 
                                                            
10 In her later work, Partee (1984) introduced such cases as “definite anaphors with definite antecedents.” This is not 
the position of this dissertation. Since the past tense of the first clauses in (26) is first introduced in the discourse, I 
argue that it has an indefinite reading.  
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appeal to the internal semantics of a tense morpheme, especially when the definiteness of tense is 
not morphologically marked in English, and the quantificational force of the indefinite reading of 
tense is still retained. The analogy between tense and pronouns as pointed out by Partee should 
be revised, so that tense is more like DPs, including indefinite descriptions. I will show the tech-
nical implementation of such semantics in a later part of the chapter.    
 There might still be one more question raised by this unifying approach to tense. As I 
briefly mentioned above, the definiteness distinction is not overtly marked in the English tense 
system, unlike definite and indefinite descriptions in English. On what basis do we distinguish 
two kinds of interpretation? To contemplate this issue, let us expand our DPtense analogy and 
take a look into some languages that lack articles—whose (in)definiteness of DPs is also not 
morphologically marked.  
 
3.1.2 A Case of Korean  
If I draw more parallelism between nominals and tenses, I believe the analyses of (in)definite 
DPs in articleless languages will also give an insight into a similar distinction in tenses. For ex-
ample, (in)definiteness of DPs is contextually determined in languages like Korean, Chinese, and 
Japanese, where (in)definiteness of nominals is not overtly marked (Lee 2000). Bare DPs of Ko-
rean are represented in (27) from Lee (2000): a bare noun in (27a) is interpreted as indefinite 
while in (27b) with a perfective auxiliary, it is interpreted as definite.  
 
     (27) a. Mary-nun sakwa-lul  mek-ess-ta 
                           top apple-acc   eat-past-decl 
                ‘Mary ate apples.’ 
 
             b. Mary-nun sakwa-lul  ta  mek-e peli-ess-ta 
                            top apple-acc all   eat     up-past-decl 
                ‘Mary ate up the apple(s).’ (cf. *Mary ate up apples.)  
 
 In English, the indefinite article a sometimes indicates the cardinality of the following 
noun as in, eat an apple. In such a context, when a head noun occurs with a number modification, 
we have a numeral classifier construction in a language like Korean, as exemplified in (28). The 
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distinction, in (27a) and (27b), appears due to ta and peli- indicating aspectual telicity (Mary had 
to finish the apple or apples for the sentence to make sense), which also holds for numeral classi-
fier constructions. Thus, Lee states that “[i]f not aspectually telic or contextually definite, the 
numeral classifier construction is typically indefinite.” This is further supported by an existential 
construction found in (29). Such a construction requires an indefinite noun phrase, which attests 
to the indefiniteness of the noun. An indefinite reading of bare nouns and nouns with numeral 
classifiers seems to be a default one in Korean.  
 
     (28) Mary-nun sakwa sey    kae-lul  mek-ess-ta 
                       top apple  three  cl-acc  eat-past-decl 
            ‘Mary ate three apples.’ 
 
     (29) yeynnal-ey enu maul-ey    nongbwu  han salam-i    sal-ass-ta 
             old.days-in  a    village-in  farmer      one cl-nom    live-past-decl 
             ‘Once upon a time, there lived a farmer in a village.’11 
  
 As pointed out above, aspect seems to be an important factor in determining the definite-
ness of bare nominals in the languages discussed above. But in determining the definiteness of 
tense in English, some other contextual factors seem to be involved. Of course, patterns of nomi-
nals found in such languages cannot be the main reason for analyzing English tenses in the same 
manner. However, the fact that a similar pattern is observed in different domains of grammar in 
different kinds of languages could be a sufficient basis for the claims about definite and indefi-
nite readings of tense.  
 More generally, this issue is concerned with the question of how concepts are encoded in 
the grammar in different languages. Many Indo-European languages mark definiteness of DPs 
with overt articles; the majority of languages have numbers, but there are languages that only 
have words for one, two, and three in their number system. The majority of languages do not 
mark definiteness of tense morphologically, but that does not necessarily mean that such ambigu-
ity between definite and indefinite tenses is an impossible mechanism in the grammar. Plus, def-
                                                            
11 Examples (27)-(29) are all from Lee (2000) and some are slightly modified. Top indicates a topic mark-
er, nom a nominative case, acc an accusative case, decl a declarative ending, and cl a numeral classifier. 
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initeness would be more significant type of information for DPs rather than for tenses, as defi-
niteness is quite abstract. It is likely that many languages have been developed so that definite-
ness of DPs is overtly marked, but definiteness of tenses is not.   
 I would also like to introduce another ambiguous case in Korean. The suffix -ess/-ass in 
Korean is commonly known as the past tense marker. However, there has been much debate on 
the exact categorization of the suffix and its nature (Sohn 1995, Oh 2003). Some researchers 
have argued that -ess is mainly a past tense marker (Kim 1985, Lee 1987), but some have 
claimed that it marks the perfective aspect (Nam 1972, Sohn 1975). Another group of researchers 
have maintained that  -ess represents both tense and aspect (Suh 1976, Lee 1982). 
 Researchers seem to agree on at least several points—that -ess has multiple uses, and its 
meaning and usage are heavily dependent on various factors such as aktionsart of the root verb, 
temporal adverbials, the contextual information, and so on. Oh (2003), among others, has col-
lected and analyzed conversational discourse data and argues that -ess represents both preterit 
and perfective, depending on the context. For example, in (30a), we have an example of the sim-
ple past usage of -ess, which is most frequently observed in Oh’s data (2003: 1193-4). The time 
at which the speaker did not know is within her high school years and thus we have a simple past 
reading of -ess, in that it denotes a time interval in the past. On the contrary, in (30b), the time at 
which the action of becoming red is not necessarily in the past; -ess indicates that the action is 
completed rather than placing in the past the time during which the action takes place. The in-
choative suffix -ci- and the transferentive suffix -ta(ka) denote the change in state, which also 
affect the meaning of ess.  
   
     (30) a. kotung-hakkyo  ttay   mol          -ass-e 
      high    -school   time  not-know-past-decl 
     ‘(when I was) in high school, I didn’t know her.’ 
 
  b. ppalkay-ci-ess-taka        hayay-ci-e 
      red-become-perf-conj    white-become-decl 




 The past tense/aspect marker -ess in Korean is ambiguous in the sense that it sometimes 
represents the preterit and at others the perfective. The simple past English may as well be am-
biguous, and the ambiguity in English preterit is about the (in)definiteness of the tense, which 
depends on context. 
 
3.2 Formal System 
3.2.1 Preliminaries 
In this section, I will provide a truth-conditional semantics for the past tense in English, for both 
indefinite and definite readings of it. First, let me posit that linguistic expressions are assigned 
their semantic values under a variable assignment function g in a context c  C (the set of all 
contexts) relative to a possible world w  W (the set of all possible worlds). The denotation of a 
linguistic expression  is represented in (31). Proper names rigidly denote the same individual 
relative to every world. For example, John c,g,w = John, Mary c,g,w = Mary, and so on.  
 
     (31)  c,g,w (the denotation of a linguistic expression  in context c relative to assignment g  
 and world w) 
 
 Let us suppose that contexts are modeled as n-tuples of parameters. The utterance time is 
one of the parameters of the context, or an index, following Montague (1970). Indices include 
the speaker, the addressee, the time of utterance, and so on. These elements are devised to ac-
count for the context dependence of indexicals; their references are determined by the index. 
Some contextual elements are introduced in (32). For instance, c1 may be defined as c1 = 
<speakerc1, addresseec1, timec1, placec1, cSAL1, gc1>. The pronoun I in context c denotes speakerc, 
now denotes timec, here denotes placec, and so on. Each c has an assignment function gc which 
maps syntactic indices on referential expressions in a sentence  onto objects in cSAL, a set of sa-
lient objects in c. Assignment function g assigns values to variables in such a way that it agrees 
with gc on all values for which gc is defined, as stated in (33). For example, if gc assigns 1 to 
John and 2 to Mary, all other g’s also assign 1 to John and 2 to Mary. Since gc is fixed by the 
context, variables whose value is fixed by gc do not vary; thus, gc is appropriate for assigning 
values to deictic pronouns and salient tenses. On the other hand, g assigns value to variables, not 
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part of the context, and is suitable for indefinite DPs and indefinite tenses. Such a technique is 
employed in Lasersohn (2017)—see Lasersohn (2017) for more discussion and a more detailed 
implementation of the idea. 
   
     (32) Contextual elements for any given context c  C:  
 a. speakerc is the speaker of c. 
 b. addresseec is the addressee of c. 
 c. timec is the time of c.  
 d. placec is the place of c. 
 e. cSAL ⊆ U ⋃ I (the set of salient objects in c; U is the set of individuals and I is the set of  
     all intervals of time).    
 f. gc is a partial function from + (the set of positive integers) into cSAL. 
 
     (33) Appropriate assignment g:   
 g is an appropriate assignment of values to variables for c iff g is a function from  into 
 U ⋃ I agreeing with gc on all values for which gc is defined.    
 
 Why do I have a context parameter, but not a time parameter? This question is related to 
another question—whether or not a proposition or content, in Kaplan’s (1989) terms, is time-
neutral. He proposed two kinds of meaning, character and content. A character of an expression 
is a function from possible contexts to contents. This context of utterance is the first type of indi-
ces that has the agent, the addressee, the time, and the location of the context. A content (analo-
gous to intension) is a function that maps a possible circumstance or a possible world to a truth 
value. Indices such as world (and time, for Kaplan is the point at which the truth of the sentence 
is evaluated) is the second type of indices, which I will call a parameter. Notice that truth values 
are assigned in two stages. For example, the content of the sentence with an indexical, I like cats, 
changes or varies depending on who says it, or, in other words, the content is fixed by the con-
text of utterance. If John is the agent of the context and utters the sentence, the content of the 
sentence is that John likes cats. Then, the content of the sentence is assigned its denotation, either 
true or false, relative to a possible world.   
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 If the content of a tensed sentence  is sensitive to time, then the content of  will change 
depending on the context, particularly the time of the context. For instance, if the sentence John 
is smiling is uttered at 3 p.m., then the content expressed by the sentence is that John is smiling at 
3 p.m.; if the sentence is uttered at 5 p.m., then the content is that John is smiling at 5 p.m. The 
truth value of the sentence will depend on whether John is smiling at the time of utterance. On 
the other hand, if we posit that the content of a sentence does not vary with the context, then the 
assignment of truth values to contents is relative to a time parameter—either the time of utter-
ance or some time at which the sentence is evaluated.  
 The latter option has received an objection. If the content is time-neutral and its denota-
tion is assigned relative to times, it is difficult to define contradiction without contradicting our 
intuition. For example, John is smiling uttered at 3 p.m. and John is not smiling uttered at 5 p.m. 
can both be true if John is smiling at 3 p.m. and not at 5 p.m.; but since the content is time-
neutral and determined regardless of time, John is smiling and John is not smiling contradict with 
each other no matter when they are uttered (See Lasersohn 2017 for more discussion). Though 
contradiction may not be an important part of the semantics in this dissertation, I will adopt the 
first option, accepting the sensitivity of tensed sentences to time, and set up a system that the 
sensitivity of linguistic contents to time is pertinent to (the time of) the context, rather than to a 
time parameter.  
 Having a time parameter in the second stage, from contents to extensions, is analogous to 
the second option as discussed above with regard to the time-neutrality of the content of expres-
sions. That is, the content of a sentence itself is not sensitive to time, but its truth value is deter-
mined by a time parameter. Tense and tensed sentences are also context-sensitive: for example, 
for the past tense to make sense, the time denoted by the tense morpheme must be prior to the 
context time. We will have the context to address the indexicality of tense, but not this second 
type of time parameter for evaluation. Contents are not the same at every time and a time index 
supplied by the context will suffice for the purposes of this dissertation. For a tensed sentence, its 
content and truth value are sensitive to the utterance time, which is supplied by the context. A 
sentential truth predicate is defined as in (34). 
 
     (34) A sentence 	is true in context c relative to w for any assignment function g  




Now, definitions of types are in (35); domains for the types are listed in (36).  
 
     (35) Types:  
 a. e is a type  
 b. t is a type  
 c. i is a type  
 d. If a is a type and b is a type, then <a, b> is a type 
 e. If a is a type, then <s, a> is a type 
 
     (36) The set of Da of possible denotations of type a: 
 a. De = U (the set of relevant individuals) 
 b. Dt = {0, 1} (the set of truth values; Falsity and Truth, respectively) 
 c. Di = I (the set of relevant time intervals) 
 d. D<a, b> = {f | f is a function from Da to Db} 
 e. D<s, a> = {f | f is a function from W to Da}  
 
 Proper names are already mentioned above as world-independent expressions which de-
note the same individual in any possible world. Denotations of indexicals like I and you are de-
termined by the context, regardless of a world. I c,g,w = speakerc, you c,g,w = addresseec, 
now c,g,w = timec, and so on. Some of the lexical items whose denotation may differ from world 
to world are given in (37). x, y are variables over individuals, t over times, w over worlds. The 
type of (37a) is e,i,t, (37b) is i,e,t, and (37c) is e,i,e,t. We use λ-notation in the usual 
way to represent functions. For example, in [λx: x  A. B], the expression between the colon and 
the dot indicates the domain of the function, and B indicates the value of the function for all pos-
sible arguments.  
 
     (37) a. lawyeri c,g,w = λxe. x is a lawyer at g(i) in w  
  b. arrive c,g,w =  λti. λxe. x arrives at t in w 




 We assume syntactic categories and phrase structure rules in the usual way. Some catego-
ries and their abbreviations are given in (38). We indicate an intermediate projection with a bar 
notation. For example, if we merge an auxiliary (= T) with a verb phrase (= VP), we have a Tʹ. 
When the Tʹ is merged with a subject, we have a maximal projection TP. An instantiation of such 
a syntactic structure is seen in (39). Lexical items and phrase structures generated by the English 
syntactic rules receive a denotation by semantics. Interpretation will be given at the level of the 
logical form of sentences. At the LF, common nouns, tenses and, hence, tensed verbs bear a tem-
poral index i, which is a positive integer.   
     
     (38) Syntactic categories: NOUN (N), VERB (V), ADVERB (ADV), PREPOSITION (P), DETER- 
 MINER  (D), TENSE/AUXILIARY (T), COMPLEMENTIZER (C)  
 
 







 Now we have a compositional function application rule as defined in (40). We also have 
the operation of existential closure (41) as part of a sentential truth definition, following Heim 
(1982). This will account for the quantificational character of the indefinite article a or an indefi-
nite tense. Any unbound variables in the derivation will be bound by (41).  
 
     (40) Function application rule:  
 For any types a, b, if α a complex expression consisting of β of type s,a,b and γ of  
 type a, then α c,g,w = β c,g,w(λw'. γ c,g,w'). 
 
     (41) For each context c,  is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g   c,g,w = 1] . 
  is false in c relative to w iff for all g such that gc  g, φ c,g,w = 0. 
         TP   
 
DP              Tʹ 
 
we       T           VP 
 




3.2.2 Interpretation of the Past Tense 
Time will be modeled with the set of real numbers . Though each number corresponds to an 
instant of time, we will employ intervals of time, not instants, as seen in several theories of tense 
(Bennett and Partee 1978, Dowty 1979). ti is a variable over intervals of time, and the set of all 
intervals of time is I. Singleton sets whose member is an instant of time also qualify as intervals.  
< indicates a precedence relation: if t1 < t2, t1 is prior to t2.  
 The syntactic category TENSE has PAST, PRES, and FUT as its members. Tense involves a 
free variable over times and bears an index i, a positive integer. Thus, the denotation of tense 
TENSEi c,g,w is g(i). The past tense is represented as PAST with an index i at the LF and is defined 
likewise as in (42). Past tense must denote a time interval that precedes the utterance time and is 
undefined otherwise.  
 
     (42) PASTi c,g,w = g(i), if g(i)  timec (undefined otherwise) 
 
 For example, John arrived is analyzed in (43): the sentence is true in context c iff there is 
an assignment of a value to 2 such that John arrives at g(2), which precedes the utterance time. In 
other words, if 2 is mapped onto some time interval prior to timec, at which John arrives, John 
arrived is true. The index is treated as existentially quantified by the existential closure rule in 
(41). For example, let us say that gc maps 1 onto 4:00 p.m. and 2 is not in the domain of gc; there 
is an appropriate g that maps 1 onto 4:00 p.m. and 2 onto 3:00 p.m. If timec is 5:00 p.m. and John 
arrived at 3:00 p.m., (43a) is true. (44) shows a syntactic structure of the sentence and the types 
of each node.   
 
     (43) John PAST2 arrive is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g & John PAST2 arrive c,g,w = 1] 
  a. John PAST2 arrive c,g,w   
  b. = arrive c,g,w( PAST2 c,g,w)( John c,g,w)  
  c. = arrive c,g,w([g(2), if g(2)  timec])(John) 
  d. = [λt. λx. x arrives at t in w]([g(2), if g(2)  timec])(John)  
  e. = 1 if John arrives at g(2), if g(2)  timec in w 
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      = 0 if John doesn’t arrive at g(2), if g(2)  timec in w 
      (undefined if g(2) ≮ timec) 
 







 The above example illustrates an indefinite reading. The sentence with a past tense mor-
pheme is interpreted, provided that the time interval it denotes in c relative to an appropriate g 
precedes timec. Once a time interval is introduced in the discourse, it becomes a member of cSAL. 
In (43), 3:00 p.m. is added to c as a salient time interval times. It can now work as an antecedent 
of subsequent coindexed time variables if there are any. A new time interval introduced in ci al-
ters ciSAL, and thus alters ci to ci+1. For instance, c1 = <Bill, Mary, 5:00 pm, Urbana, {John}, <1, 
John>> and Bill says [He1 PAST7 arrive]. If g(7) is defined and John arrived at 4:00 p.m., the up-
dated context due to the sentence is now c2 = <Bill, Mary, 5:00 p.m., Urbana, {John, 4:00 p.m.}, 
{<1, John>, <7, 4:00 p.m.>}>.   
 
     (45) Addition of new time intervals to the context:  
 For any sentence  containing an expression j in ci = <speakerci, addresseeci, timeci, 
  placeci, cSALi, gci>, if for all g such that  is true relative to ci, g, and actual world w@, g(j) 
  = x, then cSALi+1 = cSALi + x. Also, Dom(gci+1) = Dom(gci) + j.    
    
 Let us now assume that Bill says John smiled and that John’s smiling co-occured with his 
arrival. Therefore, the tense in John smiled is coindexed with the tense in John arrived. The 
context for [John PAST7 smile] is c2; the denotation of the sentence is presented in (46).  
 
     (46) John PAST7 smile is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g & John PAST7 smile c,g,w = 1] 
         TP  t 
 
 DP  e              Tʹ  e,t 
 
John       T  i         VP  i,e,t 
   
            PAST2       arrive 




  a. John PAST7 smile c,g,w   
  b. = smile c,g,w( PAST7 c,g,w)( John c,g,w)  
  c. = smile c,g,w([gc2(7), if gc2(7)  timec])(John)   
  d. = [λt. λx. x smiles at t in w]([gc2(7), if gc2(7)  timec])(John)  
  e. = 1 if John arrives at gc2(7), if gc2(7)  timec in w 
      = 0 if John doesn’t arrive at gc2(7), if gc2(7)  timec in w 
      (undefined if gc2(7) ≮ timec) 
 
 (45) shows one way of updating cSAL. Adverbials like yesterday add the times they denote 
to cSAL. Elements of cSAL could also be given in the beginning of the discourse as part of the 
shared knowledge between the interlocutors. An index on a tense which is in the domain of gc is 
mapped onto an element in cSAL, times. Unlike the indefinite interpretation of tense, the definite 
interpretation is indexical, in that a tense morpheme denotes a particular time times in cSAL via gc.   
 Let us have the distinction between definite and indefinite tenses as summarized in (47). 
If an index of a tense morpheme is in the domain of gc, the tense morpheme is definite; in the 
case of indefinite tenses, we want to say that its denotation is determined not by gc but by an ap-
propriate g due to existential closure, since the index on an indefinite tense is not in the domain 
of gc. If the value of a time variable is only determined by gc, such a rule will only account for a 
definite or indexical reading of tense. The salience condition (47) looks similar to Heim’s famili-
arity condition in (14). The difference, however, is that (14) constrains the interpretation of NPs 
whose syntactic definition is already characterized, while (47) serves as a semantic definition of 
definite and indefinite tenses.   
 
     (47) Salience condition: For any temporal expression i and context c,  
 a. If i  dom(gc), i is definite.   
 b. If i  dom(gc), i is indefinite.   
 
 We now have a system in which the interpretation of tense is determined by features of 
the context and contextual salience. The context dependence of tense is more explicitly shown in 
terms of temporal indices and their value assignments. Notice that such a system is also advanta-
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geous for a language whose definiteness of tense is not overtly marked because both readings of 
tense are assigned by the same kind of semantic operation, which is gc or g. Additionally, by al-
lowing both quantificational and indexical interpretations of tense, we are able to account for 
more data, which was not so in the theories that have only one type of interpretation, as reviewed 
in Chapter 2. Coreference of variables over salient time intervals will be tackled in more detail in 









In this chapter I will show how the semantics proposed in the previous chapter with both definite 
and indefinite interpretations of tense account for temporal anaphora. As you can anticipate from 
the term, temporal anaphora is associated with anaphora or anaphora resolution of DPs. Anapho-
ra resolution concerns what DPs, especially anaphors, in a discourse refer to in relation to other 
DPs. Coindexation or coreference of variables due to pronouns and definite descriptions is an 
issue of anaphora resolution, along with how these variables are bound. Since both quantifica-
tional and referential uses of tense are allowed in our tense system, it is worth investigating how 
time variables that enter into a discourse are bound and how coindexed variables and their values 
are accounted for.  
 I will also show in this chapter that tenses are interpreted within a limited domain, as well 
as how this domain is selected and shifted in the course of conversation. In relation to temporal 
domains, I will propose a new version of an anchoring condition for tenses. When-clauses will 
also be discussed, along with a pragmatic constraint in tense interpretation. As I demonstarted in 
the previous chapter, multiple salient time intervals are allowed in my tense semantics, which is 
an advantage over previous theories, as reviewed in Chapter 2. For these purposes, I will mostly 
use excerpts from TV interviews I transcribed and adapted specifically for this chapter.      
 
4.1 Selection of Approximate Time Domain  
4.1.1 Chronologically Sequenced Utterances 
Normally, events are recounted in the order they occurred unless interlocutors are confused or 
have a particular conversational goal. This is based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle, as the max-
im of manner, among his maxims of conversation, states that interlocutors are expected to be as 
orderly as possible. For example, when you hear a sentence such as, I heard what happened, and 
I went to the hospital, you assume that the speaker first heard what happened and then went to 
the hospital, and you may further infer that the speaker’s hearing what happened might have 
caused her to go to the hospital.  
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 For the above example, we need to add a few more rules for interrogative clauses and 
traces. First, traces are treated like variables, as presented in (1). The LF structure of [I PAST1 
hear [what PAST2 happen]] is provided in (2) with the type of each node marked, except for the 
semantically vacuous, non-branching node. (3) offers the non-branching nodes rule for such 
nodes on a syntactic tree. We also need a rule for embedded interrogatives like what PAST2 hap-
pened. I follow Karttunen’s (1977) analysis of interrogatives and provide the denotation of what 
happened in (4) following Karttunen. He treated questions and embedded questions as a set of 
propositions (p is a variable over propositions), which are true answers for the questions. Adopt-
ing Karttunen’s analysis, I will also have interrogative clauses denote a set of true propositions.   
 
     (1)  ei c,g,w = g(i) 
 













    
 
     (3) Non-branching nodes: If α is a non-branching node of type a consisting of β of type  
           a, then α c,g,w = β c,g,w. 
 
 
         TP  t 
 
 DP  e            Tʹ  e,t 
 
  I           T   i        VP  i,e,t 
   
            PAST1         Vʹ 
 
                     V                  CP  s,t 
       
                  hear       what5            Cʹ            
           s,t,i,e,t                     
                                              C              TP  t 
               
                                                        e5              Tʹ  e,t 
 
                                                                  T   i        VP  i,e,t 
 
                                                                PAST2      happen 
                                                                -ed 
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     (4) The denotation of what PAST2 happen in c relative to w (based on Karttunen 1977): 
											 what PAST2 happen c,g,w = {p| x[p = x happen at gc1(2), if gc1(2)  timec1 in w  p = 1]}. 
          (undefined if gc1(2) ≮ timec1) 
 
 Since the interlocutors are talking about a particular incident about which they already 
know, PAST2 denotes a salient time in the context times. Let us say we have the parameters of the 
initial context as follows: c1 = <John, Mary, 5:00 pm 6/16/2017, Urbana, times (= 5:00 pm 
4/16/2017), <2, 5:00 pm 4/16/2017>>. Semantic derivations of (2) are represented in (5). 
 
       (5) [I PAST1 hear [what e5 PAST2 happen]]is true in c1 relative to w  
 iff g[gc  g  I PAST1 hear what e5 PAST2 happen c1,g,w = 1] 
  a. I PAST1 hear what e5 PAST2 happen c1,g,w   
  b. = hear c1,g,w({p| x[p = x happen at gc1(2), if gc1(2)  timec1 in w  p = 1]}) 
           ( PAST1 c1,g,w) ( I c1,g,w) 
  c. = [λps,t. λt. λy. y hear p at t in w]({p| x[p = x happen at gc1(2), if gc1(2)  timec1 in w  
          p = 1]})([g(1), if g(1)  timec1])(John) 
  d. = John hear {p| x[p = x happen at gc1(2), if gc1(2)  timec1 in w & p = 1]} at g(1), if 
          g(1)  timec1 in w  
 
 We now have for I PAST3 went to the hospital an updated context c2 = <John, Mary, 5:00 
pm 6/16/2017, Urbana, {times1 (= 5:00 pm 4/16/2017), g(1)}, {<2, 5:00 pm 4/16/2017>, <1, 
g(1)>}>. The sentence is true if there is a time prior to timec2, g(3), such that John went to the 
hospital at g(3). If we assume that the speaker was uttering the two sentences in choronogical 
order, g(1) is prior to g(3). Note also that these time intervals g(1) and g(3) should be placed 
within an approximate time domain. 
 As we have discussed with the example, I didn’t turn off the stove, quantification over 
times occurs in a limited domain, in the same manner as other types of quantification in natural 
language. This also holds true for the short discourse we are discussing: each tense denotes a 
time interval in a restricted domain, which is some time in the approximate past, after the par-
ticular incident of interest. Moreover, in this example, the sequenced acts of hearing and going to 
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the hospital also happened within an approximate time domain that is contextually relevant, with 
not much temporal distance. I will use c to represent the temporal domain in the context. Thus, 
c is now part of c, whose definition is updated, as in (6). The definition of c is provided in (7a), 
and (7b) stipulates that what TENSEi denotes should be a member of c. (7b) works as a pragmatic 
constraint rather than as a part of semantic derivations. For instance, the temporal domain of (5) 
would be relevant to the topic, “what happened,” and g(1) (= t') in (5) is placed within the ap-
proximate domain around gc1(2) (= t"), as illustrated in (8). 
 
     (6) c = <speakerc, addresseec, timec, placec, cSAL, gc, c> 
 
     (7) a. c  I is a set of contextually relevant and limited time intervals.  
           b. TENSEi c,g,w  c 
 
     (8)                t"                      c1 
                   [                            ]             | 
              t'                            timec1 (Time of utterance of c1) 
     
 Often, when people recall a story from the past, their utterances are not always chrono-
logically in order. Times, denoted by the tenses in a discourse, may go back and forth when the 
speaker is confused or has something to add, for example. Restriction on time domain still seems 
effective in a partly disorganized discourse. 
 
4.1.2 Within a Restricted Time Domain   
Time domain for tense interpretation, regardless of the chronological order of tenses, is still lim-
ited, depending on the context. Tenses in a discourse denote times within a restricted domain. Let 
us take the example of (9). The interlocutors are discussing a particular party that the speaker 
was invited to. Tense (a) denotes a salient time in the context, the night that the party took place 
and (b) denotes some time interval within this party time. (c) and (d) are ambiguous. They could 
either be the times when or after the speaker received the invitation, in which case we have a 
domain shift from the party time to the invitation; or, they coincide with (b), in which case we 
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have an anaphor-like usage of tense. Obviously, (e) denotes some time between the invitation 
and the party.  
 
     (9) It (a) was a strange night and I (b) thought I (c) didn’t know why I (d) was invited. So I  
          (e) did research.  
 
 Semantic derivations of sentences containing (a) and (e) in (9) are given in (11) and (13), 
respectively. I use Xi, Yi, Zi to indicate subsets of the set of all intervals I, and there is no gap 
within these subsets of time intervals. If X is the interval between t1 and t2 inclusive, we write X 
= [t1, t2] = {t: t1 ≤ t ≤ t2}; intervals with exclusive end points are represented as (t1, t2) = {t: t1 < t 
< t2}; (t1, t2] = {t: t1 < t ≤ t2} and [t1, t2) = {t: t1 ≤ t < t2} are also possible. Conceptually, an open-
ended time interval like {t: t1 < t} is possible; but, since I argue that tense is interpreted within a 
limited time domain, it will not be used much in this dissertation. If an interval t overlaps with 
another interval X, we write t  X; if t is a subinterval of X, t  X; if X is a subinterval of t, t  X. 
I will treat the expletive it and the copula be as semantically vacuous, hence it c,g,w = [λfe,t. f] 
and be c,g,w = [λfe,t. f], where f is a variable over functions; for present purposes, I will disre-
gard the lexical semantics of the attributive adjective strange. The common noun night here de-
notes a time that is night as represented in (10). The temporal identification rule in (11) applies 
especially for time-denoting common nouns that are not used as an adverbial. The derivation in 
(12) shows that due to (11), (10) is identical with the salient time denoted by PAST1, gc1(1). In 
(13), the tense should denote some time within the domain between t1 and t2, which are the time 
when the speaker received her invitation, and the time when the party started, respectively; that 
is, c5 = (t1, t2).  
 
     (10) night8 c,g,w = g(8), provided that g(8) is a night.    
 
     (11) Temporal identification rule:  
 For any time-denoting expressions of type i, if α a complex expression consisting of β of 





     (12) It PAST1 is a strange night8 is true in c1 relative to w  
 iff g[gc  g & it PAST1 be a strange night8 c1,g,w = 1] 
  a. it PAST1 be a strange night8 c1,g,w   
  b. = PAST1 be a strange night8 c1,g,w   
  c. = PAST1 a strange night8 c1,g,w  
  d. = PAST1 c1,g,w	= a strange night8 c1,g,w  [Due to (11)] 
  e. = gc1(1) = g(8), provided that g(8) is a night in w (undefined if gc1(1) ≮ timec1) 
 
     (13) I PAST5 do research9 is true in c5 relative to w  
 iff g[gc  g & I PAST5 do research9 c5,g,w = 1] 
  a. I PAST5 do research9 c5,g,w   
  b. = do c5,g,w( research9 c5,g,w)( PAST5 c5,g,w)( I c5,g,w)    
  c. = [λy. λt. λx. x does y at t in w]([λx. λt. x is research at t in w])([g(5), if g(5)   
         timec5])(speakerc5)   
  d. = [λt. λx. x does research at g(9) in w at t in w]([g(5), if g(5)  timec5])(speakerc5)   
  e. = speakerc5 does research at g(9) in w at g(5), if g(5)  timec5 in w 
  f. g(5)  c5, where c5 = (t1, t2) (undefined if g(5) ≮ timec5) 
 
 Let us look into the time domains in which the tenses of (b), (c), and (d) in (9) are inter-
preted. These times, along with the times denoted by (a) and (e) and their time domains, are dia-
grammed in (14). Interval c5 is the domain for (e), as mentioned above, between t1 at which the 
speaker got the invitation and t2 at which the party started. Interval c1 is the domain for (a) and 
starts from t2 and ends at t3 when the party ended; that is, c1 = [t2, t3].   
 
     (14)               t1        t2            t3 
 
               
     Speaker received                  Party              Party          timec  
        the invitation                 started            ended 
 
c5  t(e)  c1  t(a) Reading 1:  c1  t(b) 
Reading 2: {t1  c5}  t(b) 
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 There are two options for interpreting (b): it could either be that the speaker did the think-
ing some time in {c5  t1} or in c1. In this example, the domain for its first reading includes t1, 
one end of the relevant time domain for the entire discourse (9), because the speaker’s thinking 
action is in regard to invitation she received at t1. Time domains for tenses (c) and (d) in the sub-
ordinate clauses are determined in accordance with (b); the subordinate past tenses should denote 
a time interval in the domain either preceding or overlapping with the domain for the past tense 
in the main clause. That is, if t(b) denotes some time in c5, t(c) and t(d) cannot denote a time in c1. 
The hierarchical structure of the tenses schematized in (15) gives an explanation for this prece-
dence constraint on the subordinate tenses. T(b) in the tree diagram indicates the tense node for 
the past tense due to (b), thought, and so on. Syntactically, T(c) is in the c-command domain of 
T(b), and so is T(d). When the main and subordinate clauses are all in past tense, the subordinate 
tense is not interpreted in the domain which appears later than the main tense domain, unless the 
subordinate clause contains would. In (9), when the temporal domain for (b) is c1, then the do-
main for (c) is c1 or c5; when the domain for (b) is {c5  t1}, the domain for c is also {c5  t1}, 
but not c1.  
 
     (15)      TP 
       CP 
                  T(b)                CP 
                 T(c)             
    T(d)  
 
 Let us move on to (c) and (d). Again, t(d) cannot be interpreted in the domain later than 
the domain for t(c). If t(c) is interpreted in c1, t(d) is interpreted in c1 or c5; if t(c) is interpreted in 
c5, t(d) should be placed within c5 or denote t1. Here, t(d) has two possible temporal domains, and 
it is due to the two possible readings of was invited: it could refer to the action of the speaker re-
ceiving the invitation or the fact that the speaker is on the guest list. With the one-time activity 
reading, t(d) denotes t1 regardless of the domain for t(c); with the state reading, it is possible that 
the domains for t(c) and t(d) overlap. Since (9) is part of the larger discourse about the party and 
the speaker’s invitation to the party, the event or the state that the speaker was invited to the par-
ty is already salient in the context. Thus, when (d) has the activity reading of receiving the invita-
tion, we have a definite, indexical reading of the tense. The sequence of (b), (c), and (d) is an ex-
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ample of phenomena known as sequence of tense. I will discuss more about sequence of tense 
with past tenses and their ambiguous readings in the system of ambiguous tense.             
 In summary, although each tense in (9) denotes a different, or in some cases, overlapping 
time interval, it is all interpreted within a limited domain. Overall, the domain for tense interpre-
tation in (9) shifted from c1 to c5. Also, as you have seen in the cases of (c) and (d) in (9), we 
have different readings of sentences depending on through which domain the tenses are inter-
preted.    
 Domain shift is also observed in a discourse when there is a topic change. There are three 
sentences in (16), which are part of a larger discourse. In the first two sentences the interlocutors 
are discussing the Boston Marathon bombing that occurred in 2015. As the speaker mentions the 
movie about the bombing that the hearer is part of, the topic is now the movie and its production. 
The temporal domain for the first two sentences is the day that the Boston Marathon took place 
(represented by X in (17), April 15, 2013), which is made more obvious due to that day. On the 
other hand, the underlined past tense (e) denotes some time between the marathon and the time 
utterance, more specifically, in the time period during which the movie was being made (Y in 
(17)). As the topic of the discourse changes, the temporal domain for tense interpretation also 
changes. It may be that if there is an overt expression that indicates time like that day, the inter-
val denoted by that expression is chosen as the temporal domain for the sentence and hence be-
comes available for the following sentences, until a new domain is selected.   
 
     (16) There (a) were people that day who (b) ran a marathon, and then (c) ran another two  
  miles to a hospital to give blood. Boston (d) was a beautiful place on that terrible day. I  
  understand that you almost (e) didn’t make this movie.  
  
     (17)                 
 
               
                                                 timec 
 
 Specifically, the domain for (d) is that day, similar to (9a). The predicate was a beautiful 
place indicates a state in that what the verb describes lasts for some period of time, and thus we 
have a reading that its temporal domain overlaps with the time denoted by that day (t(d)  X). 
X = April 15, 2013  Y  
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Classifying the predicate as a state is based on word-internal time structure of verbs, according to 
Vendler’s (1957) verb classification system. This is a topic that I will discuss in more detail in a 
later chapter. 
 Tenses (a), (b), and (c) in (16) are interpreted in X like (d), but in terms of their temporal 
domain, they are distinguished from (d). (a) in there-construction is related to the noun people, 
and the temporal index on people is related to the indices on (b) and (c) because (b) and (c) are 
describing the people’s actions. The two predicates, ran a marathon and ran two miles, are clas-
sified as accomplishments in Vendler’s system—that is, what the predicates describe last for a 
certain amount of time and have a culmination point. One person, for example, ran a marathon 
and two miles, and the temporal domain for these two actions is not likely to overlap with the 
entire duration of X. Of course, each individual who ran both a marathon and an additional two 
miles could have done so at different times, and if you collapse all these times that each individ-
ual may have run a marathon and plus two miles, there is a possibility that the entire duration of 
these actions of every individual denoted by people would coincide with X. Recall Enç’s exam-
ple, All rich men were obnoxious children, repeated in (18a). Time arguments involved with each 
individual are quantified to capture the natural reading of the sentence, and the relation between 
the two time arguments of both nouns is also part of the representation in (18b). (19a) is a simpli-
fied representation of (a), (b), and (c) in (16). (19b) indicates the temporal domain for (19a).       
 
     (18) a. All rich men were obnoxious children. 
  b. t1t2[x[[rich-man(x) at t1]  [obnoxious-child(x) at t2]]  [t2 ≤ t1]] 
 
     (19) a. t2t3[x[[run-a-marathon(x) at t2]  [run-two-miles(x) at t3]]  [t2 ≤ t3]] 
  b. For all t2 and t3, {t2  t3}  X 
 
 Sometimes, the chronological order of utterances is not clear. For instance, the sentences 
in (20) concern the same topic, the presidential election in 2017. Interlocutors may presume that 
the temporal domain for the utterances in (20) is the election period c, possibly from Election 
Day back to a few months prior. Both tenses denote some time interval within c due to contex-
tual relevance. They are still interpreted within the same limited domain though their precedence 




     (20) We didn’t vote for dirty air, dirty water. We didn’t say let’s make America dirty again.  
 
 In summary, there is a restriction on the temporal domain through which tenses in a dis-
course are interpreted. Tenses involved in related actions and events are interpreted in the same 
or approximate temporal domain c. A domain for tense interpretation is determined based on 
contextual considerations such as how occurrences normally develop and how shared knowledge 
between the interlocutors should include all relevant time intervals in a discourse, whether or not 
the utterances are sequenced in a chronological order. A topic of a discourse is also a factor to be 
considered—when the speaker introduces a new event—for example, changes the topic—the 
domain for tense interpretation also changes. The temporal domain is fixed as an approximate 
time period to the main events discussed in a discourse, and though its boundaries may not al-
ways be precisely determined, it seems that a naturally settled chunk of time is at work for tem-
poral interpretation. As the events that the interlocutors discuss move back and forth in terms of 
the time they took place, a relevant temporal domain also shifts accordingly. Interlocutors are 
effective at shifting and fixing temporal domains, and the context also provides appropriate val-
ues to time variables within a limited domain.  
 
4.1.3 Salience Ranking of Time Intervals   
It is possible that there is more than one salient time interval in cSAL. As we have discussed the 
adaptability of the salience theory of definite descriptions for definite tenses, we have seen that 
salience is a gradable notion and that there is a hierarchy among salient objects in the context. 
Also, there may be a hierarchy among salient time intervals in the context that one interval is 
more salient than another. As with salient objects in the context, the interval at the top of the sa-
lience ranking is the most salient time interval in the context and it is selected as the value of a 
definite tense.   
 The discourse in (21) involves a random experience of the speaker. Though the speaker 
probably knows when the event she is describing took place, this is not clearly presented in the 
context or to the hearer. As the first sentence is uttered, (a) denotes some time in the past, t(a) in 
(22) which is now contextually salient, and a temporal domain c is set up including the intervals 
approximate to the time selected by (a). Tense (b) denotes some time interval within c set by (a) 
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and becomes salient in the context. Since the time denoted by (b), t(b), is added to the discourse 
later than t(a), t(b) is higher in the salience ranking than t(a). (c) is related to an action that is con-
current with (b) and thus t(b) overlaps with t(c) (t(b)  t(c)). t(d) is almost adjacent to t(c) because the 
woman’s action of looking at the speaker seems to start immediately after her action of saying 
something about her life. I will use ‘’ to indicate that two intervals are adjacent or one interval 
immediately follows another (t(c)  t(d)). After t(d) is added to the context, it is now the most sali-
ent time, higher in ranking than t(c) and t(b). The first and between (b) and (c) seems to indicate 
the concurrency of (b) and (c); the second and before (d) cues adjacency of the events related to 
(c) and (d); the and between (d) and (e) could either be an adjacent or concurrent one—in the 
concurrent reading, t(d) overlaps with t(e) (t(d)  t(e)).  
 
     (21) There (a) was a homeless woman one time. I (b) saw her and she (c) was saying some- 
  thing terrible about her life, and she (d) looked up and (e) nodded.  
 
     (22)      
 
               
                 t(a)                                timec 
 
 This is how cSAL is updated as the discourse in (21) continues. Let us call the initial cSAL 
cSAL1, which does not have any member. After the first sentence in (21) is uttered, we have the 
updated cSAL2 (23a): t(a) and a woman, whose denotation is represented as w in (23), are intro-
duced to the discourse, and t(a) and w become a salient time interval and a salient object in the 
context. As the speaker continues with I saw her…, her denotes w which is in cSAL2 as the most 
salient individual in the context. At this point, no rule in the system prevents a pronoun from de-
noting a mismatching individual in gender and number. Let us require that pronouns should be 
assigned their value via gc as long as they match in person, number, and gender. Tense (b) is as-
signed its value via g rather than gc2—the speaker’s action of seeing the woman took place as a 
new action without any overlap with other intervals in the context, and thus (b) introduces a new 
time interval, which gains salience, becoming the most salient one in the context. The most sali-
ent time intervals and objects are boldfaced in (23). cSAL is to be a partially ordered set. The most 
An approximate domain c 
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salient time intervals and objects are boldfaced in (23). The order of time intervals and the order 
of individuals are not correlated with each other. After she was saying… is uttered, we have 
(23c). Again, the value of the tense (21c) is assigned via g or gc4: (21c) denotes a time interval 
that is already added to the context with and indicating concurrency of the actions described by 
the verbs connected with it, and t(c) denotes t(b), the most salient time interval in (23b). As she 
looked is uttered, we have (23d). Depending on whether nodded is concurrent with or adjacent to 
looked, (21e) either denotes t(d) via gc6 or an adjacent time interval t(e) which immediately t(d) fol-
lows via g.       
 
     (23) a. cSAL2 = {t(a), w}  
  b. cSAL3 = {t(b), t(a), w}  
  c. cSAL4 = {t(c) = t(b), t(a), w} 
  d. cSAL5 = {t(d), t(c) = t(b), t(a), w} 
 
 We have examined the range of the intervals denoted by tenses in a discourse and multi-
ple intervals that are salient in the context. Specifically, we have seen how new intervals are add-
ed to cSAL and how the value of the following tense is determined depending on concurrency or 
adjacency of the action associated with the tense as the discourse continues. Selection of tem-
poral domains for tenses and of the most salient interval in the context is quite unpredictable and 
depends heavily upon the context. I have set the domain for tenses as a restriction on their as-
signment functions. It is influenced by the lexical aspect of the verbs, pragmatic factors, and ex-
tralinguistic factors such as encyclopedic knowledge. Interlocutors seem able to track such un-
predictable and dynamic parts of tense interpretation in a discourse, and tenses in a discourse are 
interpreted in a constrained manner. 
 
4.2 When-Clauses 
Temporal domains are more obviously selected with clauses starting with when or as: the time 
interval that the verb of a when-clause denotes is a central point. The temporal domain for the 
tense in the when-clause, and possibly in following tenses, is formed around this point. At a 
glance one may think that when indicates the simultaneity of the verbs in the two clauses, con-
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nected with when. Interestingly, however, a tense in a post-when-clause does not always have an 
anaphor-like, definite reading: tenses involved with when show slightly different behaviors in 
temporal domain selection and simultaneity of the intervals that they denote, depending on fac-
tors like aktionsart.    
 Let us view the examples. The past tenses in (24a) seem to denote overlapping time in-
tervals and thus PAST2 denotes t1, which is the value of PAST1. However, upon closer examination, 
times t1 and t2, denoted by the tenses in (24a), do not completely overlap. Strictly speaking, there 
is a particular time interval (t1) that is quite short, during which the speaker’s action of getting up 
is completed, and it is possible that the speaker’s speech began before she reached to the point of 
getting up there and continued for a while after she arrived there, as illustrated in (24b). t1 and t2 
might not even overlap, but t1 could immediately follow t2 if she began saying something after 
she completed her action of getting up there. All these possible scenarios are covered by when, 
and the two actions are grouped together with some indication of simultaneity, although the 
times during which the two actions took place may not be completely overlapping.     
  
     (24) a. When I got1 up there, I said2 it.   
             b.                 t2 (saying it) 
                                    [ ]                       | 
                  t1                timec 
 
 Interestingly, t3, during which the speaker and his family were in Colorado, forms a tem-
poral domain, possibly for the following utterances found in (25). The actions that the verbs in 
(25) describe are of different types: according to Vendler’s classification, being in Colorado in-
dicates a state, and placing Georgia behind the wheel is an achievement, in that the action is 
completed at an instantaneous interval, which is similar to (24b), illustrated as in (25b). When 
indicates that the two actions in the clauses it connects are related, and the two actions involve 
some concurrency, but it is not the case that one of the tenses always works as an antecedent for 
the other, as we can see in (25). It is likely that the interlocutors talk more about what happened 
in Colorado, in which case t1 becomes a temporal domain for the following tenses associated 
with events that took place in Colorado.   
 
     (25)  a. We were1 in Colorado when we first put2 Georgia behind the wheel. 
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  b.         t1 (being in Colorado) 
                                    [ ]                       | 
                  t2                timec 
	
 I now offer a denotation of when, based on (24) and (25) (I only considered a reading that 
t1 is within t2). (26) is a simplified syntactic structure of [[when p] q], where p and q are variables 
over sentential elements of type i,t. Both (26a) and (26b) are possible options for the sentence. 
(27) is the initial denotation of when. In (27), t of p is a subinterval of t' of q because in both (24) 
and (25) t, which corresponds to t1 in (24) and to t2 in (25), is placed within t'. The derivation of 
(25) is given in (28). It is a simplified version; first indicates that the action of putting Georgia 
behind the wheel continued afterward, and this occasion is the first one among the actions that 
followed, an action that is dropped in the derivation in (28). Also, the denotations of in Colorado 
and behind the wheel are omitted for present purposes.  
 
     (26) a.                                                               b. 
 
 




     (27) when c,g,w = λpi,t. λqi,t. [p(t)  q(t')  t  t' in w] 
 
     (28) We3 were1 in Colorado when we3 put2 Georgia behind the wheel. 
             a. we3 PAST1 be in Colorado c,g,w 
  b. = λti. gc(3) be in Colorado at t in w  
    c. we PAST2 put Georgia behind the wheel c,g,w 
  d. = λti. gc(3) PAST2 put Georgia behind the wheel at t in w  
  e. (26): λpi,t. λpi,t. [p(t)  p(t')  t  t' in w]([λti. gc(3) put Georgia behind the wheel at t  
       in w]( PAST2 c,g,w))([λt'i. gc(3) be in Colorado at t' in w]( PAST1 c,g,w)) 
  f. [gc(3) put Georgia behind the wheel at g(2), if g(2)  timec in w]  [gc(3) is in Colora- 
      do at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w]  g(2)  g(1) in w 
  g. (Due to existential closure) (26) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [[gc(3) put 
                    TP  t 
          CP  i,t,t  q  i,t     
when          p  i,t        
i,t,i,t,t           
        TP  t 
  q  i,t     CP  i,t,t          
        when          p  i,t    
     i,t,i,t,t       
78 
 
      Georgia behind the wheel at g(2), if g(2)  timec in w]  [gc(3) is in Colorado at g(1),  
      if g(1)  timec in w]  g(2)  g(1) in w] = 1] (undefined if g(1) ≮ timec) 
 
 Now, t  t' in (27) is due to the lexical aspect of the verbs in (24) and (25). (29) is another 
[q [when p]] example. In here, t' of q, which is t1, is a subinterval almost completely overlapping 
with t2, and t2 seems to form the temporal domain. Unlike (24), t1 is not allowed to be outside of 
the domain of t2. Thus, according to the types of verbs, (30) is also a denotation of when, along 
with (27).       
 
     (29) a. He didn’t1 even want to eat meals when he played2 cards.  
 
             b.              t2 (playing cards) 
                        [                               ]     | 
                  t1                timec 
      
     (30) when c,g,w = λpi,t. λqi,t. [p(t)  q(t')  t'  t in w] 
  
 Here is another example with as. The verbs in (31a) have a very short interval during 
which the actions they describe take place. There is a moment that the speaker finished a sen-
tence and felt something. As indicates that these two intervals overlap (t1  t2), or at least, t2 
should be placed within a highly proximate interval to t1. (31b) also connects two clauses with as, 
but the verbs in (31b) describe longer processes: the activities of telling stories and going along 
were taking place for a certain period time, which is distinguished from (31a) in that it is at a 
short interval that finishing a sentence and feeling occurred. We do not know from (31b) exactly 
how long he was telling stories, but it is clear that t3 and t4 mostly overlap. Alternatively, to say 
the least, t3 and t4 should be placed within the same temporal domain. 
  
     (31) a. As I finished1 the sentence, I felt2 myself being lifted up. 
  b. He told3 us stories as we went4 along.  
 
 As we have seen in the above examples, when/as indicates a loose simultaneity between 
the verbs it connects, rather than perfect overlap in times they denote. In other words, time inter-
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vals denoted by the tensed verbs are within the approximately same domain, though how these 
time intervals precisely overlap may be different. We use when to connect two actions or events 
that not only completely overlap, but also partially overlap and even successively occur. 
 Lasersohn (1999) dubbed this pragmatic slack. It is a pragmatic assumption among inter-
locutors or a tacit constraint on discourse that as long as the details of information they share are 
close enough, they are felicitous though not perfectly accurate. Lasersohn employed a pragmatic 
halo, assigned on an expression α to account for regulations on such pragmatic slack, according 
to similarity to the denotation of α. The pragmatic halo of α, as formalized in (32), is a partially 
ordered set of elements of the same logical type, with the denotation of α. A set of objects HC(α) 
has the denotation of α and other objects different from the denotation of α, with pragmatically 
ignorable details in C. ≤α,C indicates an ordering of HC(α), which puts the denotation of α in the 
middle of the halo.12 Precise, not-allowing-margins types of truth-conditional semantics would 
not allow when to be licensed under such a loose concurrency environment, which is contradicto-
ry to actual language use. Therefore, as we have observed in the examples thus far, we accept 
pragmatic slack in time intervals, which tenses denote and stipulate as in (33)—that pragmatical-
ly close enough time intervals in the context are qualified to be coindexed. However, at this junc-
ture I will not propose a new device to account for pragmatic slack in temporal anaphora. (33) 
allows a case like (24), where there may be actually no overlap between the two time intervals. 
Once a time interval becomes salient, the following coindexed tenses will have a definite reading, 
denoting the contextually salient time interval. The constraint in (33) makes it possible to keep 
the anaphoric use of tense, an approach that was discarded in the later work of Partee (1984) be-
cause of the imprecision of the time intervals as denoted by the consecutive clauses using when.  
 
     (32) The halo of α relative to context C: HC(α), ≤α,C   (Lasersohn 1999) 
 
     (33) Pragmatic constraint on tenses in discourse: when ti and tj are close enough with prag- 
   matically ignorable discrepancies, ti  tj.   
 
                                                            
12 See Lasersohn (1999) for more detail and for further issues such as truth conditions with inaccurate details and 
how much pragmatics should be read into grammar.  
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 The revised denotation of when is given in (34). The relation between t and t' is not an 
instance of an either-way inclusion, but rather, an overlap. Such overlap includes a case in which 
t immediately follows t' or vice versa. This revision is based on (33). (34) accounts for (31)—
both (31a) and (31b)—if we ignore possible on-and-offs of his telling stories along the way, ac-
cording to pragmatic slack; (29) and (24) are also explained by (34). (35) is a derivation of (24).  
 
     (34) when c,g,w = λpi,t. λqi,t. [p(t)  q(t')  t  t' in w] 
 
     (35) When I got1 up there, I said2 it7.  
  a. I PAST1 get up there c,g,w 
    b. = λti. speakerc get up there at t in w  
  c. I PAST2 say it7 c,g,w 
  d. = λti. speakerc say gc(7) at t in w 
  e. (35): λpi,t. λqi,t. [p(t)  q(t')  t  t' in w]([λti. speakerc get up there at t in w] 
       ( PAST1 c,g,w))([λti. speakerc say gc(7) in w]( PAST2 c,g,w)) 
  f. [speakerc get up there at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w]  [speakerc say gc(7) at gc(2), if 
       gc(2)  timec in w]  g(1)  gc(2) in w 
  g. (Due to existential closure) (35) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [[speakerc get 
       up there at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w]  [speakerc say gc(7) at gc(2), if gc(2)  timec in 
      w]  g(1)  gc(2) in w] = 1] (undefined if g(1) ≮ timec) 
 
 Now, the problem is (25). The duration of the actions described by each tensed verb is 
quite different: were describes a state that may last for a long duration, but put is a one-time 
event with an instantaneous culmination point. In a way, what actually matters in when-clauses is 
that there exists an overlap between the times denoted by the tensed verbs in the clauses. So, we 
ignore unnecessary and inaccurate details like at what time t1 starts and ends, but only look into 
the section that overlaps with t2. And of course, inclusion entails overlap. Also, due to pragmatic 
slack, when seems to be licensed as long as t1 is in close-enough proximity to t2. And thus, (34) is 
maintained. Alternatively, however, it might be reasonable not to forcefully apply (34) and retain 
(27), which may be maintained if one of the intervals of a when-clause is too much longer than 
another.    
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 It is likely that when-clauses more evidently indicate a temporal domain. Between the 
two intervals connected with when, a relatively long, not-instantaneous interval tends to be cho-
sen as the domain for tense interpretation unless the sentence is uttered under a clear topic in 
context or with another overt temporal expression, as mentioned above. For example, in (25), t1 
seems to be the domain rather than t2.   
 
4.2.1 Question-Answer Pairs   
A few examples of question-answer pairs will be examined in this section. As you may anticipate, 
in addition to an extremely limited type of question-answer in which both question and answer 
are about the same action and have the same verb, there are other patterns in which a question 
and its answer do not necessarily coincide. First of all, a question and its answer describing the 
same event involve with an overlapping time interval, and the times denoted by the tenses in the 
question and the answer are coindexed. In many such cases, the verb in the answer is realized as 
a proform do/does/did. Whether it is the verb as is or a proform, the tensed verb in the answer 
denotes a salient time interval due to the tensed verb used in the question. Judging by the ques-
tion in (36), a temporal domain for the discourse in (36) is limited to the night prior to the con-
text time during which the party took place. The past tense in the question denotes a time interval 
t1 by which it becomes salient in the context, and the past tense in the answer denotes t1 with a 
definite interpretation. The time denoted by came is also in the domain of last night.   
 
     (36) A: Didi you go to the party last night?  
             B: Yes, I didi. More than 20 people camej.  
 
 Interestingly, (37) includes a negation as part of the answer to the question. The action of 
saying, which is relevant to the tense, did not take place as indicated by the negation. Neverthe-
less, the tense in B’s response refers to the same time, denoted by the past tense in A’s question, 
which is similar to (36).    
 
     (37) A: Didi you say, “I’m the chef”? 




 The next example, in (38), is a bit more complicated. As we saw in the previous section, 
the tense in the when-clause of the question denotes a time within the time interval denoted by 
were in the main clause. Negation is again part of the answer in this example, and the past tenses 
of was and were are coindexed. The time index on happened in the question is identical with the 
time index on happened in the answer. Now, immediately in the next sentence is sensitive to the 
overt temporal domain (day) and the covert one (the time of Boston Marathon bombing) in the 
discourse. Temporal adverbials including immediately will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
     (38) A: Where werei you when that happenedj? 
             B: I wasi not in Boston, and then I heardk what happenedj, and then I immediately wentl  
                  to Boston the next day. 
 
 Take a look at the verbs in example (39) below. The verbs in the question and the answer 
are different, but they seem to denote some overlapping time interval. The conversation concerns 
the accent that B’s mother had when she was alive. The verb sound in the question and was in 
the answer both describe a state that lasted for a long time. It seems that both tensed verbs denote 
a relatively long time interval, while B’s mother was alive and probably that B was aware of her 
mother’s accent. Coindexation is a possible option for the tenses in (39) and thus the past tense in 
was has a definite interpretation.  
 
     (39) A: How didi your mother sound?  
             B: It wasi lovely.   
 
 As with relative clauses, for example in the case of when discussed above, tenses in ques-
tion-answer pairs are, to say the least, in the same temporal domain. Furthermore, when a ques-
tion and its answer share the same verb, as we saw in the examples above, the tenses associated 
with the verbs are coindexed whether or not the verbs are negated. When the tenses are coin-
dexed, the second tense is indexically interpreted because the interval it denotes has already be-




4.2.2 Lexical Aspect 
As in the examples presented thus far, lexical aspect or aktionsart has been repeatedly mentioned. 
While (grammatical) aspect concerns “different ways of viewing the internal temporal constitu-
ency of a situation,” (Comrie 1976), lexical aspect is about the internal temporal structure of a 
situation, denoted by a predicate; tense decides where the interval denoted by a tensed verb 
should be placed, relative to the time of utterance. Since Vendler (1957) has classified predicates 
into four categories, people like Comrie (1976), Dowty (1979), and Smith (1991) also give a 
classification of predicates with more categories and features. In this dissertation, I will use 
Vendler’s system and terms, although Vendler did not use the term aktionsart in his article.  
 The four categories of Vendler’s classification are activity, state, accomplishment, and 
achievement. Such a classification is based on questions such as whether or not an action or a 
situation a predicate denotes has an endpoint, or whether or not an action lasts for some time. His 
classification and examples are given in (40). Activity predicates do not have an endpoint in the 
action they describe; the actions described by activity terms are also dynamic and continuously 
happening at the subintervals of the time during which the actions occur. State terms describe 
static and durative situations, including habits or jobs. Activity verbs can be used with the pro-
gressive, but state verbs cannot, as shown in (40b). Accomplishments indicate a process occur-
ring for a period of time, short or long, up to its culmination. As with activity terms, the actions 
predicated by accomplishment terms are continuous at their subintervals, disregarding pragmati-
cally ignorable short breaks. As to achievements, their actions take place at a particular moment. 
And thus, accomplishments and achievements are used with different types of temporal adverbi-
als, as you can see in (40c) and (40d). Accomplishments work well with durative adverbials like 
for an hour, but achievements do not.  
 
     (40) Aspectual classes of Vendler (1957) 
  a. Activity: They chatted, I was running 
  b. State: She knows (/*is knowing) my sister, Sue is tall 
  c. Accomplishment: John ran a mile, He drew a tree for an hour (/*at one).  




 We have some cases in the examples above that state verbs are selected for a temporal 
domain. It was a strange night in (9) describes a static state that lasted for some period of time, 
which in this example is night. The time that night denotes actually overlaps with the time of the 
topic (interlocutors are discussing a party), and more specifically ‘night’ would mean the party 
night, the time during which the party was taking place. In Boston was a beautiful place on that 
terrible day in (15), was is also a state term and day delimits the time that was denotes. 
 In a way, the copula be is tricky because sometimes it is coupled with a temporal NP like 
the examples in (9) and (15), with the time it denotes overlapping with the time that the temporal 
NP denotes, and sometimes it is coupled with an NP that is also correlated with the following 
verbs, with the thematic role of its agent. This pattern was observed in (15), whose relevant part 
is repeated in (41) in its formal representation. As I stated above, X in (41c) is also a domain for 
t1; and, not only that, {t2  t3} actually overlaps with t1.   
 
     (41) a. There (a) were1 people that day who (b) ran2 a marathon, and then (c) ran3 another two  
      miles.  
  b. t2t3[x[[run-a-marathon(x) at t2]  [run-two-miles(x) at t3]]  [t2 ≤ t3]] 
  c. For all t2 and t3, {t2  t3}  X 
 
 The tendency we observe, namely, that state predicates are more likely to be selected as a 
temporal domain is also observed in when-clauses, as in (25), and repeated in (42). Interlocutors 
are discussing how to teach their children to drive, and this story is now more limited to a tem-
poral domain, which is the time during which the speaker and his family were staying in Colora-
do. While putting Georgia behind the wheel is an achievement predicate, were in Colorado pred-
icates a state that lasted for some time. Domain selection is not a matter of to which predicate 
when is attached, but of which predicate’s lexical aspect is more stable and long enough to serve 
as a temporal domain. When merely connects the two intervals denoted by the tenses used in the 
clauses. 
 




 Lexical aspect is a critical factor in the discussion of a temporal domain. Contextual fac-
tors and discorsal factors are also important for determining a temporal domain, but such factors 
cannot exclusively determine temporal domains, disregarding the aspectual type of predicates.      
 
4.3 Anchoring Condition Revisited and Domain Anchoring 
As we reviewed in Chapter 2, Enç (1986, 1987) treats tenses as referential expressions, not quan-
tificational ones. Enç (1987) also provides anchoring conditions for matrix and embedded tenses. 
She first points out that tenses make an indexical reference to the time of utterance: “the truth of 
a tensed sentence is relative to the speech time.” Thus we have (43). She proposed the anchoring 
conditions in (44), similar to the Binding Principles. Basically, according to Enç, tense is an-
chored if it is governed by Comp(lemtizer), and C (or Comp) is related to the time of utterance 
(or the speech time). C is anchored if it denotes the time of utterance, which is denoted by the 
index 0, as can be seen in (45), and thus the matrix tense in (45) is anchored, according to (44a) 
and (44c).      
 
     (43) Enç’s Anchoring Principle: Each tense must be anchored.  (1987: 642) 
 
     (44) Anchoring Conditions (p. 643) 
  a. Tense is anchored if it is bound in its governing category, or if its local Comp is an- 
      chored. Otherwise, it is unanchored.  
  b. If Comp has a governing category, it is anchored if and only if it is bound within its  
      governing category.   
  c. If Comp does not have a governing category, it is anchored if and only if it denotes the  
       speech time.  
 
     (45) John died: [S' Comp0 [S NP [I' PASTi VP]]] (p. 644) 
 
 Embedded tenses are anchored in a different manner. Among different types of embed-
ded tenses Enç discussed, let me focus in this section on complement tenses, PAST under PAST. 
Recall (9) above, whose part is repeated in (46). We have seen that (46) has two readings: the 
speaker either thought “I don’t know” or “I didn’t know.” Namely, times denoted by the tenses 
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either overlap (t1  t2) or t2 < t1. Enç argues that the difference between the two readings lies in 
how the complement tense is anchored. Simply put, (44a) and (44b) make it possible for the 
complement tense to be anchored in two ways. First, as in (47a), since the lower Comp is bound 
by and coindexed with the matrix tense, the subordinate tense is anchored according to (44a) and 
it denotes a time prior to the time denoted by the lower Comp due to the definition of the past 
tense by Enç. The simultaneous reading (47b) is obtained when the subordinate tense is directly 
anchored, bound by the matrix tense in its governing category, the matrix clause. Thus, the sub-
ordinate tense is coindexed with the matrix tense, denoting the same time as the matrix tense.      
 
     (46) I thought1 I didn’t2 know. 
 
     (47) Complement tenses Enç (1987: 646) 
    a. [Comp0 [NP [PASTi [V [Compi [NP PASTj  
              b. [Comp0 [NP [PASTi [V [Comp [NP PASTi  
 
 Whether one adopts a quantificational or indexical interpretation of tense, or both, it is 
uncontroversial that the interpretation of the (matrix) tense is determined relative to the time of 
utterance. If we revise the meaning of anchoring to this property of tense, making indexical ref-
erence to the time of utterance, not necessarily relying on government and a time-denoting com-
plementizer, (43) is still acceptable because anchoring is now the essential part of the definition 
of tense. Examples of subordinate tenses discussed in this chapter are of a rather simple type; the 
interaction between the intervals denoted by matrix and subordinate tenses is merely overlap, due 
to when. As to complement past tenses under another past tense, I have made it clear that the 
time denoted by the complement preterit cannot be later than the time denoted by the matrix 
preterit, as discussed with regard to their syntactic structure. Based on the discussion so far, I 
will only adopt Enç’s anchoring condition in the limited sense that tense is relatively defined by 
making reference to another time—matrix tenses indisputably to the time of utterance and em-
bedded tenses in temporal adjunct clauses, complement clauses, and relative clauses to other 
times. 
 Again, I am not committing to Enç’s proposal in its entirety, especially binding and gov-
erning categories and complementizers involved in tense interpretation. However, I will maintain 
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that every tense must be “anchored,” as stated in (48).13 In terms of this simplified type of an-
choring, (46) has two readings because PAST2 is anchored either to PAST1 (the shifted reading is 
obtained) or to the time of utterance as the main tense (the simultaneous reading is obtained). In 
this account, anchoring is reduced to the issue of to what time interval a tense makes indexical 
reference.  
 
     (48) Anchoring of tense: every tense is relatively interpreted to another time. 
 
 I would also like to expand anchoring to temporal domains. As noted in (7) and repeated 
in (49), tense is interpreted in a restricted domain, determined by context. When a time interval 
enters into a semantic computation, a temporal domain is formed around the interval unless the 
interval itself functions as a domain; the subsequent tenses are interpreted in this domain, or an-
chored to this domain, until a new one is formed. Then, for example, the time denoted by the 
tense in when we were in Colorado in (42) is selected as a temporal domain in the context of be-
ing a relatively long interval, and highlighted by when. As to the famous stove example, I didn’t 
turn off the stove, a temporal domain is tentatively formed surrounding the time denoted by the 
tense, which is in the approximate past, as summarized in (50). As long as there exists a time 
within this domain at which the speaker did not turn off the stove, the sentence is true and the 
quantificational interpretation can account for it.  
 
     (49) Domain anchoring:  
 TENSEi c,g,w  c, where c  I is a set of contextually relevant and limited time intervals.   
 
     (50) Temporal domain formation 
  a. c is a relevant time interval in the context, if there is one.    
  b. If not, c is formed around a time interval denoted by a new tense.  
 
 Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (2005, 2007) also propose their versions of anchoring 
conditions, along with the syntax of temporal expressions in terms of spatiotemporal predicates 
and a few particular time intervals. Intervals of importance in their analysis are the utterance time 
                                                            
13 See Ogihara (1989, 1996) for detailed arguments against Enç (1987). 
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(UT-T), assertion time (AST-T), and event time (EV-T). These intervals are similar to Reichen-
bach’s three time indices (AST-T being roughly analogous to Reichenbach’s reference time), but 
in Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria’s system, these times reside in the specifier positions, being 
an external argument of TP, ASP-P (aspectual phrase), and VP, respectively, whose precedence 
relations determine various tenses and aspects. Their relations are regulated by the heads T and 
ASP, with spatiotemporal predicates such as WITHIN, AFTER, and BEFORE. (51) is the syntac-
tic representation of Maddi was drawing a house—T puts the UT-T after the AST-T and ASP 
orders the AST-T within the EV-T, characterizing the progressive aspect.     
 
      (51) Maddi was drawing a house. (Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria 2005: 193) 
                            TP 
 
                UT-T  T' 
 
       T          ASP-P 
            AFTER 
   AST-T          ASP' 
 
    ASP         VP 
            WITHIN 
      EV-T   VP 
 
 What governs the anchoring of various temporal subordinate clauses are the econo-
my/optimality principles found in (52). They explicate the mismatch (and match) between tenses 
and aspects connected with expressions like after, before, and when. Anchoring processes of 
such clauses are illustrated in (53). We have non-contradictory orderings between the times ac-
cording to the steps observed in (53), and thus (52a) is maintained, but (53c) violates the econo-
my principle (52b): after redundantly specifies the ordering between the times, which is already 
spelled out in (53a), and (53b), therefore, is semantically vacuous.          
 
     (52) Economy/optimality constraints (Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria 2005: 207) 
  a. Anchoring a subordinate clause into a matrix clause is optimal iff it yields an ordering 




  b. No step in a given temporal derivation can be semantically vacuous: every step in the 
       derivation must be temporally informative (that is, must yield a temporally distinct in- 
      terpretation).  
 
     (53) Illustration of the ungrammaticality of *Max will leave after Sue arrived. (p. 208) 
  a. Step 1: Compute the temporal interpretation of the matrix Max FUT leave 
       UT-T___AST-T1 
  b. Step 2: Compute the temporal interpretation of the adjunct Sue PAST arrive 
       AST-T2___UT-T 
  c. Step 3: Compute the temporal contribution of the connective after 
       AST-T2___UT-T___AST-T1 
 
 Economy constraints in (52), however, do not account for complement tenses like (46). 
This rather simple and highly frequent case is explained by an additional series of complex com-
putations. They begin with a familiar technique to resolve the simultaneous and shifted ambigui-
ty. This is done in terms of different anchoring patterns: either the complement is anaphorically 
anchored to the matrix tense (and thus the time denoted by the complement tense is prior to the 
time denoted by the matrix tense) for the shifted reading, or it is deictically anchored to the UT-T 
for the simultaneous reading. However, due to (52a), anchoring of the complement past to the 
UT-T is problematic: both AST-T’s of the tenses are prior to the UT-T, but the ordering of the 
AST-T’s is not specified. Not only that, other past-under-past cases connected with before and 
after are also troubling when the subordinate tense is anaphorically anchored to the matrix tense. 
As can be seen in (54) and (55), before violates (52b), and after violates (52a). To fix this, they 
proposed a set of resetting rules, in particular, in the case of the simultaneous reading of the past-
under-past complement tense, the complement AST-T is anchored not to the UT-T in step 2, but 
to the matrix AST-T, which is the reset anchor time, so that the output is optimal.  
 
     (54) Anchoring the external argument of subordinate T to matrix AST-T (pp. 212-213)  
  Max left before Sue arrived.  
  a. Step 1: Compute the temporal interpretation of the matrix Max PAST leave 
       AST-T1___UT-T 
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  b. Step 2: Compute the temporal interpretation of the adjunct Sue PAST arrive 
       AST-T2___ AST-T1 
  c. Step 3: Compute the temporal contribution of the connective before 
       AST-T1___ AST-T2 
 
     (55) Anchoring the external argument of subordinate T to matrix AST-T (p. 213)  
  Max left after Sue arrived.  
  a. Step 1: Compute the temporal interpretation of the matrix Max PAST leave 
       AST-T1___UT-T 
  b. Step 2: Compute the temporal interpretation of the adjunct Sue PAST arrive 
       AST-T2___ AST-T1 
  c. Step 3: Compute the temporal contribution of the connective after 
       AST-T2___ AST-T1___UT-T 
 
 However, I do not see how such a resetting obtains the desired, but omitted, simultaneous 
reading. By resetting the problematic anchor time, optimality is checked, as shown, but how is 
the outcome different from that of shifted reading while the simultaneous reading is still quite 
robust? Putting aside other types of subordinate (or dependent, in their terms) tenses for present 
purposes, I would like to compare their economy principles with the structure shown in (11) for 
the past-under-past complement clauses. I highlighted the c-command relation between the tens-
es in (11); due to this structure the complement past tense cannot denote times later than the 
times denoted by the higher past tense. The difference between the two readings may still be de-
pendent on divergent anchoring patterns—the complement past tense anchored either to the time 
of utterance (that is, prior to timec) or to the time denoted by the higher past tense.   
 I agree with Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria that time intervals denoted by tenses are 
ordered with respect to each other because tenses are relatively defined, which means that tenses 
are intrinsically susceptible to other relevant time intervals. The anchoring principle of this dis-
sertation, (48) also assures that tenses make indexical reference to other times like timec, relative-
ly defined, not necessarily referring to abstract spatiotemporal predicates in the syntax. Thus, 
Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria’s intuitive idea that intervals are related to each other and that 
their ordering is determined relative to each other is consistent with (48), although its implemen-
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tation is different from mine. I also apply anchoring as a restriction on intervals denoted by tense, 
namely, a restriction on the assignment g, as in (49).   
 Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria’s theory covers a variety of examples and consequent-
ly becomes complicated, with several additionally conditioned rules and exceptions. In particular, 
they must appeal to another set of resetting rules in order to address why their economy princi-
ples cannot account for the simple case of past-under-past complement tenses. I wonder how 
their resetting rules are related to the intrinsic properties of tense or aspect. My complaint is that 
even with the resetting rules the simultaneous reading of the past-under-past complement tense is 
still not clearly elucidated.    
 Ogihara’s (1989, 1996) tense deletion is known as a prominent solution to the sequence 
of tense (SOT) examples like (46). He opposes Enç’s position on tense and her account for SOT 
phenomena, maintaining that tense interpretation is quantificational. (56) is the conclusive ex-
ample that Ogihara presents against previous scope-induced analyses. He argues that the reading 
that John’s purchase of a fish takes place later than the utterance time is obtained only through 
his optional tense deletion rule, as applied to the relativized NP. (57) shows how both simultane-
ous and shifted readings of past-under-past complement clauses are obtained. The tense deletion 
rule is optionally applied at the LF; when applied, the tense node is empty, not being able to have 
its own features, and hence we have the simultaneous reading. We have the shifted reading when 
the rule is not applied, as in (57b), and the subordinate past denotes a shifted interval farther to-
ward the past. With Ogihara’s treatment, you do not have to refer to the relation between time 
intervals and thus are free from the question of why the tenses should be anchored either to the 
speech time or to the matrix time—not to other times if they may exist, or to other expressions.  
 
     (56) John said that he would buy [NP a fish that was still alive].  (Ogihara 1989: 106) 
 
     (57) Ogihara’s ST or tense deletion rule applied to (46), I thought I didn’t know.  
  a. Simultaneous reading: [John PAST think [I  do not know]]  
  b. Shifted reading: [John PAST think [I PAST do not know]] 
 
 If we adopt Ogihara’s deletion rule, the two readings of tense would be employed to both 
(57a) and (57b). In case of (57a), the subordinate tense denotes the same time as the matrix tense 
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and thus is assigned its value from gc, which is a definite interpretation. As to the shifted reading 
(57b), it is likely that the subordinate tense has an indefinite interpretation of tense, whose value 
is assigned by g.        
 In summary, what I would like to propose about anchoring is that anchoring of tenses is 
now limited, first of all, to the point that tenses make some kind of indexical reference to a cer-
tain time interval, such as the time of utterance. Further, that the relation between the times in a 
discourse is also important, in that a tense is anchored relative to other time intervals, as denoted 
by the relevant tense. Also, a tense is interpreted within a restricted domain, which represents 
another aspect of anchoring. There are cases in which the time denoted by a tense is selected as a 
temporal domain including the surrounding intervals, which are contextually relevant. Of course, 
as we have seen, domain anchoring is loosely done due to pragmatic slack. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have discussed a few temporal phenomena in a discourse: temporal domain, 
coindexation of tenses, lexical aspect, and anchoring of tense. Temporal domain is intriguing: we 
maintain that temporal quantification occurs within a limited domain, in the same manner as 
quantification over nouns/objects, and here we have seen how such a limited domain is selected 
in the context. When there is an overt temporal adverbial, a time interval it denotes is a possible 
temporal domain for tense interpretation. Covertly, when we have a clear topic or an incident of 
interest throughout a discourse, tenses in the discourse are interpreted within the domain with 
rather clear temporal boundaries. If none of the above is clear in the context, then an indefinite 
tense introduces an interval and a domain—that is, a temporal domain approximate to the time 
denoted by a tense is formed, and the tense is anchored to the domain.   
We have discussed that tenses are relationally defined with respect to another time inter-
val. As seen in Chapter 2, several people have pointed this out, particularly in relation to the ref-
erence time. Different opinions about the nature of this third type of time, reference time, exist. 
Further, how the reference time is selected and what role it plays, especially in the interpretation 
of temporal anaphora and temporal adverbials are of great interest of many researchers. In this 
dissertation, I have included a temporal domain in the picture, namely, that the reference time is 
not the only player that determines temporal relations. Additionally, as the discourse continues, 
salient times are stacked up in cSAL with a hierarchy, one of which will share the burden of the 
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reference times, for example, being the antecedent of the following anaphoric tense. This is also 
another aspect of contextual dependency of temporal interpretation, in that reference points or 
anchoring points are also provided by the context, cSAL, that matrix tenses are basically deter-
mined in regard to their relation to the context time or the time of utterance. Further research is 
needed for how the hierarchy of the salient individuals/times in cSAL is determined, how long they 
maintain their salient status, and what constraints exist with which to select time intervals for an-
choring.    
 Tenses that denote times that are not completely overlapping are still qualified to be 
coindexed due to pragmatic slack. In natural language, even when tenses are connected with 
when or as, the actions related to the tenses are not precisely simultaneous. Nevertheless, if the 
times are close enough to each other in the minds of language users, the tenses denoting those 
times are coindexed in a loose sense, and thus reoccurring tenses are eligible for definite inter-
pretation. We have also looked at how aspectual classes work in this process; the internal tem-
poral constituency of verbs determines the duration of the action denoted by the tensed verb, 
which is relevant to domain selection. Surely the boundaries of temporal domains are set accord-
ingly.  
 My tense system allows for both quantificational and indexical interpretations, and this 
chapter shows how the idea is implemented in a discourse. Tenses are interpreted in a limited 
domain and coindexed in a pragmatically constrained manner, either due to when or not, in 
which case indexical reading is involved. Tense is anchored to a time or to a temporal domain. 
Allowing a definite interpretation of tense is advantageous for temporal anaphora resolution: 
when a previously mentioned time interval is later referred to, it now bears a definite reading—









In this chapter I will show how the semantics proposed in Chapter 3, with definite and indefinite 
interpretations of tense, account for temporal adverbials. Specifically, temporal locating adverbi-
als and the intriguing adverb, immediately, will be tackled. 
 
5.1 Temporal Locating Adverbials    
I will start with temporal locating adverbials, like yesterday. Such adverbials serve as a temporal 
domain for tense to be anchored to, as proposed in the previous chapter. That day was an exam-
ple from Chapter 4, and the time denoted by that day was a restricted domain in which a series of 
past tenses in a discourse were interpreted. In this section I will review selected studies of tem-
poral locating adverbials and point out some of the issues to be addressed. I will also propose my 
analysis using the framework laid out in the previous chapters. 
 
5.1.1 Inclusion Relation and Temporal Domain  
Temporal adverbials like yesterday, today, and last week restrict the time frame within which the 
action they describe occurs. For example, (1a) tells us that the event occurred at some time inter-
val in the past and that the temporal domain is not represented; but in (1b) the time interval is 
now overtly restricted in the set of all sets containing an interval denoted by yesterday. Yesterday 
is also deictic in that it denotes different time intervals, depending on the utterance time, timec. If 
the sentence above was uttered during the day of November 5, 2013, then John ran a marathon 
on the 4th of the same month; if it was uttered on October 5, 2013, John did so on October 4th.  
 
     (1) a. John ran a marathon. 
           b. John ran a marathon yesterday.  
 
 Challenges for a temporal adverbials analysis lie in that temporal adverbials are interpret-
ed in concordance with tense interpretation: tense morphemes do not seem redundant when there 
is a time adverb within the sentence, and time intervals denoted by temporal adverbials must 
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match with the time denoted by the tensed predicate. An operator system in which tense is treat-
ed as a sentential operator also introduces an operator for a temporal adverb. The adverbial scope 
paradox due to the interaction between the two scope-taking operators was already discussed in 
Chapter 2. Also, in such a system, there is no apparatus that can prevent sentences such as *John 
will run a marathon yesterday.  
 
5.1.1.1 Dowty (1979, 1982) and double indices 
 To deal with the scope paradox, Dowty (1979) proposes that a time adverb denoting a 
time interval in the past or in the future is combined with a present tense sentence, introducing 
with the adverb the past or the future tense as a single, mingled element. He asserts, “tenses in 
English are primarily parasitic on time adverbials” (p. 323). Take John left yesterday as an ex-
ample: yesterday combines with John leaves in the derivation, changing the verb into left. In this 
system, three rules for the past, present, and future temporal adverbs/tenses are posited as shown 
in (2), with Dowty’s notation. Yesterday belongs to the temporal adverbial category (TmAv) and 
denotes the set of all sets of intervals within yesterday, as translated in (3a); after lambda conver-
sion and other logical processes we have the translation of the entire sentence, as stated in (3b). 
Sentences without temporal adverbials are interpreted by a separate set of rules for tenses. That is, 
when there is a time adverb within a sentence, one of the rules in (2) is applied; when there is no 
time adverb, rules like (4) apply.  
 
(2)  Dowty’s (1979: 327-328) rules for temporal adverbials 
       a. If α  TmAv,   t, then F36(α, ) = 'α, where ' is the result of changing the  
           main verb in  to past tense. 
             Translation: α'(λt[PAST(t)  AT(t, ')]) 
 b. If α  TmAv,   t, then F37(α, ) = 'α. 
             Translation: α'(λt[PRES(t)  AT(t, ')]) 
 c. If α  TmAv,   t, then F38(α, ) = 'α, where ' is the result of inserting will  
   before the main verb of . 




     (3)  a. λPtt[t  yesterday'  Pt{t}] (p. 328) 
            b. t[PAST(t)  t  yesterday'  AT(t, leave'(j))]  (p.325) 
 
(4) Dowty’s tense interpretation rules  (pp. 353, 359) 
a. AT(τ,φ) M,w,i,g = 1 iff φ M,w,i',g = 1, where i' = τ M,w,i,g. 
b. PAST(τ) M,w,i,g = 1 iff there is some non-empty i'  I such that τ M,w,i,g < i' < i. 
c. t[PAST(t)  AT(t, sleep'(j))] 
 
 This “syntactic solution” resolves the scope paradox because there is no scope interaction 
anymore, in that the time adverb and the tense are introduced to the system together as a single 
unit; but it seems syntactically odd and counterintuitive. This analysis gives the impression that 
the temporal interpretation is derived from the temporal adverbial, not the tense morpheme. 
More significantly, tense seems redundant, as a tense morpheme becomes optional, “like an 
agreement marker,” even becoming mingled with it, depending on the presence or absence of 
time adverbials. Rather, the intuition is that a tense morpheme is a major player and time adverbs 
are optional. A normal syntactic rule would introduce a tense morpheme into a derivation as an 
autonomous unit. Another disadvantage is that, as Dowty (1982) himself points out, this system 
brings out two different sets of rules for tenses, again, depending on the presence or absence of a 
temporal adverbial.  
 Binnick (1991) discusses another problem for this analysis. To select a proper rule from 
(2), it should be assumed that temporal adverbials are categorized as past, present, and future ad-
verbs. However, not only is it unclear how these time adverbs are categorized, but also it is un-
certain how the selection of rules in accordance with the matching tense is obtained. Will (2a) 
properly apply with yesterday, for example? Also, consider the following adverbs, as exempli-
fied in (5). “Neutral adverbs” like today, or this afternoon are difficult to classify because they 
can occur with two or even with all three tenses, past, present, and future, and thus it is not clear-
ly circumscribed how to select the correct rule in order to generate the proper tense.  
 
     (5)  a. This afternoon she worked very hard. 
 b. This afternoon she is working very hard. 




Once we separate time adverbs from tense, rejecting Dowty’s (1979) earlier style, the 
more crucial question becomes how we formally and compositionally connect the time interval 
that is denoted by a temporal adverbial with that of the main tense. Dowty’s (1982) later work 
suggests a semantic solution employing Kamp’s (1971) idea of doubling indexing for time. 
Kamp’s examples in (6), which were already introduced in Chapter 2 as a counterexample to 
tense operators, have N, as in (6d), which is roughly translated as relative to the time of utterance, 
or anchored to the time of utterance, which obtains the troubling reading of (6b), that a child’s 
becoming king takes place later than the time of utterance, hence lying outside the scope of past 
tense. As I made clear in Chapter 4, tenses are interpreted relative to some other times relevant in 
the context. Truth conditions for tense interpretation are not dependent on a single time interval, 
but truth or falsity of tensed sentences is relative to two time indices now, which include the time 
of utterance.  
 
(6) a. A child was born who would become king. 
b. A child was born who will become king. 
c. P[a child is born and F[it becomes king]] 
d. P[a child is born and NF[it becomes king]] 
 
 In Dowty (1982: 32), tense operators or predicates are interpreted in terms of a pair of 
time indices <i, j> where i refers to the reference time and j the speech time, similar to Reichen-
bach. But the way Dowty employs those indices is different from Reichenbach. Definitions of 
three tense predicates are shown in (7). Sentence  is true relative to <i, j> and for the past, for 
example, the reference time i precedes the speech time j, as you see in (7b).  
	
     (7)  a. PRES  i,j = 1 iff  i,j = 1 and i = j.   
 b. PAST  i,j = 1 iff  i,j =1 and i < j.   
 c. FUT  i,j = 1 iff  i,j = 1 and j < i.      
   
 Now the reference time is not dependent on the evaluation time but more to the context, 
and a similar effect is found in the interpretation of time adverbs. The denotation of yesterday is 
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presented in (8a), and John left yesterday is interpreted as in (8b) (Dowty 1982: 32, 36). t* indi-
cates the reference time. John’s leaving takes place at t* within the interval denoted by yesterday, 
which is prior to the speech time j, according to (7b) and (8a). The time adverb is interpreted in 
terms of the reference time and the speech time, not directly in relation to the tense. Time adver-
bials, especially locating adverbs, place the reference time i within a particular time interval they 
denote. This technique is intuitive and explanatory for solving the problems previously posed. 
 
     (8)  a. yesterday' i,j = (the set of all sets containing) an interval within the day preceding     
                                    the day containing j. 
     b. John left yesterday i,j = yesterday'(λt[t = t*  PAST[leave'(j)]])  
 
5.1.1.2 An analysis 
According to the definition I presented in Chapter 3, the past tense is defined only if it denotes 
some time prior to the time of utterance; and I have also posited that there may be several salient 
time intervals in the context. In Chapter 4, a common noun that denotes a time interval, like night, 
is defined as in (9); it denotes a time that is night. This rule worked for a sentence such as it was 
a strange night. However, it cannot account for sentences like (8b), in which yesterday modifies 
the entire action of John’s leaving, due to type mismatch. Thus, we first offer two separate en-
tries for time-denoting nouns that are adverbially and non-adverbially used: an example of time-
denoting nouns αi, whose value is g(i), is (9), and an adverbially used time-denoting noun is rep-
resented as αadv-i. The denotation of adverbially used time-denoting nouns is given in (10a) and 
its LF structure is represented in (10b). Such adverbials are of type i,t,t, a function from a sen-
tence of type i,t (whose temporal argument should be filled in) to another sentence. Now, (9) 
applies only to time-denoting nouns that are nominally used.      
 
     (9) nighti c,g,w = g(i), provided that g(i) is a night.          
 
     (10) a. For a time-denoting noun α adverbially used,  





             b.             TP 
                    TP              DP 
 
                                     αadv-i 
 
 Now we can tackle the sentence, John left yesterday. In accordance with (10a), the deno-
tation of yesterday is given as in (11). The definition of yesterday redundantly means that it de-
notes a time prior to the time of utterance. The inclusion relation, which works almost exactly 
like a temporal domain, between the time denoted by yesterday, the day immediately preceding 
the day which contains timec, and t' denoted by the tense of the sentence p, represents the core of 
the meaning of the temporal locating adverbial yesterday. The time denoted by yesterday is rela-
tively long, and thus it may serve as a temporal domain for the discourse in which it appears. The 
derivation of John PAST1 leave yesterday2 is provided in (12). “g(2)  g(1)” captures the meaning 
of yesterday, as the time denoted by the tense should be within the time denoted by yesterday. 
Sentences like *John left tomorrow are not allowed, because tomorrow denotes the day immedi-
ately following the day which contains the time of utterance, while the tense denotes some time 
prior to the time of utterance: the inclusion relation between the intervals is incongruous, as they 
do not even overlap.  
      
     (11) yesterdayi c,g,w = λpi,t. λti. [p(t)   g(i)  t in w], provided that g(i) is the day preceding 
   the day containing timec.  
 
     (12) John left1 yesterday2.  
  a. yesterday2 c,g,w( John PAST1 leave c,g,w) 
  b. John PAST1 leave c,g,w   
  c. = λti. John leave at t in w 
  d. yesterday2 c,g,w([λti. John leave at t in w 	
	 	e.	 	λpi,t. λti. [p(t)   g(2)  t]([λti. John leave at t in w 	
	 									 PAST1 c,g,w , provided that g(2) is the day preceding the day containing timec   
  f. = [λti. John leave at t in w  g(2)  t] PAST1 c,g,w , provided that g(2) is the day pre- 
         ceding the day containing timec  
  g. = John leaves at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w  g(2)  g(1), provided that g(2) is the day 
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           preceding the day containing timec 
  h. (Due to existential closure) (12) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [John leaves  
       at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w  g(2)  g(1)] = 1], provided that g(2) is the day prece- 
       ding the day containing timec (undefined if g(1) ≮ timec) 
 
 How about adverbials neutral to the time of utterance like this afternoon in (5) or at 4:30? 
For example, when you hear John arrived at 4:30, you place the time 4:30 prior to the time of 
utterance, and so on. Of course, pragmatic slack is assumed here: though John’s arrival may not 
occur precisely at 4:30, if it is close enough with pragmatically ignorable discrepancies in minute 
temporal detail, at 4:30 is qualified to make the sentence true. The denotation of at is given in 
(13), whose type is i,i,t,t. Like other temporal locating adverbials, the two time intervals of 
interest are in an inclusion relation.14 The LF structure of John arrived at 4:30 is presented in 
(14); (15) shows its semantic derivation. If there is an assignment function that maps the index 
on arrived to a time prior to timec, and this time and the time denoted by 4:30 overlap, the tem-
poral part of the conditions for the sentence to be true is met. 
 
     (13) at c,g,w = λti. λpi,t. λt'i. [p(t')   t  t' in w] 
 
     (14)                           TP 
              PP                         TP 
                          P'               DP                 T' 
                   P         DP       John       T             VP 
                             4:305                                 arrive 
 
     (15) At 4:305, John arrived7.  
             a. at 4:305 John PAST7 arrive c,g,w   
  b. = at c,g,w( 4:305 c,g,w)( John PAST7 arrive c,g,w) 
  c. John PAST7 arrive c,g,w 
  d. = λti. John arrive at t in w 
                                                            
14 Particularly for short intervals such as those denoted by arrived or 4:30, it would be more precise to state that the 




  e. at c,g,w( 4:305 c,g,w)([λti. John arrive at t in w]) 
  f. = λti. λpi,t. λt'i. [p(t')   t  t'](g(5))([λti. John arrive at t in w])( PAST7 c,g,w), provided 
         that g(5) is 4:30 
  g. = [[λti. John arrive at t in w]  g(5)  t]( PAST7 c,g,w), provided that g(5) is 4:30   
  h. = John arrives at g(7), if g(7)  timec in w  g(5)  g(7), provided that g(5) is 4:30 
  i. (Due to existential closure) (15a) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [John arrives  
     at g(7), if g(7)  timec in w  g(5)  g(7)] = 1], provided that g(5) is 4:30 
     (undefined if g(7) ≮ timec) 
  
 Since at 4:30 denotes a relatively short time, a temporal domain is formed around 4:30. 
Actually, 4:30 could denote several times: 4:30 p.m. or 4:30 a.m. on the same day John arrived, 
and possibly other 4:30 timeframes in the days prior to the time of utterance. However, due to 
the domain anchoring we discussed in Chapter 4, and repeated in (16), possible times that are 
qualified to be considered as a denotation of 4:30 in (15) are limited to one or two 4:30 
timeframes within the same day (containing the time at which John arrived—some time prior to 
the time of utterance).   
 
     (16) Domain anchoring:  
 TENSEi c,g,w  c, where c  I is a set of contextually relevant and limited time intervals. 
 
5.1.2 Types of Temporal Locating Adverbials and Ambiguity of Tense 
Altshuler (2014) gives a more nuanced view of different types of temporal locating adverbs with 
respect to [anaphoric] and [deictic]. The meaning of deictic adverbials like yesterday depends 
on context: the day denoted by yesterday changes according to the time of utterance and the day 
that contains it. The denotation of anaphoric adverbs is influenced by discourse-internal infor-
mation: the day after, that same day, and currently are anaphoric—whose meanings are depend-
ent on their previous utterances.  
 Another criterion Altshuler proposes is whether or not a temporal adverbial introduces a 
new time discourse referent (DREF), which serves as the reference time for the clause in which 
the adverbial occurs, following Partee (1984). The reference time, according to Altshuler (p. 7), 
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is “the time to where a story has thus far developed in the context of a narrative.” For example, 
Partee/Altshuler accounts for (17) as follows: gave Fido a bath introduces a new temporal DREF, 
the time “just after” the action of giving Fido a bath, and serves as the reference time for the ac-
tion of cleaning the house; cleaning the house introduces a new time DREF, which serves as the 
reference time for (17b), as the “life span” of the initial DREF “cuts off.” Interestingly, in their 
analysis, temporal locating adverbials also introduce a time DREF. In (18a), on May 12, 1984 
introduces a new time DREF, which is May 12, 1984, and it serves as the reference time for 
cleaning the house. Yesterday, in (18b), is different from (17b): the adverbial introduces a new 
time DREF, which is May 11, 1984, and it serves as the reference time, or the temporal location 
as Altshuler asserts, for the hiring action.     
  
     (17) a. Sue gave Fido a bath and cleaned our house.   (p. 60) 
             b. My wife hired her and gave her a check for one month in advance.   
 
     (18) a. On May 12, 1984, Sue cleaned our house.  (p. 62) 
             b. Yesterday, my wife hired her and gave her a check for one month in advance. 
 
 What poses a problem for Partee/Altshuler is the adverbial that same day in (19). 
Altshuler explains that the life span of the time DREF introduced by cleaned our house is cut off 
or may not be the reference time for the following action, that is, the new time DREF introduced 
by that same day, and this new DREF becomes the reference time of the hiring action. What ac-
tually happens in the progression of discourse, however, is that we may have a reading that the 
hiring action took place just after the house cleaning action, among other possibilities of how the 
events in (19) are ordered within the same day. In other words, in natural language the life span 
of the DREF introduced by cleaned our house is not cut off, and the DREF still works as the ref-
erence time for the hiring action, unlike the prediction of the analysis.     
 
     (19) a. On May 12, 1984, Sue cleaned our house.   




 To solve this problem, Altshuler proposed that that same day is twice anaphoric in the 
framework of Compositional Discourse Representation Theory: it retrieves two salient times 
which have already been introduced into the discourse, but does not introduce a new DREF. (19) 
has the syntactic structure found in (20) with Altshuler’s notations (p. 69). The indices t and e 
indicate time and eventuality, respectively; u3 is a DREF associated with Sue. PFV is a covert 
perfective operator required by the simple past in English, adopted from Smith (1991) and 
Kratzer (1998).  
 
     (20) a. [TP[AdvP on May 12, 1984t1][TP PST[AspP PFVe2,t2 [VP Sueu3 cleaned our house]]]]  
             b. [TP[AdvP that same dayt1,t2][TP PST[AspP PFV
e4,t4 [VP my wifeu5 hired heru3]]]] 
   
 (21a) gives the denotation of on May 12th 1984 and (21b) the denotation of the adverbial 
clause that same day with the indices, where i, j, k are variables over environments. On May 12th 
1984 introduces a new DREF t1 corresponding to a particular day, which places the time of the 
clause within t1; as for (21b), Altshuler explicates that that same day “checks in the input context 
whether there is a time antecedent t1 that has the property of being a day and takes place 
throughout a previously introduced time t2 within which the described event takes place.” ; in 
(21b) indicates sequencing of the two concatenated DRSs: K; K' means K and K' are sequenced 
DRSs if and only if K can bring information from an input environment i to an intermediary en-
vironment k, and K' can bring information from k to an output environment j.   
 
     (21) a. λQλiλj.k(i[t1]k  t1k = may.12.1984  Q(t1)kj) 
  b. λQ.[ | day{t1}, t2  t1]; Q(t2) 
 
 The reduced denotation of (20) is presented in (22). t1 is a time DREF introduced by on 
May 12th 1984, which is prior to the speech time; the house-cleaning event (e2) took place during 
t1. t2 is a time after the house-cleaning event, introduced by PFV in (20a), which becomes the 
reference time for the hiring event (e4  t2). One of the anaphoric DREFs of that same day is re-
solved to t1 and the other is resolved to t2. (21) and (22) preserve the reading that the hiring ac-




     (22) [t1, e2, t2, u3, e4, t4, u5 |  
  a. t1 = may.12.1984, t1 < t0, e2  t1, u3 = sue, clean.our.house{u3, e2}, e2 < t2 
  b. t2  t1, e4  t2, wife.of.speaker{u5}, hire{u5, u3, e4}, e4 < t4] 
 
 Despite the elegance of the analysis and the insight that the adverbial is twice anaphoric, 
the problem discussed above may also be solved in a less complicated manner if one recants the 
view that the length of time associated with that same day is not the reference time of the follow-
ing VP. As I have been proposing in this dissertation, the time interval denoted by the adverbial 
serves as a domain for tense interpretation so that tenses may be interpreted in a constrained 
manner, as in natural language use, and anaphoric relations between the tenses in a discourse 
pertain to the times denoted by tenses, not those denoted by temporal adverbials.  
 One of the techniques that may solve the problem posed by that same day is double in-
dexing. Among such analyses, Altshuler gives von Stechow’s (2002) version as an example: von 
Stechow adopts the indexical interpretation of tense and defines PASTj g,c as g(j) (it is defined 
only if g(j) precedes the speech time) and provides an intersective analysis, which yields a good 
result for (19a). This time, however, (23b) with the day before instead of that same day is trou-
bling because May 11th is “not previously established in the discourse,” as the past tense in (23b) 
is assigned its value from the context assignment function, as is the case with pronouns.   
 
     (23) a. On May 12, 1984, Sue cleaned our house.   
             b. The day before, my wife hired her. 
 
 Neither (19) nor (23) is a problem in my system. We maintain that temporal locating ad-
verbials provide a temporal domain for tenses in a discourse and that every tense is relatively in-
terpreted to another time. Times denoted by temporal locating adverbs serve as a limited domain 
for tense interpretation, not necessarily playing as an antecedent. A temporal locating adverbial 
puts the time denoted by the tense in the sentence in which it occurs within the interval denoted 
by the adverbial. Inclusion or intersection will account for several phenomena, like (19) and (23), 
of temporal locating adverbials. Altshuler does mention temporal location as he discusses how 
temporal anaphora progresses in a discourse like (19)—but the difference is that his temporal 
location is synonymous with the reference time based on the indexical tense interpretation, 
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whereas temporal locating adverbials concern temporal domains, and are not directly involved in 
temporal anaphora resolution.  
 Essentially, the problems caused by that same day and the day before in Partee/von 
Stechow’s analyses indeed stem from the proposal that tense is interpreted like pronouns. If your 
tense system has the quantificational or indefinite option, the day before as not previously estab-
lished is not a problem anymore, since hired in (23) denotes a time that is not contextually salient; 
thus its tense is assigned its value via g, whose temporal domain is fixed by the day before. The 
ambiguity of tense with quantificational and indexical interpretations of tense is a compelling 
advantage not only to temporal anaphora but also to temporal adverbials of different types. 
(19a) is interpreted as in (24). The denotation of on is given in (24), similar to that of at. 
on c,g,w takes a time as its argument and a sentence of type i,t; as part of its definition, on also  
regulates the relation between the time that its argument denotes and the time denoted by the 
tense of the sentence in which it occurs. We still lack a rule for a possessive DP such as our 
house in (24d), but for present purposes let us assume that our house denotes a particular object 
of type e, which is assigned by gc. The time denoted by the adverbial on May 12, 1984 is now a 
temporal domain (c) and added to the context. Also, the time that has been mentioned in the 
previous utterances not only serves as a temporal domain but also is added to cSAL as it becomes 
salient in the context. Let us say c0 in (25a) is the initial context for (19a), adding 0 to the set of 
indices. After (19a) is uttered, we have the accordingly updated context c1 as exemplified in 
(25b), which now provides the context for (19b). g(1), which is represented as t1, is now a con-
textually salient time interval and a member of cSAL1, as the time May 12, 1984 denotes.   
 
     (24) a. on c,g,w = λti. λpi,t. λt'i. [p(t')   t  t' in w] 
  b. on May 12, 19843 Sue PAST1 clean our house5 c,g,w   
  c. = on c,g,w( May 12, 19843 c,g,w)( Sue PAST1 clean our house5 c,g,w) 
  d. Sue PAST1 clean our house5 c,g,w 
  e. = λti. Sue clean gc(5) at t in w 
  f. on c,g,w( May 12, 19843 c,g,w)([λti. Sue clean gc(5) at t in w])  
  g. = λti. λpi,t. λt'i. [p(t')   t  t'](g(3))([λti. Sue clean gc(5) at t in w])( PAST1 c,g,w), pro- 
         vided that g(3) is May 12, 1984 
  h. = [[λti. Sue clean gc(5) at t in w]  g(3)  t]( PAST1 c,g,w), provided that g(3) is May 12,  
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  i. = Sue cleans gc(5) at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w  g(3)  g(1), provided that g(3) is May 
         12, 1984 
  j. = (Due to existential closure) (24b) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [Sue cleans  
         gc(5) at g(1), if g(1)  timec in w  g(3)  g(1)] = 1], provided that g(3) is May 12,  
        1984 (undefined if g(1) ≮ timec) 
 
     (25) a. c0 = <speakerc0, addresseec0, timec0, placec0, cSAL0 = {our house}, gc0 = <5, our house>,  
               c0> 
 b. c1 = <speakerc1, addresseec1, timec1, placec1, cSAL1 = {t1, Sue, May 12, 1984, our 
house}, gc1 = {<1, t1>, <5, our house>}, c1 = May 12, 1984> 
 
The more intriguing part of (19) is the second sentence (19b), which includes that same 
day. First, I would like to point out that that same day or that day as a whole function as a tem-
poral adverbial of type, i,t,t, but not day alone. This is the difference between day and yester-
day: yesterday is ambiguous because it is of type i in a sentence like it was yesterday and it is of 
the type i,t,t in a sentence like (12), which by itself modifies the entire sentence. Therefore, let 
us assume that day is of type i, whether it is used as a noun or as an adverb in phrases such as the 
day before/after and that day. Since day alone cannot be used adverbially, the type-shifting rule 
for time-denoting nouns is not eligible for day.   
The distinction Altshuler makes between deictic and anaphoric adverbials is that deictic 
ones like (11) denote times in relation to contextual elements such as the time of utterance (timec) 
while anaphoric ones are defined in relation to discoursal elements previously established: yes-
terday denotes a day prior to the day containing timec and that same day denotes the day of inter-
est that has been mentioned in previous utterances. The denotation of yesterday in (11) shows its 
dependence on the context as part of its definition along with the inclusive or intersective rela-
tion with the time denoted by the tense within the sentence containing yesterday, which correctly 
identifies the day before the day containing timec. Anaphoric adverbials necessarily make refer-
ence to elements that have already been introduced by previous sentences, and in this way are 
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made salient in the context. Thus, I suggest that anaphoric adverbials denote a particular time 
that is a member of cSAL, thereby matching the properties of the time they describe. 
 The anaphoric nature of that same day is due to that (which is intensified by same) rather 
than the lexical semantics of day by itself. The LF structure of that same day is shown in (26). 
That takes an expression denoting a time and connects it with another time in cSAL; and the result-
ing complex expression serves as a temporal adverbial—that is a type of i,i,t,t. Figuratively 
speaking, that functions like “pointing”: it particularly denotes a time that has become salient in 
the context. Among many possible days that day could denote, a particular day in cSAL is identi-
fied. Such property of the meaning of that in that (same) day is expressed as seen in (27a); that 
that, like a pointer, searches for a time in cSAL which corresponds to a day, its argument, and 
marks such a time interval as relevant. This process is executed by POINT, defined in (27b). If 
there is no time interval in cSAL that matches the property of the argument of POINT, this operator 
is not defined. I will define same as a function of type i,i, which maps a time onto the same 
time.  
 
     (26)	LF structure of that same day: 
                                        DP  i,t,t 
     i,i, t,t   D                 D'  i 
           that 
              i,i AP            N  i     
                                 dayi 
	 	 		 					same  
            
     (27) a. that c,g,w = λti. λpi,t. λt''i. [POINT(t, t')  p(t'')   t'  t'' in w] 
  b. POINT(t, t') iff t'  cSAL and t' matches the properties of t (undefined if no such t' is in 
       cSAL).   
  c. same c,g,w = λti. t 
 
We are now ready to present a compositional denotation of that same day. (28) shows the 
semantic composition of that same day. Refer to (25b) for the context for (28) and (29). (29) is 




     (28) a. same day1 c1,g,w = day1 c1,g,w  
  b. day1 c1,g,w = g(1), provided that g(1) is a day 
  c. that same day1 c1,g,w = that c1,g,w( same day1 c1,g,w)  
  d. = that c1,g,w(g(1)), provided that g(1) is a day 
  e. = λti. λpi,t. λt''i. [POINT(t, t')  p(t'')   t'  t'' in w](g(1)), provided that g(1) is a day 
  f. = λpi,t. λti. [POINT(g(1), g(3))  p(t)   g(3)  t in w], provided that g(1) is a day and  
        g(3) is May 12, 1984 
 
     (29) That same day1, my wife7 hired2 her8.  
  a. that same day1 my wife7 PAST2 hire her8 c1,g,w  
  b. = that same day1 c1g,w( my wife7 PAST2 hire her8 c1,g,w)  
   c. my wife7 PAST2 hire her8 c1,g,w  
  d. = λti. gc1(7) hire gc1(8) at t in w 
  e. (29a) = λpi,t. λti. [POINT(g(1), g(3))  p(t)  g(3)  t in w]([λt'i. gc1(7) hire gc1(8) at t'  
                  in w])( PAST2 c1,g,w), provided that g(1) is a day and g(3) is May 12, 1984 
  f. = [POINT(g(1), g(3))  [λti. gc1(7) hire gc1(8) at t in w]  g(3)  t in w]( PAST2 c1,g,w),  
         provided that g(1) is a day and g(3) is May 12, 1984 
  g. POINT(g(1), g(3))  gc1(7) hires gc1(8) at g(2), if g(2)  timec1 in w  g(3)  g(2) in w,  
      provided that g(1) is a day and g(3) is May 12, 1984 
  h. (Due to existential closure) (29a) is true in c relative to w iff g[gc  g  [POINT(g(1),  
      g(3))  gc1(7) hires gc1(8) at g(2), if g(2)  timec1 in w  g(3)  g(2) in w] = 1] iff g(3)  
       cSAL and g(3) matches the properties of g(1) (undefined if no such g(3) is in cSAL),  
      provided that g(1) is a day and g(3) is May 12, 1984 (undefined if g(2) ≮ timec1) 
 
In summary, times denoted by deictic adverbials like yesterday are added to cSAL in the 
context, are qualified to be a potential antecedent of anaphoric adverbials; and anaphoric ones 
such as that same day concern times that are already marked salient in the context via the opera-
tor POINT. Regardless of their types, temporal locating adverbials appeal to the context—and 




5.2 Immediately     
Look at the sentences in (30), which contain immediately. Possibly, (30a) is preceded by a sen-
tence like They heard a meow. In this case, it may be that the time at which they heard a meow 
and the time at which they noticed their cat from its particular meow almost completely coincide. 
In (30b), explosions occurring and people’s subsequent running do not exactly overlap, but there 
may be a very short interval in between, assuming that their nervous system processes the situa-
tion and in essence orders them to run. This time interval between these two actions would be the 
closest interval when we would normally say that an event immediately follows (symbolized as  
in Chapter 4) another in a discourse. Immediately in (30c) also connects an event not known in 
this example with John’s action of starting. This time, however, the gap between the two events 
that immediately connects might be several hours due to the inclusion of on that very day. Sup-
pose that John heard about “them” at around 10 a.m. that day. After he received a sanction from 
his boss and gathered a research team, he finally was able to study them at around 3 p.m. the 
same day. In such a scenario, the size of the gap in between that is placed by immediately is fixed 
accordingly to a given temporal domain. The gap becomes slightly larger in (30d): though the 
speaker went immediately, it must have taken nearly one day. In (30e), the time frame is possibly 
two weeks, or even a month. However, it does not seem to go beyond a few months, as seen in 
(30f). This is probably due to the lexical semantics of immediately—however slowly we take it, a 
year later is not “without any delay or lapse of time; instantly,” (which is the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition).  
 
     (30) a. Immediately, they noticed their cat.  
  b. When the explosions went off, people ran immediately towards the problem.  
  c. John immediately started to study them on that very day.  
  d. I heard what happened, and I immediately went to Boston the next day.  
  e. The new watches immediately became the talk of the nation. 
  f. ?The new watches immediately became the talk of the nation the next year.  
 
 Using Altshuler’s taxonomy, I suggest that immediately is an anaphoric temporal adver-
bial which makes reference to already existing times in the context. Immediately indicates that 
the interval between the events before and after it is quite short. But, unlike that day, it does not 
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refer to a previously mentioned time; rather, it denotes a time that follows its antecedent in such 
a way that the interval between the relevant events is considerably brief. Besides, as we have just 
seen in (30), the size of the interval changes flexibly in accordance with the size of the times in 
the context, and with common knowledge. 
 Immediately has a distinctive syntactic distribution from typical temporal locating adver-
bials such as yesterday. As seen in (30), it modifies not only sentences as a whole, but also VPs, 
as it signifies a temporal relationship among its many other lexical meanings. For the sake of 
simplicity, let us treat immediately as a sentential adverb, taking a sentence of type i,t as its ar-
gument, like yesterday: this would not cause much difference in terms of meaning, though im-
mediately will have a different type and syntactic structure when it modifies a VP. Plus, since it 
shows a temporal relationship with a time denoted by a previous tense morpheme, this type of 
immediately will be i,i,t,t. We begin with this rather rough denotation in (31). t is the most 
salient time in cSAL, probably because it has just been mentioned. t' denoted by the tense in the 
argument sentence immediately follows t in cSAL of the input context. 
 
     (31) immediately c,g,w = λti: t  cSAL. λpi,t. [p(t')   t  t' in w] 
 
 Now, the question is how we characterize  in terms of the length of the gap between t 
and t'. From (30), we summarize the temporal specifications that immediately brings, as present-
ed in (32). /  / indicates the length of the set of the intervals within /  /. When there is an overt 
temporal adverbial, as in (30c) and (30d), the length of the set of intervals between t and t' ap-
proximates to () the length of the temporal domain set by the adverbial. In cases like (30b), 
times denoted by tenses connected with when overlap as we had defined them in Chapter 4; im-
mediately confirms it. (30a) and (30e) fall into (32c): /(t, t')/ may differ, depending on the lexical 
aspect of the verbs and how long it takes for the events described by the verbs to be completed. 
In any case, the gist of the meaning of immediately following is summarized as in (32c), /(t, t')/  
small.  
 
     (32) Temporal specifications of t  t': 
  a. When there is an overt temporal adverbial: /(t, t')/  /δc/ 
  b. When it is adjacent to a when-clause: /(t, t')/   
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  c. When there is no overt temporal adverbial: /(t, t')/   or /(t, t')/  small 
 
 Immediately picks out the most salient time in the context and connects it with the time 
denoted by the tense in the sentence in which it occurs. It specifies relationships between these 
two times; the length of the gap between the two times changes according to the size of temporal 
domains, as fixed by overt temporal adverbials or when-clauses. (30e) presents a difficult case in 
which to pinpoint the value of /(t, t')/. More detail in the discourse will feed the context, which in 












Before I presented my analysis, I made clear that we need both definite and indefinite interpreta-
tions of tense. The tense system in this dissertation achieves that by employing two different 
types of assignment function, g and gc, as they fix the value of time variables of tense mor-
phemes. The tense system established in this dissertation sets a quantificational interpretation of 
tense as default, which is said to be an empirically accurate analysis, and also accounts for the 
indexical character of tense—tenses which denote contextually salient times and anaphoric tens-
es via gc which assigns a particular time in cSAL to time variables. We have seen that tense inter-
pretation is contextual not only in that matrix tenses are determined with respect to the time of 
utterance but also that sometimes tenses indexically denote salient times in the context.  
 It is possible that there is more than one salient time in the context that is involved in 
temporal relations, and therefore tense interpretation is not rigidly restrained by two or three time 
parameters. Keeping multiple time intervals available for temporal interpretation, we do not need 
to come up with a provisory time parameter as sentences become complex. Additionally, we do 
not risk overlooking an important time interval in context, for example, times denoted by tem-
poral adverbials. My analysis maintains a tense theory that is more intuitive and explanatory.  
 Temporal domains and domain anchoring explicitly show that quantification over times 
occurs in a limited temporal domain. We have seen that temporal domains are dynamically 
changed and updated as discourse proceeds, and how such changes influence tense interpretation. 
My analysis, which allows definite and indefinite interpretations of tense, is particularly advan-
tageous for temporal anaphora resolution, which draws similarities between tenses and nominals. 
 Temporal locating adverbials are mainly defined in terms of an inclusion relation be-
tween the time denoted by an adverbial and the time denoted by the tense of the sentence in 
which the adverbial occurs. Times denoted by temporal adverbials become a temporal domain 
for tense and a contextually salient time. If we have an anaphoric adverbial such as that same day 
in the sentence, one of the times in the context that fits the property of the time relevant to the 
adverbial serves as the antecedent of the anaphoric adverbial. That same day was also composi-
tionally analyzed in this dissertation according to its syntactic composition. Immediately, intri-
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guingly, places the time denoted by the tense in the sentence in which it occurs in accordance 
with the interval between the times of the tenses it connects, and in the process immediately 
shows sensitivity to the length of temporal domains.     
 One of the challenges in this dissertation concerns how we constrain the context. How 
many salient time intervals can cSAL contain? How long do they stay in cSAL? We have posited that 
there is a hierarchy among the objects in cSAL, but it is not explicitly stated how it is determined 
and how the most salient object is selected, other than being just introduced in a discourse. We 
have seen that our expectations and common sense about normal durations of events do play a 
role in the interpretation; how they are implemented in the context, however, must be left vague 
at this point.      
 This would be one of the remaining issues for future research. Also, this dissertation 
mostly deals with the simple past; obviously, the next step is to examine how the tense system 
advocated in this dissertation accounts for other tenses and aspects in their various combinations, 
particularly with subordination. Domain anchoring could play an interesting role in the interpre-
tation of embedded tenses. This analysis may also be extended to some other languages, particu-
larly Korean, whose tense marker brings much controversy in its nature and aspectual scope. 
Another question concerns habitual use of past tense. Accounting for sentences such as They had 
a meeting every Friday would be the next project. Also, discussion in this dissertation was lim-
ited to a small, narrow chunk of discourse, but temporal relationships in a more complex dis-
course deserve in-depth exploration.      
 These remarks conclude the dissertation, which began with the question of how language 
encodes time. Hopefully it is now clear that tense is relational and contextual. The context has 
salient times other than solely the time of utterance, and these elements specify and influence 
temporal relations. Such elements also include language users’ knowledge about actions bound 
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